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Abstract 
Drug-related violence in Mexico has grown into a profound social problem, aggravating existing 
insecurity, vulnerability, and citizen’s wellbeing. In critical scenarios of this kind, the virtues of 
social engagement for enhanced wellbeing, improved security and true democracy appear futile. 
This research examines how resources and incentives for mobilization operate. Specifically, 
social capital and political culture are studied as mechanisms that may affect those relationships. 
This research draws upon theories of Collective Action and Social Capital Theory. Also used are 
studies on the influence of emotions and perceptions on citizen’s collective mobilization. This 
approach contributes by accounting for informal participation and their various political loadings 
in conflict environments. To achieve the objective, Regression Analysis and Structural Equation 
Modelling were conducted. The study uses secondary data collected in 2011 (N = 7,416) using a 
probabilistic sample design representative of seven Mexican states selected by their levels of 
violence. Two subsamples were constructed to examine the varying effects of social and political 
resources on mobilization across regions (north and south). Results show the emotional 
component associated with citizen’s mobilization for collective action. The findings also exhibit 
social capital and political culture as key indicators of people’s decision to organize for social 
 change. Finally, intriguing results related to the “negative form” of social capital were observed. 
To be precise, social capital appears to be insufficient to explain citizens' motives to mobilize 
with others for social change. Implications for policy and scholarship are presented. Specifically, 
initiatives regarding the importance of the effects of the weakened democratic environment, 
social lack of trust, government unresponsiveness and impunity, and self-directed processes of 
justice at the community level are highlighted. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1 Problem statement  
This research investigates individual and collective responses to crime violence in contexts of 
enduring conflict. The study will specifically examine the mobilization of Mexican citizens 
living in an environment of prevailing crime violence, instability, inequality, and governmental 
unresponsiveness. Four conditions of this setting will serve as a base for the study: i) an ongoing 
circle of vulnerability due to structural socio-economic violence, ii) a strong and widespread 
presence of organized crime, iii) political strain due to polarization in the relationships between 
citizens and government, and iv) a deteriorated quality of life. 
Prevailing crime violence related to socio-political crisis and the deterioration of 
democracy and wellbeing has been largely studied across various disciplines (Adams, 2013; 
Banfield, 2014; Buxton & Eade, 2016; Little, 2014; Murshed, 2014). However, critical questions 
about the interplay of these factors and the spread of collective mobilization in unique conflict 
scenarios remain largely unexplored. Such an approach will be a fruitful source of knowledge to 
better comprehend the current conflict resolution strategies that aim to increase security and 
wellbeing for the construction of sustainable peaceful environments. 
1.2 Significance of the study 
The significance of this study lies in its emphasis on examining citizens’ collective mobilization 
in the face of ongoing crime violence and weakened institutional capacity. The research will 
explore the effects of criminal violence that is hindering mobilization. Additionally, the study 
will show the occurrence of collective mobilization for social change and its relationship to 
social capital, political culture, and context-related factors. Finally, it will examine social 
engagement across different localities to discuss the existing and potential, formal and 
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spontaneous forms of collective organization.  
In recent decades, global achievement of welfare for all have been critically challenged 
by increased poverty, exclusion, corruption, and violence (Kawachi, Takao, & Subramanian, 
2013; Lora, 2013; Stiglitz, Sen, & Fitoussi, 2009). Prevailing vulnerability and instability 
aggravate the extended presence and impact of organized crime violence, further deteriorating 
social welfare. Inequality has risen at different paces the past twenty years, almost everywhere in 
the world 1. The main sources of inequality stem from criminal violence, income inequality and 
income share, government regulations, educational inequalities, gender disparity and wage 
setting policies, among others (Alvaredo, Chancel, Piketty, Saez, & Zucman, 2018). The impact 
of prevalent conflict and extensive crime violence on individual living conditions are of primary 
concern as they compromise the future development of many generations. 
The idea of enhanced wellbeing appears futile within contexts of enduring conflict, 
(Cohen-Chen, van Zomeren, & Halperin, 2015; Little, 2014) and building sustainable peace in 
torn societies remains a dilemma (Lederach, 1997). Societies in permanent conflict face 
everyday violence, social unrest, disruption and political confrontation affecting all aspects of 
their daily lives; unresolved disputes continue to define social relations, producing enduring 
                                                           
1
 2013 figures estimate that there are 767 million people living below the international poverty line (US$ 
1.90 per person per day); this equals to 10.7 percent of the global population. Children are more 
vulnerable; half of those under 18 years old are amongst the global poor. While poverty rates have 
declined, it has so unevenly across regions: East Asia and the Pacific report more poverty reduction in the 
past years, while in Sub-Saharan Africa, half of the people still live in extreme poverty. Most of the 
global poor that live in rural areas have received deficient education and are employed in the agricultural 
sector (World Bank Group, 2016). Access to school has improved worldwide in the past 15 years; 
however, there is still a literacy crisis because of the slow start in learning and low performance scores. In 
2016, 10 percent of children living in the low and lower middle-income countries were reported to remain 
out of school mostly because of poverty, violence, gender inequality, disability, caste systems and 
ethnicity; children living in conflict-affected countries being the most deeply affected. (World Bank 
Group, 2017). 
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societies (Little, 2014). In addition, the possibility of isolated political agreements for substantive 
change is extremely fragile; if achieved, the underlying conflict remains 
This research has been performed in an environment with high levels of violence, weak 
government responsiveness and compromised democratic practices; in such an environment, 
people might refrain from participating and cooperating. Consequently, the investigation will 
explore the patterns and obstacles of collective mobilization as well as the apparent absence of 
citizen participation in societies facing violent conflict (Cohen-Chen et al., 2015; Edwards, 
2014). 
Both the viability and effectiveness of individual and collective engagement in contexts 
of enduring conflict remain unclear. Contemporary conflict studies focus on examining the forms 
and incidence of violence and conflict dynamics (Coleman, Vallacher, Nowak, & Bui-
Wrzosinska, 2007; Darby, 2012; Krause, 2012) with little attention to the extensive effect they 
have on citizens lives. Yet, citizens’ involvement in advancing democratic change and their 
practices for survival and self-protection are persistent (Cammett & Malesky, 2012; David A. 
Shrik, Wood, & Olson, 2014). Self-directed forms of participation can be a critical resource for 
the fight against violence and vulnerability while they also fuel social engagement and restore 
relationships between government and society (Campbell, 2014; Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2015; 
Graeff & Svendsen, 2012, 2013). 
Most studies on social organization have focused on form and structure (for example: 
research pertaining to social movements, organization memberships or political affiliations) 
(Oliver, 1993; Putnam, 1993; Tarrow, 2015; Warren, 2001). However, little has been said about 
the positive impact of informal and spontaneous forms of organization, such as neighborhood 
gatherings or group discussions on social change and security (Ratner, Meinzen-Dick, May, & 
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Haglund, 2013; Stockemer, 2013). By investigating levels of individual engagement in 
mobilization activities, this study contributes to a more complete account of the forms of 
organization and their various political loadings. 
The intensity of organized crime violence as a feature of the environment in which 
mobilization occurs is of central interest to this investigation. Research on crime and drug-related 
violence that characterize long-lasting conflicts is quite recent and scarce (Abello-Colak & 
Guarneros-Meza, 2014; Cockayne & Lupel, 2009). The dominance of organized crime and the 
spread of crime violence have detrimental effects in an already damaged relationship between 
citizens and their governments in these environments. This situation needs to be revisited. As 
new actors take the stage within violent environments, the state’s monopoly of violence 
continues to transform itself. A follow up of the participating actors would surely lead to better 
understanding of the citizens’ engagement with criminal groups: What works for them? How do 
they mediate conflicts that continue to change? How and why do they play a part towards 
covering functions usually pertaining to the state? Why do they sometimes serve as stabilizing 
factors within these environments? (Peace Focus, 2013; World Bank Group, 2011). 
This research will highlight the ways in which self-directed citizens’ responses relate to 
the functioning of the institutional structure, consequently affecting social cohesion, crime 
contention policies and social welfare. The findings will help us comprehend resource use and 
strategy development for improved living conditions in contexts of persisting violence (Edwards, 
2014; Heffron, 2000; Sabet, 2013), an urgent matter with critical implications for social welfare, 
social policy, conflict management and policy intervention research. 
This investigation also builds upon the principle that cross-area study will better capture 
the complexity of contexts of persisting violence. The national violence level can no longer be 
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the sole unit of measurement for the analysis of conflict and violence (Paffenholz, 2014; Straus, 
2012). For that matter, micro and meso levels have proved to be as relevant as macro realms 
(Nepstad, 2013; Straus, 2012). Guided by this perspective, the hypothesized relationships of this 
research will account for peoples’ places of residence (Trejo & Ley, 2015). Specifically, the 
observed differences across regions will show citizens’ positive use of certain type of resources 
to develop mobilization strategies to improve their wellbeing. Also, a study of the national 
conflict dynamics from within will put forward this research along with the most novel 
approaches in conflict studies (Cohen-Chen et al., 2015; Krause, 2012; Little, 2014; Paffenholz, 
2014).  
1.3 Background to the study  
In recent decades, fewer civil and interstate wars have occurred around the world; nevertheless, 
an increased number of conflict related deaths, notably due to criminal and urban violence 
(Paffenholz, 2014; Peace Focus, 2013). In Latin America, the second most violent region in the 
world (Schedler, 2013; Shirk & Wallman, 2015; United Nations Development Programme 
[UNDP], 2013), crime and violence have escalated to worrisome levels. The homicide rate in 
Latin America doubles the worldwide average, accounting for 42% of the murders committed 
around the world; around 140,000 homicides per year (United Nations Development Programme 
[UNDP], 2013).  
Violence in Latin America is associated with the state of development and that of 
democratization (Shirk & Wallman, 2015). This has led to high numbers of human losses, 
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economic2 and political consequences3 (Carrion M., 2005). Further consequences such as higher 
levels of isolation, despair, distress, civic and social disengagement as well as the militarization 
of the public space, disrupt the lives of entire populations (Dávila-Cervantes & Prado-Montaño, 
2014; Díaz & Meller, 2012; Salama, 2013).  
The levels and features of violence in the Latin American region should be studied 
through their specific historical and social process, specifically concentrating on the events that 
occurred during the 1970’s and 1980’s. Existing social conflicts and structural factors 
(inequality, lack of governance, and corruption) meant that the region was an example of the 
atrocious relationship between structural violence and catastrophic policy approaches (Carrion 
M., 2005; Moncada, 2013; Salama, 2013; United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 
2013). A wide variety of crimes are reported in Latin America, they include, but are not limited 
to, ethnic and racial intolerance, political repression, drug trafficking, child abuse, gender 
violence, domestic violence, as well as kidnapping, death threats and disappearances perpetrated 
by police squads or paramilitary groups (Diprose, 2008) . 
As is the case in many parts of Latin America, Mexico’s formal democratization has not 
translated into an improved quality of life, nor has it resulted in increased safety for citizens. 
Consequently, increased insecurity, general dissatisfaction with the government and the police 
intensified, basic human rights became less important and the weakened rule of law. El Salvador, 
Honduras, and Guatemala portray some of the most dramatic cases (Schedler, 2013) amidst a 
                                                           
2
 If understood as business organization, drug cartels produce, transport and distribute drugs with the 
alliance of other criminal and state institutions. It has been estimated that drug dealing in Mexico has had 
a negative economic impact of about 4.3 billion dollars in 2006. Some economic gains, which remain 
unaccounted for, come from extortion, robbery, investment in technology and bodyguards that reinforce 
private security, bribery and rescue payments, among others (Robles 2013).  
3
 Mexico’s poverty has remained the same in the past decade; numbers remain at 52.3 percent since 1994 
(Corona Juárez, 2014). 
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climate of extensive crime and violence, profound levels of poverty and inequality, which 
defines a situation similar to that in México (Azaola, 2012).  
1.3.1 Mexico´s levels of violence and the War on Drugs 
Along with Colombia and Honduras, Mexico’s context of drug-related violence illustrates well 
the aforementioned complexity and the profound consequences of drug-related violence 
(Campbell & Hansen, 2014). The magnitude and consequences of violence in Mexico is 
endogenous as a result of an interplay between external factors, internal dynamics and complex 
interactions between different actors.” (Osorio, 2013b, p. 6) 
Violence in Mexico is predominantly of the modern, organized kind. It has expanded 
since the late 1980s by means of corporative logic, investment in advanced technology, the 
emergence of new actors such as sicarios –assassins for the cartels–, pandilleros –gang 
members–, and halcones – which are street-level informants– as well as transnational crime 
networks and infiltration of the social system (Carrion M., 2005)4. Their criminal activities have 
diversified; apart from drug trafficking, narcos have integrated crimes of extortion, kidnapping, 
human trafficking, gang violence and forced disappearance (Calderón, Robles, Diaz-Cayeros, & 
Magaloni, 2015; Pereyra, 2012). Another characteristic of the violence in the region, and 
particularly of Mexico, is that most homicides are targeted executions, (Rios, 2013) greed and 
retaliation against authorities or rivals (Duran-Martinez, 2015; Osorio, 2013b) and extrajudicial 
killings (Human Rights Watch, 2011). 
Historically, Mexican Authorities have confronted drug trafficking in Mexico via the 
                                                           
4
 Drug cartels have developed from drug trafficking organizations to transnational criminal entities, 
mainly influenced by intentional and unintentional governmental policies, changes in illicit market logic, 
cartel mergers, and other innovations (Bunker, 2013). In Mexico, cartels have transformed from located 
drug trafficking families into regional drug cartels and global criminal organizations. 
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armed forces who operate through crop eradication, drug seizures and other tactics. By the end of 
2006, the federal government launched the so-called “War on Drugs, an unprecedented frontal 
fight against criminal organizations (Corona Juárez, 2014),” (WoD). The lack of the state’s 
action towards security and the absence of a public safety plan has resulted in indiscriminate 
violence of critical consequences to the population (Duran-Martinez, 2015; Herrera-Lasso, 
2013).  
Between 2007 and 2010, Mexico accounted for the fastest growth rate for intentional 
registered homicides. As per 2016, the homicide rate had risen to 18%. Due to this increase, 
Mexico has occupied a place in the bottom quartile of the Global Peace Index since 2017, 
ranking at the lowest position in the region. Other spheres affected as consequence of the 
conflicted environment are freedom of information, government efficiency, corruption, and 
perceived state corruption (Killelea, 2014). Since the introduction of the militarized public 
security policy and its death toll5, the country has been immersed in a new civil war type of 
conflict for a decade (Barra & Joloy, 2011; Osorio, 2011; Schedler, 2013) representing a living 
example of crimes against humanity (Open Society Foundations, 2016). 
Violence and the absent rule of law have become Mexico’s greatest threat. Since 2006, 
the WoD has resulted in the loss of hundreds of thousands of human lives along with the people 
who have disappeared. The WoD has also risen the internal displacement rate, worsened the 
political strain and lost the trust of the public (see Figure 1). Officially, 90,246 intentional armed 
homicides have been reported between 2001 and 2014 resulting in a 185% increase (“How much 
                                                           
5
 The casualty rate is now around 40 times higher than the established standard threshold used to observe 
the onset of civil wars, meaning that the death rate of this level of criminal violence is comparable to the 
onset of 50 civil wars, over the span of just six years. It has taken four times the lives people that died in 
the Median Civil War (Osorio, 2011; 2012), 
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do 90,246 dead weigh?”, 2014). According to other reports, the overall homicide rate grew by 
over 260% from 2007 to 2010 (Human Rights Watch, 2011) and drug-related homicides 
increased by 600% in the same period (from 2,766 in 2007 up to 16,603 in 2011) (Schedler, 
2013, 2015). Over 5,000 people have disappeared6 and around 230,000 people have been 
displaced7 (Ley, 2015). The states with the highest level of intentional homicides are Guerrero, 
Sinaloa, Chihuahua, which are closely followed by Morelos, Michoacán, Baja California, Sonora 
and Tamaulipas (Calderón et al., 2015; “How much do 90,246 dead weigh?”, 2014)8. These 
states are the frontline in the fight for local and regional supremacy, and well as the scene of 
disputed areas between cartels (Campbell & Hansen, 2014). The five most violent cities in the 
continent are all in México: Ciudad Juárez, Acapulco, Torreón, Chihuahua and Durango9 (Open 
Society Foundations, 2016; Salama, 2013).  
 
                                                           
6
 Grave cases such as Ayotzinapa in 2014 have led to international involvement towards justice. One 
example of this is how national and international pressure created the specialized independent group 
GIEI, (Spanish acronym), which focused on forced disappearance and produced a series of 
recommendations for the government to solve cases (see GIEI). 
7
 Forced displacement is both a reactive and a preventive action. Those leaving their homes due to crime, 
violence or fear, are responding to a generalized environment of insecurity and impunity (CMDPDH). 
8
 During a month of Zedillo’s presidency, the average of serious crimes (homicide, extortion kidnapping 
and armed robbery) totaled 6,308 (1996-2000). The number increased to 7,629 during the Fox 
administration (2000-2006) and to 13,331 under the government of Calderon (2006-2012), which equals 
to a 75% percent increase compared to the last six years. The unofficial reported numbers of serious 
crimes between 1997 and 2011 added up to 13 million. Most victims were male (9 out of 10), a third of 
which were married “meaning that in just two decades almost 90,000 women became widows; 180,000 
children lost their fathers” (Villagran, 2013, p. 125) due to crime violence. 
9
 About forty percent of all drug-related homicides between 2007 and 2011 occurred in ten municipalities, 
Ciudad Juarez being the first, followed by Culiacan, Tijuana, Chihuahua, Acapulco, Gómez Palacio, 
Torreon, Mazatlán, Nogales, and Durango (Benítez Manaut, 2013). Attacks are more likely to happen in 
localities with: a) greater rivalry and violence between cartels for control over drug transfer b) greater 
fiscal autonomy and independent resources; and c) local opposition governments in states governed by the 
left where, federal authorities have left local authorities to fend for themselves in the fight towards 
organized crime for electoral reasons. (Trejo & Ley, 2015). 
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Figure 1. Annual data on homicides in Mexico  
Source: Open Society Foundations. (2016). Undeniable Atrocities. Confronting crimes against humanity 
in Mexico. New York, pp.36. 
 
This “cartel-state conflict” (Lessing, 2015, p. 1496), is a war of ever-changing opponents, 
tactics, and rules as cartels use coercive force to make policy changes to constrain institutional 
actors or limit forms of institutional reinforcement (Lessing, 2015). It has become a war of 
material gain where criminal violence and violence against the population has intertwined with 
corruption between state and enterprises. Local landlords, who take the role of government 
officials are in charge of law reinforcement. All the while, governmental spheres –involving the 
military and the political system- are infiltrated and controlled by organized criminals that access 
power at a municipal and state level10. Territories, resources and people are being controlled by 
                                                           
10
 Electoral cycles are frequently used by criminal groups to attempt against authorities and demonstrate 
what consequences await if authorities refuse to protect them or if they make an alliance with rival 
criminal groups. Violence and coercion are used against candidates and political activists, while citizens 
are threatened to vote for a specific party. Furthermore, elected authorities are usually forced to deliver a 
timely part of the municipal budget as well as their obedience. Organized crime also targets municipal 
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the drug market (Osorio, 2013b; Pereyra, 2012). However, there are some less affected areas 
where harmony and determination seem to nourish social strength, resistance and social change. 
(Pereyra, 2012; Schedler, 2013).  
 
Figure 2. Reported Annual kidnappings (SNSP investigation added to RENPED) 
Source: Open Society Foundations. (2016). Undeniable Atrocities. Confronting crimes against humanity 
in Mexico. New York, pp.36. 
(SNSP: National Public Security System Sectretariat (Secretariado Ejecutivo del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad 
Pública) RENPED: National Registry of Information of Missing or Disappeared Persons (Registro Nacional de 
Datos de Personas Extraviadas o Desaparecidas) 
 
General concern over human right abuses has increased. In the past 10 years countless 
cases of torture, physical abuse, obstruction of justice, verbal or mental abuse, excessive or 
arbitrary use of force or public office, and illegal detention against civilians have been identified 
(Daly, Heinle, & Shirk, 2012; Human Rights Watch, 2011). Such tactics aim to extract 
                                                           
officials with positions in the areas of finance, security, transportation and trade regulation (Trejo & Ley, 
2015). 
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information about organized crime or elicit forced confessions that would later be used to 
conceal the abuse (Human Rights Watch, 2011). Most human right violations by security forces 
are never duly investigated and few drug-related homicides are actually prosecuted, which adds 
to the atmosphere of impunity, widespread abuse, and corruption (Human Rights Watch, 2011). 
Corruption, specifically that of the Mexican police, is viewed as a defining factor of the 
safety crisis, affecting the level of public dissatisfaction more than the violence itself (Sabet, 
2014)11. Lack of confidence adds to fear that local authorities and justice departments may be 
infiltrated by organized crime and perceived corruption, which has led to alienated citizens and 
crime underreporting (Open Society Foundations, 2016). In Mexico, citizens are more likely to 
be to bribe the police, affecting the numbers of reported crime12. This situation feeds the vicious 
cycle of impunity and insecurity by protecting crime perpetrators and fostering criminal violence 
(Human Rights Watch, 2011; Sabet, 2014; Villagran, 2013).  
The core of Mexican violence and criminal drug activities, lies in its structural motives 
and existing insecurity (Herrera-Lasso, 2013; Osorio, 2013a) which has been made worse in a 
climate of a political and economical crisis. The issue has facilitated the spread of drug crime 
across the country (Corona Juárez, 2014). The conflict in Mexico has evolved from being a 
struggle between organized crime and security forces to become an issue of national security. A 
situation of criminal and state violence, gang proliferation, a lack of education and of job 
opportunities have resulted in an immense number of victims. (Barra & Joloy, 2011; Montero, 
2012; Salama, 2013). 
                                                           
11
 Currently, Mexico stands as the most corrupt country among the OECD members (International Crisis 
Group, 2017). 
12
 Recent reports indicate about 78% of crimes unreported; this “black number” (cifra negra) represents 
the body of crimes not registered by the authority (Villagran, 2013). 
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The absence of policy 
After more than a decade of the increasing drug-related conflict, the country lacks a clear 
policy towards dealing with the consequences of drug crime and the control of drug cartels. 
Public security issues remain critical. Since 2006, public security has been managed through law 
enforcement, the hunting down of drug-cartel leaders, and military operations, solutions that lack 
of concern over justice, the corruption of the police, and gang proliferation13. The situation 
remains unchanged. Consequently, affected individuals and communities have developed 
strategies to improve their living conditions (Heinle, Molzah, & Shirk, 2015; Mendoza Zárate SJ 
& González Candia SJ, 2016; Schedler, 2015). 
The effect of violence expands beyond the number of deaths. A central concern for 
victims’ organizations in the recent years has been the issue of double victimization (doble 
victimización); which means family and victims are targets of stigmatization and poor treatment 
(Villagran, 2013). The media tends to glorify drug crime, disseminate propaganda and reveal 
information that compromises crime-operations, finally hurting victims and their families all 
over again. While public space appears to have been taken over by criminals, the socially 
distressed have responded by pushing for self-defense groups, vigilantism, and lynching, 
therefore introducing a new critical dimension to the public security debate (Grayson, 2011; 
Olson, Shirk, & Wood, 2014). By taking the law into their own hands without directly 
challenging cartels and gangs, citizens have begun to act in their own neighborhoods against 
feelings of abandonment and threat, administering their own type of punishment in the name of 
                                                           
13
 At the time this work was written the law of internal security was being debated and approved, with 
academics and organized society showing great concern. Other reforms, such as a constitutional human 
rights reform and the military code of justice reform- were previous developments that shed light to 
human right protection exposing the abuses of the military and federal police.  
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the community (Grayson, 2011).  
Overall, the case of Mexico illustrates a conflict in which crime and violence have 
penetrated institutions at many levels. The conflict has inhibited and undermined the capacity of 
the state, enabled widespread corruption and caused major deficits to state formation (Morris, 
2013; Olson et al., 2014) as criminal groups seize control over vulnerable territories that are 
valuable for drug trafficking (Corona Juárez, 2014; Osorio, 2013b). In addition, the incapacity of 
the state to prevent systematic violence has turned into a ‘two-sided failure’, as it is incapable of 
protecting the victims and is unwilling to do so (Schedler, 2014). The Mexican struggle to fight 
crime and drug-violence is not just about confrontation between the government and cartels, it is 
also a drug-related conflict between and within cartels, and of the government against the civil 
society (Campbell & Hansen, 2014).  
1.4 Theoretical focus 
This research will draw upon Social Capital Theory and Collective Action theories that 
examine the circumstances under which individuals mobilize to promote social change when 
living in contexts of enduring conflict. Additionally, in order to explore the hypothesized 
influence of the environment, the study will examine the political resources and motivations for 
mobilization as well as the individual experiences and emotions resulting from the living 
environment.   
The set of resources individuals used to relate and build social relationships, the 
associations and the resulting social agreements is informed by Social Capital Theory (Bourdieu, 
1986; Coleman, 1988). It is believed that the realization of social capital will result in positive 
solutions to social problems, consequently promoting the generation of strong communities 
(Field, 2003; Portes, 1998; Svendsen & Svendsen, 2009). However, the degradation of social 
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living conditions related to distorted social bonds leading, in turn, to the degradation of social 
cohesion has also been observed (Portes, 2000; Wacquant, 1998). This research will be based on 
a broad perspective of social capital and will include context-associated factors that individuals 
use as resources to build strategies and alliances to improve living conditions (Niño Pérez & 
Devia Garzón, 2015). 
Collective Action theories will also be used to account for mobilization of individuals for 
social change. This school of thought studies activities pursued by a group for social and political 
purposes (Ethridge, 1987; McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2004; Olson et al., 2014). The study of 
collective action requires observing a variety of individual and group identities, aims, roles, 
experiences, and values. Because of this, mobilizing with others is well related to the various 
contexts in which individuals live, as well as to various political motivations and opportunities 
for people to assembly and organize together (Edmonson, 2013). Consequently, the participation 
of civil society, as well as contention and struggle, are key factors that constitute collective 
action (Tarrow, 2015). Hence, Collective Action theories are suitable to study contexts of 
violence and the forms in which it restrains and stresses social movements. 
1.5 Research questions and specific aims 
The purpose of this investigation is to study the resources used for collective mobilization by 
Mexican citizens living in context of enduring conflict. With that in mind, the specific aims 
defined for the research are:  
A1. To evaluate forms in which the impact of crime violence on individuals living in 
enduring conflicts lead them to assemble and mobilize with others seeking social 
change.  
A2. To assess the influence of a) social capital and b) political culture components (such 
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as levels of trust, social cohesion, and political awareness, among others) on 
people’s mobilization for collective action.  
A3. To examine the extent to which i) emotions and ii) experiences resulting from the 
context influence the ways in which people mobilize for collective action 
A4. To understand the relevance of a) social capital and b) political culture as 
mechanisms for mobilization in contexts of enduring conflict where emotions and 
exposure to violence accumulate.  
Accordingly, the investigation is guided by five research questions and their corresponding 
hypotheses as follows:  
Q1. Are the individual characteristics associated with of a) social capital and b) political 
culture related to collective mobilization of citizens living in contexts of enduring 
conflict? 
H1.1.   Individual characteristics (namely age, gender, education, and employment) 
will be associated with people’s levels of trust, social cohesion and 
commitment with the community (realized Social Capital) and by their 
awareness, political knowledge and information levels (acquired Political 
Culture). 
H1.2.   The examined demographic variables will not be relevant by themselves as 
such, but they will be in relation to the context and other complex 
socioeconomic and political dynamics related to the living conditions.  
Q2. Do the observed relationships have varying effects across locations? 
H2.1.   Variations of relationships that are observed across the territory are 
expected. A comparison of two groups of selected states will show the way 
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in which individuals use their social and political resources with the purpose 
of mobilization varies across locations with similar levels of violence but 
with socio-economic and historical differences (north and south regions).  
H2.2.   An extension of the regional differences will be observed within specific 
resources (Social Capital and Political Culture) used in each region, which 
will, in turn, result in different levels of collective mobilization. 
Q3. To what extent do levels of social capital influence mobilization for collective 
action of citizens living in contexts of enduring conflict? 
H3.1.   Social capital factors (trust, social cohesion and willingness to help the 
community) will influence people´s mobilization for collective action 
positively.  
H3.2.   Social Capital is a protective factor in contexts ridden with conflict and 
crime; higher levels of Social Capital will lead people to mobilize with 
others with the purpose of social change.   
Q4. How important is political culture for collective mobilization within these contexts? 
H4.1.   Because of Political Culture features, even in conflict environments, the 
more informed and aware citizens are about the political and institutional 
environment, the more inclined will they be towards mobilizing for social 
change. 
H4.2   In contexts of enduring conflict, political knowledge and awareness have a 
specifically strong role in the initiation of citizens’ mobilization. 
H4.3   Additionally, the importance of Social Capital becomes stronger if citizens 
are encouraged to politicize.  
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Q5. How much do i) emotions and ii) experiences influence contexts for the 
mobilization for collective action?  
H5.1.   This research will show that the forms of collective mobilization (such as 
marching, petition signing and sit-in protests among others) will be 
variously affected by emotion levels (specifically fear) and the (direct or 
indirect) exposure to violence.  
Q6. Is the relationship between i) emotions and ii) experiences with iii) collective 
mobilization mediated by a) social capital and b) political culture? 
H6.1.   In the context of the WoD, i) relational resources (trust, community 
networks, and social cohesion) and ii) political resources (information and 
knowledge about the political environment) significantly influence the effect 
of fear and experiences of violence in collective mobilization. 
H6.2.   Social Capital and Political Culture are mediating constructs that help 
transform the effect of the adversity faced by citizens in crime and conflict 
environments into mobilizing actions for social change. 
H6.3.   The mediating character of Social Capital and Political Culture will show 
the differentiated role of individuals and collectivities depending on the 
context they live in, which in turn influences collective mobilizations 
differently.  
H6.4.   Given the mediation of Political Culture, the influence of context-associated 
emotions and experiences on political action will be further supported. 
Specifically, fear of crime and experiences to violence strongly influence 
collective mobilization.  
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To answer the research questions, the subsequent chapters are organized as follows. 
Chapter 2 presents and discusses the theoretical framework used for the research, namely: a) 
Social Capital, b) Collective Action theories, and c) Approaches to Emotions and Political 
Culture. The applicable existing literature on the use of social and political resources for 
collective mobilization in contexts of conflict, and specifically in Mexico, is also presented in 
Chapter 2. Next, Chapter 3 presents and explains the methods along with the characteristics of 
the data set, the measures and the statistical procedures. Chapter 4 summarizes the study 
findings. Finally, Chapter 5 presents a discussion of the findings in light with current debates; 
implications for scholarship, policy and intervention levels are also discussed. The final chapter 
will also highlight future research possibilities for an enriched agenda, one to positively impact 
social welfare and the construction of peaceful and sustainable environments.  
   
 20 
Chapter 2. Literature review and Theoretical framework 
An overview of the relevant studies informing the current research is presented in this chapter. 
This review will allow the reader to recognize the extent to which current research is sufficiently 
informative for this investigation’s interests; the gaps in scholarship will also be identified. As 
mentioned previously, this work is guided by studies on the role of social capital for social 
change, collective mobilization and political action research. The theoretical framework will be 
summarized in the second section. The chapter ends by presenting the conceptual model used for 
the research.  
2.1 Background studies: overview of the literature  
Mobilization resources and collective action have been studied from different angles and 
with various purposes. Close attention is paid to individual and group features as well as to 
context-related variables that stimulate mobilization, which are most commonly defined as 
political sources for social change (Ostrom & Ahn, 2009). 
2.1.1 Individual characteristics and mobilization for collective action 
Individual characteristics influencing mobilization in violent contexts have been studied 
using a complex set of micro-level factors. A set of demographic, socioeconomic and opinion 
based variables were used by Hansen-Nord and colleagues (2014) to represent violence 
exposure. Distributed in negative gradients of violence exposure, a significant association of age 
with cognitive social capital was found (i.e. the younger age group correlated to lower social 
capital); the gradient was not observed for structural social capital. Associations with 
employment status and socioeconomic conditions (Deneulin, 2008; Hansen-Nord et al., 2014; 
Sabatini, 2009) have also been explored. People with high socioeconomic status and high 
education, men and middle-aged people have been found to be more politicized and to 
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participate more actively in politics than others (Valkonen, 1969). However, these factors are 
usually treated within context, not in isolation. Even complex approaches are at risk of putting 
too much emphasis on the individual, and of inappropriately dealing with individual capabilities 
if wider development achievements are to be assessed (Stewart, 2005; Stockemer, 2013).  
Because most individual features are associated to living conditions that come from or 
are facilitated by others –the family, the community or the government-, “placing individual 
subjects at the center stage of [an approach], maintains conceptual tension between the individual 
and his or her society” (Sabatini, 2009: 105). It has been found that individual factors are better 
understood if placed in context and in dialogue with macro-level environmental influences 
(Stockemer, 2013) and the diversity of political activities (Lorenzini & Giugni, 2012) allowing 
or inhibiting political involvement. For instance, Lorenzini & Giugni (2012) examine 
employment status in relation to the conditions of exclusion it produces, along with other 
alternatives of integration and participation performed by the unemployed youth. Similarly, 
Sabatini (2009) emphasizes the necessary study of social networks for development and well-
being, which can nurture social cohesion and economic activity, resulting beneficial to 
individuals’ living conditions and wellbeing.  
In this line of argument, research looking at the relationship between enhanced 
democracy and increased development (Beer & Mitchell, 2004) shows that strong social bonds 
and institutional transparency reduces violence and inhibits human rights violations. Special 
attention is given to civic participation as a protective factor that facilitates sustained 
development, enhanced justice and social stability (Graeff & Svendsen, 2012; Johnson, Headey, 
& Jensen, 2003).  
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2.1.2 The effect of context and location on mobilization 
Looking at living structures has proved useful for examining the tension between the 
individual and the conceptual recognition of the relational and contextual aspect of action 
(Deneulin, 2008). This approach looks at the necessary conditions for an individual to develop 
and flourish, and how their choices and their interconnection are affected. Similarly, studying the 
contextual factors influencing individual and group action enriches the analysis of social 
dynamics. For instance, Ratner (2013) assesses the characteristics of the resources and users, 
governance agreements, and collective institutions to determine the scope of cooperation in 
conflict environments.  
Examples also include the study of contexts where opposite goals are pursued or 
excessive obligations are imposed (Graeff & Svendsen, 2012; Mustafa, 2005) and of the 
exclusion or reinforced degradation that results from negative bonding (Sabatini, 2009; 
Wacquant, 1998) and its detrimental effects. An “erosion of social capital” (Wacquant, 1998: 26) 
happens when public service organizations turn into instruments of surveillance and further 
depreciate the informal social capital available.  
Modern values such as individualism and equality of opportunity are concerning 
(Heffron, 2000) as they displace the community as a point of reference and as a necessary source 
of social trust and cooperation. Everyday life experiences suggest that social networks may work 
as a double edged sword for wellbeing; on the one side, they nurture trust and shared values; on 
the other, they may allow group members to pursue narrow sectarian goals and lobby against 
other groups (Sabatini, 2009).  
To address the incompatibility between aims and policies, a careful inclusion of other 
factors, such as the nature of group interactions, community leadership, and spontaneous social 
 23 
organization might prove advantageous (Heffron, 2000; Montgomery, 2000; Ratner et al., 2013). 
Heffron (2000), for discussing policy implications and social capital, as well as the need for rules 
and agreements to be made in order to challenge and change structures.  
A focus on the community’s role when explaining the political arena helps to further 
distinguish structure from context (Johnson et al., 2003). Effective governance is vital for new 
responsibilities and structural change to move forward; this includes an analysis of the 
community, the available resources, as well as the nature of the neighborhood and its social 
capital sources and public interventions (Johnson et al., 2003). Observing the reciprocity of 
community values and norms as well as attitudinal and informal participation variables has 
proven to be useful for social capital development and to explain political participation and 
mobilization in contexts of weakened democracy and trustworthiness (Heffron, 2000; Klesner, 
2003, 2007). However, research has shown contradictory outcomes requiring a critical look at 
the production and distribution of social capital (Wacquant, 1998).  
2.1.3 Social capital in relation to political culture and collective action 
Mobilization analysis in unconventional settings also help understanding the political role 
of social networks. By focusing on citizen’s formal political actions, research has shown the 
relevance of their participation in democratic transformation and in the construction of the 
political agenda (Pickvance, 2001; Stockemer, 2013). Looking at contextual influences in 
understanding individual inaction and action and at collective responses to dissatisfaction, throws 
a light towards understanding why some people participate in mobilizations or sign petitions and 
others do not (Pickvance, 2001).  
Politics are at the core of social life and mobilization for change. Throughout politics, 
people change individually and collectively (Warren, 1990: 209). This perspective is grounded 
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on the intersection between power and conflict in line with democracy and democratization. In 
addition, having a political perspective on social processes analyses has proven to clarify 
interests, define the domains, and integrate everyday understandings of politics (Warren, 1990).  
Political culture literature shows this is a highly contested area of research (Almond, 
2000; Chilton, 1988; Formisano, 2001; Lichterman & Cefaï, 2006a). However, the necessity of a 
political account that extensively captures the relevance of political and democratic processes 
within a society is generally agreed. An examination of democratization trends on the political 
interest of human rights protection (Beer & Mitchell, 2004) offers a complex account of the role 
of context in the formation of political culture. Studies on politicization (composed of interest 
and knowledge about politics) are valuable to explain the variability of individual behaviors in 
context (Valkonen, 1969). 
Political culture also results from people’s political behavior in diverse environments 
(Atkinson & Fowler, 2014; Durlauf, 1999), it stems from democratization processes where 
power, conflict, and violence intersect (Baykan & Lelandais, 2004; Flores Cuamea & Núñez 
Noriega, 2016; Loveless, 2013) and from the associations between victimization, crime, and 
political participation of crime victims (Bateson, 2012). Tragic events have been found to 
produce waves of concern and political action, affecting individual perceptions and changing 
political culture (Flores Cuamea & Núñez Noriega, 2016). Indeed, citizens’ mobilization, a sense 
of social belonging, solidarity, and self-commitment to active participation are key conditions for 
the transformation of political culture (Baykan & Lelandais, 2004; Flores Cuamea & Núñez 
Noriega, 2016).  
Change in political culture has also been studied in contexts of political unrest, as it is 
associated with perceptions of inequalities, global trends for resistance and alternative 
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globalization (Baykan & Lelandais, 2004; Loveless, 2013). Knowledge and organizational 
models transfer to enriched repertoires of action, constituted by harmony and tension due to 
coexisting diverse political cultures (Baykan & Lelandais, 2004). Similarly, when studying voter 
turnout, Atkinson & Fowler (2014) found reverse causation with social capital and community 
activity, as these characteristics appear to inhibit political participation. They conclude that social 
capital and collective action, often believed to be potential solutions to political participation, are 
actually competing political participation. In sum, evidence suggests that social capital and 
community activities could be either a complement or a substitute to political participation 
(Atkinson & Fowler, 2014; Teney & Hanquinet, 2012).  
The association between violent and criminal contexts and the forms, shapes, and 
motivations for collective action have also been studied (González Gil, 2006) along with the 
ways in which the environment affects their effectiveness (Ratner et al., 2013; Thomas & Louis, 
2014). Collective action has been found to be compelling in achieving broader social change, 
while no clear trend has been observed on whether it contributes to change citizen’s opinions 
(Thomas & Louis, 2014). Consequently, the implications of strategic non-violent mobilization 
are under debate, specifically within contexts of high levels of distrust and corruption.  
Understanding the intersection between social capital’s mechanisms and the dominance 
of criminal violence lies at the core of this research. However, little has been said about these 
non-traditional conflict and post-conflict scenarios where grievance, opportunity and constantly 
changing circumstances affect conflict resolution (Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2015; Little, 2014) as 
well as social and institutional dynamics (Niño Pérez & Devia Garzón, 2015).  
It is of special interest to this research to explore the conditions in which the conflict 
became the norm in spite of reconciliation or peace processes (Little, 2014). For citizens living in 
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these environments, conflict persists and everyday life remains the same. In light with Niño 
Pérez & Devia Garzón’s (2015) discussion, the length and intensity of current civil conflicts 
demand a new priority scheme for achieving resolution and reconstruction. This would mean 
exploring environmental dynamics and resources that could strengthen institutions and build up 
social capital (Niño Pérez & Devia Garzón, 2015).  
Most research performed on these contexts focuses on showing the potential outcomes of 
social networks and resources in post-conflict countries as well as their possible positive or 
detrimental effects (Cuesta & Alda, 2012; Dinesen et al., 2013; El Hajj, Afifi, Khawaja, & 
Harpham, 2011). For instance, Cuesta & Alda’s (2012) research found a negative statistically 
significant effect of interpersonal trust on victimization at the community level in Colombia. 
Other studies have also shown the implications of victimization at family and community levels 
(Payne & Williams, 2008) as well as the role of collective action in conflict for improved 
wellbeing and violence containment (Dinesen et al., 2013; Hansen-Nord et al., 2014; Ratner et 
al., 2013).  
However, it has been proved that a decline in one measure of social capital, namely trust 
in individuals or cohesion, does not necessarily reflect a decline in all institutions and 
associations (Payne & Williams, 2008). Therefore, social trust and social activism should also be 
understood as having complex associations with violence and its causes (Hansen-Nord et al., 
2014). This means that consequences of violent crime may vary differently for social capital 
components, which sustain the complexity that results from social capital and collective action 
constructs.  
Finally, the paradoxical role of civil society in resource mobilization also requires further 
assessment. The possibility that some groups are more benefited than others because of their 
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relative social and political advantages, could produce contradicting outcomes (Son & Lin, 2008) 
or else obscure or inhibit interactions within a given social structure (Teney & Hanquinet, 2012). 
It is argued that, if social capital resources are embedded in individual and organizational 
networks, expressive and instrumental civic actions are produced from it (Son & Lin, 2008). 
These results show that, despite the faced challenges, there is a direct connection between social 
capital and civic engagement. In sum, as a combination of different social relationships, social 
capital takes various forms and is also linked to diverse forms of political engagement (Teney & 
Hanquinet, 2012). Furthermore, an extensive look of social and political participation is required 
for social capital possessed by the more disadvantaged social groups.  
As the literature shows, the association between social capital and political culture has 
been clearly established. This connection has been notably observed in the political science 
literature by means of political culture and democracy debates. This line of studies suggests that 
norms of trust and participation develop after many decades, rules which are in turn used to 
explain the stability of democracies (Johnson et al., 2003). Studies on governance have also 
shown the viability of people for formulating and adhering to arrangements for common property 
management enabling long standing cooperation and sharing practices (Johnson et al., 2003). 
2.1.4 The association of emotions and experiences with collective mobilization 
The interaction between individual motives and collective interests is also important for 
analyzing mobilization and distinguishing between resources and outcomes. Emotions research 
allows a perspective on subjective critical components for collective action against violence and 
conflict (Baele, Sterck, & Meur, 2016) and it plays an important role in the creation as well as in 
the resolution of conflicts. Although the relevance of emotions in conflict has been proven 
(Baele, Sterck, & Meur, 2016; Bar-Tal & Rivera, 2007; Demertzis, 2015; Halperin & Pliskin, 
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2015), its conceptualization and measurement are still underdeveloped. For instance, on studying 
group-based emotional dynamics among Palestinians, Baele and colleagues (2016) developed a 
quantitative method to measure emotional worldviews and emotions configurations. As a result, 
the authors stress that the collective and circular dimension of the emotion, as it is first 
experienced individually, and intergroup dynamics are difficult to apprehend. 
Specifically, emotion processes and regulation (Halperin, 2015; Halperin & Gross, 2011; 
Pearlman, 2013) as well as social mobilization built on emotions such as anger and desperation 
(Sabucedo, Durán, Alzate, & Barreto, 2011; Sabucedo & Vilas, 2014) in contexts of repeated 
exposure to violence and crime have largely been studied. In this line of thought, Halperin & 
Pliskin (2015) have introduced an emotional process analysis to explain how individuals living 
in a society carry with them long-term factors that may shape structures and processes. 
Examination of emotions show that while anger, fear or hope lead to different types of actions, 
they are all necessary for the emergence of action, compromise and risk-taking, as well as the 
possibility of peaceful resolution (Halperin & Pliskin, 2015; Halperin, 2011).  
The study of emotions in protest has shown that anger and indignation have a significant 
direct effect on people’s intention to participate (Sabucedo & Vilas, 2014). Anger has been found 
to have an important influence on positive emotions, which supports the importance of studying 
emotions in collective action to understand the key dynamics for social change (Sabucedo, 
Durán, Alzate, & Barreto, 2011; Sabucedo & Vilas, 2014). The exploration of driving forces 
(such as shared experiences, satisfaction, or empathy) for mobilization contributes to explain the 
extent to which social capital produces positive or detrimental effects (Puntscher et al., 2014; 
Schmid, 2002). For instance, Schmid (2002) calls attention to motive as a variable vital for 
understanding why some institutions remain underdeveloped and the role of sympathy and caring 
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in norm following. 
Furthermore, by integrating emotions into models of political behavior, Groenendyk 
(2011) shows emotions provide a missing piece to understand collective action in democracies. 
As a result, incorporating emotive and sensitive components help produce clearer explanations 
about the conditions under which people engage in politics, therefore, facilitating political action 
(Groenendyk, 2011). Consequently, rather than focusing on the individual interest or political 
calculation, this perspective provides useful insights into the various forms of mobilization, aims 
and reciprocity relationships (van Stekelenburg, Klandermans, & van Dijk, 2011). More 
importantly, it understands that motivation results not only from anger, as people also need 
instrumentality, identity, and ideology, to actually protest and mobilize (Pearlman, 2013; van 
Stekelenburg et al., 2011).  
2.2 Overview of existing works on the Mexican context of violence 
Recent studies on Mexico’s current conflict have focused on the presence and character 
of violence (Azaola, 2012; Bergman, 2012; Calderón et al., 2015; Vilalta, 2014b) and its effect 
on citizen’s lives (Enamorado, López-Calva, Rodríguez-Castelán, & Winkler, 2014; Ley, 2016; 
Shirk, 2011). The characteristics of the victims and the forms of violence and its effects have 
been widely explored (Barra & Joloy, 2011; Edmonds-Poli, 2013; Emmerich, 2011; González-
Pérez, Vega-López, & Cabrera-Pivaral, 2012; González-Pérez, Vega-López, Vega-López, 
Muñoz-de-la-Torre, & Cabrera-Pivaral, 2009).  
In Mexico there has been an increase in the rate of impunity and corruption in the 
security system, as evidence shows. The number of editors and reporters murdered has increased 
(Edmonds-Poli, 2013) and males aged between 20 and 44 years old face higher probabilities of 
dying due to violent causes (González-Pérez et al, 2009). However, due to the faced structural 
 30 
vulnerability younger males (15-29 years old) and children are increasingly becoming potential 
victims of violence (Barra & Joloy, 2011; Kan, 2011).  
Additionally, Emmerich (2011) found a 50% increase in childhood homicides related to 
organized crime; around 30,000 children were found to cooperate with criminal groups in 
exchange of rewards and recognition, resulting in an important cultural influence on them. 
Children have become increasingly vulnerable because the loss of one or both parents in the drug 
war. An estimated tens of thousands of Mexican children are orphaned directly because of the 
drug war (Barra & Joloy, 2011). Because of this, current violence in Mexico is mainly a 
phenomenon that affects the young (Azaola, 2012; Emmerich, 2011; González-Pérez et al., 
2009). 
As for the type of violence, Mexico’s situation has been labeled as a “civil war type of 
conflict (Schedler, 2013) as defined by large internal migrations, displacements, exposure to 
crime and the militarization of public security. Moreover, massive human rights violations, 
systematic killings and the emergence of the so-called ‘narco-refugees’ also characterize this 
conflict. (Kan, 2011). Azaola’s work (2012) shows that Mexico’s historical levels of homicides 
have importantly increased since 2011, mostly due in the escalation of criminal violence as well 
as insufficient social and economic policies that effectively promote inclusion and equality.  
In this context, social tension is a result of inequality and marginalization, which 
exacerbates institutional distrust, lack of interest and isolation. It has been found that, while the 
main type of violence in the Mexican scenario is interpersonal, other known forms of violence 
are also present, namely, self-directed, legal violence (executions or punishments), and war or 
civil insurrection (open revolt and disturbances) (Diprose, 2008).  
Scholars have lately studied the daily effects of violence closely. Fear of crime, a form of 
 31 
indirect victimization, has been found to be associated with living conditions (Vilalta, 2010, 
2017) but is buffered by high levels off social cohesion by which citizens are able to respond 
collectively and effectively to crime and violence (Vilalta, 2010). Additionally, fear of crime has 
also been found to spread because of people’s place of residence, direct crime experiences, levels 
of trust in the police and media exposure (Vilalta, 2010). Increasing impunity aggravates this 
perception. In Mexico, about 84% of homicides go unpunished (Killelea, 2014), and the 
prosecution and delivery of justice shows no improvement (Guerrero Gutiérrez, 2012).  
The appearance of vigilantism (Grayson, 2011; Heinle et al., 2015) further complicates 
the case. It has presented itself as a worrying manifestation of the growing concern and 
frustration that citizens live with, as authorities have been unable to deal with crime and 
violence. Such responses include street vigilantism, self-procured justice, self-defense group 
organization, and public lynching (Olson et al., 2014; Sabet, 2013; Zizumbo-Colunga, 2010). In 
his study on the opinion of citizens on the Mexican system of justice, Zizumbo-Colunga (2010) 
has found that vigilantism is fueled by frustration, low confidence in state law enforcement 
institutions and high levels of interpersonal trust.  
Research has also looked into and closely monitored the effects on policy and citizens 
responses in Mexico, assessments of governmental responses (Human Rights Watch, 2011, 
2013) and daily life affectations (Barra & Joloy, 2011; Vilalta, 2014a) . The new role of citizens 
in public security and law enforcement has also resulted in stronger, more resilient communities 
and social organization (Sabet, 2013; David A. Shrik et al., 2014). Paradoxically, a fruitful 
source of mobilization with policy implications has been the victims’ movement (Villagran, 
2013). Victims’ organizations are constructed on the pain that those surrounding the victims 
suffer, on the increased risk of threats and violence inherent to organization, and “double 
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victimization” (doble victimización). One key contribution from these groups has been the 
gathering and analysis of crime data and undocumented cases (Villagran, 2014). Supported by 
the victims themselves, these organizations have become the most visible consequence of crime 
and violence in the Mexican society, moving beyond fear to create pressure mechanisms pushing 
for justice and security (David A. Shrik et al., 2014; Villagran, 2013).  
Mexico’s history of social mobilization has also been accounted for extensively (Aguayo 
Quezada, 2013; Alvarado Mendoza, 2010; Ley, 2015, 2016; Parás, López Olmedo, & Vargas 
López, 2011; Schedler, 2015). Civil participation is an indicator of the levels of commitment and 
the strength of a democracy and, consequently, of social behavior (Parás et al., 2011). Civil 
participation is also useful to understand the connections between engagement, insecurity and 
crime (Alvarado Mendoza, 2010; Ley, 2015). For instance, studies on the effects of violence in 
civil activism in Mexico have shown that violence against political actors threatens the electorate 
and depresses the voter turnout (Ley, 2015).  
However, non-electoral forms of participation have also been stimulated by violence and 
crime (Heinle et al., 2015; Sabet, 2014). In Mexico, violence is a strong predictor of citizen 
mobilization against crime (Ley, 2015), and it is closely associated with the strength of civil 
society networks that help overcome inherent risks for mobilization in a given environment. It 
has generally been observed that citizens may use different forms of action, namely individual 
action, protest movement or community organization (Schedler, 2015). Given the environment of 
fear and indifference, the development of collective forms of responses have been slow and 
gradual; as noted before, they are mainly expressed through victims’ movements or the 
community police (Sabet, 2017; Schedler, 2014; Villagran, 2013) by which collective solidarities 
and shared values are expressed.  
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Although Mexico has faced criminal violence for decades, 2017 has been the worst in 20 
years (Fisher & Taub, 2017). The high levels of violence haves led communities not to trust 
institutions, and to form self-defense groups or lynch suspected criminals. As shown by 
Zizumbo-Colunga (2010), wealthier individuals do not support people taking justice in their own 
hands unless they trust in law enforcement institutions reaches extremely low levels. 
Specifically, the effect of interpersonal trust to support for vigilante justice depends on civilian 
perception in security and justice institutions (Zizumbo-Colunga, 2010, p. 6). 
Given the differentiated levels of violence and crime across the country, especially in 
regards to drug trafficking-related crime, an approach of differentiated analysis and intervention 
are needed. For instance, there are places where drug-crime has a strong social basis, which 
requires a 'from-the-ground work' perspective in order to substitute long-standing agreements 
and loyalties with positive cohesion and viable shared norms. It has also been observed that these 
benefits involve various actors, such as business people, investors, the police, the military, 
politicians, and families (Pereyra, 2012). Therefore, an array of differentiated strategies have 
been said to be fundamental in addressing violence and crime in the various regions (Osorio, 
2015; Ramírez García, 2012; Trejo & Ley, 2015). 
The current research embraces the concern of what individuals and groups can do in this 
context, the possible forms of democratic participation and their contribution towards political 
change (Benítez Manaut, 2013; Naveau & Pleyers, 2012; Schedler, 2014, 2015). This research 
will be a valuable account on the operation of resources and incentives for mobilization in 
operate in a critical episode of Mexican life. It will also be an important community resource for 
true democracy, as it will help promote preventive measures along with local experience 
(negative shocks) and regional characteristics  for the realization of a true democracy (Puntscher, 
 34 
Hauser, Pichler, & Tappeiner, 2014). 
2.3 Overview of the Theory  
Guided by preceding literature, this study draws upon Social Capital and Collective Action 
theories as well as approaches used in Political Culture and Emotions Studies. Although they are 
related, these approaches present various challenges to the study of conflict and violent contexts. 
First, a focus on resources and motives will be used to understand what influences mobilization. 
An emphasis on social capital related action will offer a view on the virtues of spontaneous and 
informal forms of organization. Second, studying the political dimension of mobilization via 
political knowledge and awareness will illuminate our understanding of why mobilization 
happens in contexts of high exposure to crime violence and the spread of fear. By accounting for 
other motives, such as emotions and the vicious cycle of violence, processes of social and 
political construction of collective action might finally revealed. 
This compound will allow an examination of the resources used by individuals to 
mobilize for social change when living in contexts of enduring conflict. The research’s premise 
is that the living environment will have an effect on mobilization. The analysis presented in the 
following chapters uses a theoretical compound accordingly, to examine the propensity to 
collective mobilization associated with experiences of violence. The central elements of each 
theoretical perspective and their use for mobilization analysis in contexts of conflict and violence 
are presented below. 
2.3.1 Social Capital Theory 
Social Capital Theory (SCT) accounts for the study of resources (a social capital) by 
which individuals relate to each other and build sustainable social relationships (Bourdieu, 1986; 
Bourdieu & Wacquant, 2013; Coleman, 1988, 1990). Given its attention to social relationships, 
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SCT examines the social structural conditions by which social capital arises and is produced, as 
well as the forms in which actors use it and dispute it. Social Capital Theory is, therefore, a 
theory of action for social change; by using SCT the actions of individuals in specific contexts 
and the development of social organization can be accounted for.  
As a resource, social capital is productive and functional as it facilitates individuals to 
achieve certain ends (Coleman, 1990). However, social capital is compelling only in a 
“structured arena of social action” (Wacquant, 1998, p. 26). The notion of social capital is also 
tied to a variety of institutionalized relationships by which social dynamics are defined, and 
power is exercised (Bourdieu, 1986; Tzanakis, 2013). As a result, the set of actual or potential 
resources are linked to how individuals own and control a durable network of relations 
(Bourdieu, 1986). This relational dimension serves the theory to examine collective-owned 
capital (via membership, association or participation) enabling individuals to recognition and 
entitlement.  
The volume of social capital –or social credit- individuals have depends on the size of the 
network, the connections effectively mobilized, as well as other resources (economic, cultural, or 
symbolic) that they have and are able to activate (Bourdieu, 1986; Portes, 2000; Wacquant, 
1998). Social capital may be a source of control or of support, a mechanism of class 
reproduction, or the basis for social benefits (Portes, 1998¸ Tzanakis, 2013). Because of its 
nature, social capital may result in relationships of power or of mutual reciprocity14. In either 
case, the interactions built from social capital result from investment strategies in which 
                                                           
14
 There are two main approaches to social capital. The founders (Bourdieu and Coleman) center in 
conflict and in the existence of inequalities to examine how much social capital is attained and used to 
achieve power or reach positions of power. The other, the continuers stress consensus, cooperation and 
coordination (i.e. Putnam and its followers) and assume there are conditions that favor people developing 
capacities and building social capital (Arriagada, 2005). 
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participants have expectations or acquire benefits that, in turn, facilitate the reproduction of 
social capital. 
As a theory of social change, SCT focuses on explaining social relationships dynamics 
and the resulting agreements, norms, and institutions that, as argued, will contribute to solve 
social problems and empowering communities (Portes, 1998; Portes & Landolt, 2000; Svendsen 
& Svendsen, 2009). However, the expansion of SCT, which endorses positive consequences of 
sociability may have, at the same time, contributed to jeopardize its true empirical value (Portes, 
1998). Critics urge to revisit the theoretical foundations and to examine its unintended, and 
sometimes, obscure consequences, especially at community level analysis. Accordingly, it is 
important to distinguish between the possession of social capital from its sources, and the 
resources from the results (Portes, 1998; Ostrom, 2000).  
The lack of agreement between scholars about social capital’s conceptualization and key 
components have affected its operationalization. Given the complexity of its measures, its 
various applications and the consequences it may produce, the study of social capital has proved 
to be challenging (Ostrom & Ahn, 2009; Portes, 2000; Tzanakis, 2013). If neglected, social 
capital is an easily affected resource, which demands attention at both individual and collective 
levels (Portes, 2000). External interventions may help towards the construction and renovation of 
social capital; however, and not without difficulty, it is highly responsive to strong relationships 
facilitated by its members (Ostrom & Ahn, 2009). In consequence, the existing structure and 
context play a fundamental role in the creation, reception, use, and increase of social capital 
(Ostrom & Ahn, 2009; Portes, 2000).  
Social Capital Theory research captures the paradox of social relationships. It is 
concerned with social determinants and their effects (Teney & Hanquinet, 2012) as well as with 
 37 
their sources (Sabatini, 2009; Serra, 2011). As such, social capital can be either a resource for 
social relationships or a result of them. In other words, social capital can be used to describe the 
composition of an institution or a group as well as to define the features and quality of the 
relationships between its members (Sabatini, 2009), their limitations and uneven effects (Serra, 
2011).  
The need to explain the opposite has also been observed. If social capital erodes, the 
degradation of social living conditions (Portes & Landolt, 2000) and the institutional incapacity 
to produce positive outcomes for social cohesion (Wacquant, 1998) may result. Not all 
externalities of social capital are positive; sometimes group solidarity produces adverse 
consequences for members of other groups, generating a negative form of social capital (Portes 
& Landolt, 2000; Teney & Hanquinet, 2012; Zizumbo-Colunga, 2010). Some of its implications 
are the exclusion of outsiders, restriction of freedom to members, and the creation of structures 
used for surveillance, suspicion, and distrust (Portes, 2000; Wacquant, 1998). This process may 
be explained by inaccurate research approaches. Instead of advocating only for local 
empowerment, the translation from micro to macro levels omits specific social and political 
dynamics (Portes & Landolt, 2000: 21). The result is a vacuum and depreciation of formal social 
capital (Wacquant, 1998). 
The dual feature of social capital allows for it to be connected to the social policy agenda 
(Bebbington, 2007; Serra, 2011). The recognition of its various dimensions exhibits the array of 
potential consequences and combinations it generates. Additionally, since social capital does not 
produce beneficial effects by itself, its explicative limitations are promising to expose the 
overlapping contexts and set of social relationships that generate conflicting effects (Serra, 
2011). Therefore, for instance, collective action becomes a critical source to “create local 
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organizations and select locals as leaders” (Ostrom & Ahn, 2009: 199) to help sustain a long-
term effort that generates social capital.  
In conflict and post-conflict situations, a comprehensive perspective on social capital has 
rarely been used. Indeed, SCT research treats contexts as settings where social capital might be 
built or reinforced (Cuesta & Alda, 2012; Dinesen et al., 2013) rather than as a resource with 
which individuals build strategies and alliances to improve their living conditions (Niño Pérez & 
Devia Garzón, 2015). This is not to say that social capital is ill-treated. On the contrary, the study 
of violence and civil society participation and the role of trust, norms and sense of belonging 
have been illuminating to understand the combined effect on these contexts (Dinesen et al., 
2013). However, an examination of the defining environmental variables that could strengthen 
institutions and build social capital, particularly in contexts of cyclical violence is, in any case, 
rare. In sum, while social capital helps advance development and stability, its use in contexts of 
ongoing conflict has not been sufficiently studied. 
2.3.2 Collective Action theories 
Collective Action theories (CAT) study the activities pursued by interest groups to 
achieve social and political common purposes; namely, the economic and ideological bases of 
social conflict and the political implications of group formation (Ethridge, 1987; McAdam et al., 
2004). Acting collectively involves mobilization and organization processes, resources and 
strategies as well as opportunities for action. The study of collective action requires looking at 
numerous individual and group actors with diverse identities, aims, roles, values, experiences 
and social positions (McAdam et al., 2004). As a result, acting collectively relates as well to the 
varied spaces in which action is developed.  
Because of its composition, collective action is an event built in numerous spaces. 
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Consequent, it requires understanding how gains and losses are valued, the functioning of the 
institutional structure allowing or restricting organization and the resources at hand. The political 
use of collective action is possible only when the varied goals, resources and opportunities are 
accounted for (Edmonson, 2013).  
Due to its rationale, collective action is often understood as disruptive and revolutionary; 
it questions the prevailing forms of social organization and the operation of institutions. 
Depending its place and form, collective action is also a historical force used to make sense of 
the world by taking advantage of the existing institutional forms and the available knowledge. 
Charles Tilly’s work (1977) is perhaps the most emblematic of studies that incorporate historical 
logics and the politics of protests. Tilly also accounts for the forms of organization for 
mobilization, the repertoires of interaction, the connections between its components, and the 
disruptive and transforming the character of the collectivity.  
Questioning the context and its impact on action is essential (Edmonson, 2013). The 
creation of space for political action is necessary where no regulations to constrain interaction 
between actors and the political terrain exist. This also implies there are no conventions to 
determine where action itself begins and ends. Collective action is, therefore, understood as 
progressive and fluctuating over time; circulating perceptions and aims or tactics cannot be 
empirically established a priori (Edmonson, 2013). As a result, collective political action should 
not be seen as a unitary phenomenon; special attention to the generation of conditions and results 
is critical to assess their contributions as well as their contradictions (Foweraker, 1997).  
Furthermore, collective action analysis must be examined in context. McAdam and 
colleagues (2004) focus on the struggles of mobilization involving governments as parties to 
contention. By looking at the transgressive and relational nature of movements, contentious 
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analysis examines the various episodes, as their constitutive elements in which multiple parties 
interact (Sampson, McAdam, MacIndoe, & Weffer-Elizondo, 2005; Tarrow, 1998, 2015) 
pursuing unconventional forms of political participation (Stockemer, 2013).  
The analysis of collective action in unstable and violent environments is challenging. 
There is a hypothetical relationship between the existence of prolonged violence and the forms 
and strength of collective action within these contexts (González Gil, 2006). Such a perspective 
points to an analytical approach to examine forms of collective action deployed by social actors 
when in presence of violence (González Gil, 2006). In these contexts, violence and crime might 
detonate or inhibit organization, affect regularities and tendencies, condition the impact of 
mobilization or produce its deactivation. For that matter, CAT is an appropriate approach to study 
contexts of violence and the forms in which it restrains and stresses social movements. 
Civil society participation is critical for collective actions. Its inclusion shifts the focus 
from the individual motive to a collective aim that is robust and durable overall (Sampson et al., 
2005). This analytical focus also allows for the inclusion of a temporal perspective on collective 
action appearance and decline, its diverse forms and the emergence of new modes of 
mobilization. Additionally, it challenges the notions of citizenship and the actors’ roles while it 
eases inclusion criteria (Tarrow, 1998). Among the key factors constituting a new form of 
collective action are contention and struggle, the density of nonprofit organizations, the linkage 
of a working trust with shared expectations and civic sustained capacity (Sampson et al., 2005; 
Tarrow, 2015). Indeed, social capital and civil society are considered “twin concepts” (Mustafa, 
2005, p. 328) linked to social movements and NGOs. 
An encompassing approach is required to approach the research questions for this study. 
Therefore, the interconnection between SCT and CAT will assemble to the study of emotions 
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and political culture. The result will offer a powerful mechanism for the analysis.  
A strong ground for the necessary –actual and potential- resources for mobilization is 
provided by SCT, while CAT accounts for the aims, opportunities and contextual effects for 
organization. Furthermore, the drivers for mobilization (feelings and experiences) and the 
features orienting political action (knowledge and awareness), described in the next section, are 
transversely present in SCT and CAT. Their inclusion results in a potential conceptual apparatus 
that links the definition and discussion on social capital to the study of collective action while 
recognizing the diversity of forms in which individual resources and collective goals are 
managed, interiorized and put at work (Ahn & Ostrom, 2002; Ostrom & Ahn, 2009). This 
compound offers the grounds to identify the resources that different groups use to organize and 
achieve specific economic and political goals.  
2.3.3 The study of emotions and political culture for collective action 
Whether collective action is expressed in open mass contention (Pearlman, 2013; 
Stockemer, 2013) or everyday resistance (Ash, 2009; Johansson & Vinthagen, 2014), CAT 
allows for a comprehensive approach to study social manifestation, spatialization as well as 
temporalization of resistance, civic participation and political protest. An examination of 
emotions (such as fear, sadness or shame) and their value, offer the possibility of assessing 
whether individuals can shift and use their feelings to produce successful forms of political 
participation (Pearlman, 2013). Additionally, it opens the road to recognize key political culture 
features that, together with social trust, solidarity, inclusion and cooperation, bring about 
effective democratic cultures and stronger successful communities (Almond, 2000; Formisano, 
2001; Loveless, 2013; Putnam, 1995). 
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Emotions and collective action 
For the analysis of the way in which social resources bring people into action, a past 
experience dimension is required; this is, how people manage emotions and shared experiences 
when facing adversity and physical threat. This approach also permits inquiring about how 
societies with low social cohesion, distrust and inefficient institutions might mobilize for social 
change. An approach on emotions further refines the analysis. Specifically, it offers insights on 
how social capital is successfully built and used with political aims by bringing action and power 
to the theory (Rothstein, 2000). A theory of collective memories can strongly connect social 
capital and theoretical explanations on the dilemma of cooperation and organization. 
Existing research on emotions of the protest shows their inherent importance to the study 
of collective action and social movements (Jasper, 2011; Stewart, 2002). Emotions are present in 
every aspect of political action (Jasper, 2011) and are indicators of the importance of an event for 
the social world. However, the analysis of their origin, their causal mechanisms, mutual 
influences and effects (both positive and negative) remain residual in the literature (Bericat, 
2000, 2015; von Scheve & Ismer, 2013). Social movements’ research reluctance to study 
emotions in protest appears to be changing; it increasingly recognizes that mobilizations are 
affected by context-specific feelings as well as by stable affective bonds (Jasper 2011). That is, 
participants build from pre-existing emotions as well as from temporary reactions to events.  
Some emotions are shared by members of a group or are reciprocal with other groups, 
and might drive individuals to join or avoid mobilization. Most importantly, emotions help 
explain the networks and communities through which movements occur (Jasper, 1998). 
Management of despair and indifference that favors hope and active participation has proved to 
be useful to understand the influences and effects of collective action (Bericat, 2015; von Scheve 
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& Ismer, 2013). Indeed, the contentious politics approach (McAdam et al., 2004; Tilly, 1977) 
implicitly recognizes that for actual collective action and for collective identities, emotions 
matter.  
Emotions for political action (people’s beliefs, feelings, needs and reactions) are 
relational (Bericat 2016), socially, culturally and situationally conditioned. Given this, a 
distinction between subjective feelings (due to internal emotional experiences) from manifested 
emotions (expressed external emotions) follows. As a result, expressed emotions are understood 
as input for collective emotions, from which mechanisms of cognition, expression and practices 
materialize (von Scheve & Ismer, 2013). 
Conflict is hard to understand without recognizing the involved emotions (Goodwin & 
Jasper, 2006; Jasper, 2014). The study of people’s emotions, perceptions and actions in 
uncommon conflicting environments remains limited (Cohen-Chen et al., 2015; Retzinger & 
Scheff, 2000). This might be due to the assumption that, in the absence of hope and scope for 
change, collective action is virtually impossible (Cohen-Chen et al., 2015). Actually, the 
development of hopelessness impatience, distrust, anger and indignation, as well as the bitterness 
of protracted conflicts helps perpetuate conflict by inducing indifference and obstacles 
mobilization that might contribute to conflict resolution (Halperin & Pliskin, 2015; Holmes, 
2004). In contexts of violent conflict, events trigger complex sets of specific emotions 
experienced at different intensities (Baele et al., 2016); emotions emerge because of exposure to 
violence, fear of intentional material and physical harm as well as harm accidentally perpetrated 
by drug criminals or by the state (Osorio, 2011).  
The relationship between emotions and collective action is critical for conflict and 
violence management; therefore, it demands further exploration (Retzinger & Scheff, 2000). 
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Approaching emotions for action will help better understand political action in divided societies 
(Holmes, 2004; Jasper, 1998), examine the dynamics of solidarity shaping mobilization 
(Demertzis, 2015; Jasper, 2011, 2014) as well as build efficient and credible institutions that help 
heal hurt societies (Rothstein, 2000)  
Political culture and collective action 
The study of political culture is a disputed area of research. Political culture is a rapidly 
changing terrain (Rodríguez Franco, 2017) as the debate on the political is the intersection of 
power and conflict (Warren, 1999). Political Culture theory defines political culture as a set of 
cognitive, affective and evaluative orientations which result from processes of socialization, 
exposure and experiences (Almond, 2000). Political culture was first understood as a particular 
pattern of orientations for political action in democratic conditions (Almond, 2000; Formisano, 
2001; Warren, 2001) but it gradually changed to include accounts of beliefs and culture 
influences.  
Political culture includes sets of knowledge and beliefs about the political context, 
feelings and commitments to politics and their values (Almond, 2000) and assumptions about the 
political world that leads to a disposition in which people accept or reject alternatives (Elkins & 
Simeon, 1979). The political culture of a country is constituted mostly by active attitudes among 
its citizens but also by expressed preferences, interests and awareness (Denk & Christensen, 
2016).  
Current political culture definitions are more intensely driven by the increased 
politicization of society (Rodríguez Franco, 2017; Warren, 2001)15. Because of the politicization 
                                                           
15
 Some debates about politicization refer to contested definitions. Being politicized has two conflicting 
meanings: activities forcing something into politics –make it a political issue-, and activities by which an 
already political element is recognized –make it consciously political (Samuels, 1992). 
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of a society, people are less likely to unquestionably accept and reproduce practices, routines or 
customs that affect the political and governmental structure and performance (Almond, 2000; 
Chilton, 1988). This evolution suggests that nowadays, political culture is the property of a 
collectivity and that every social relationship is potentially political (Elkins & Simeon, 1979; 
Warren, 1999).  
The need for a political account that extensively captures the relevance of political and 
democratic processes for social life is agreed upon. An examination of democratization trends on 
the political interest of human rights protection (Beer & Mitchell, 2004) offers an inclusive 
account of the role of context and socialization in the formation of political culture and its 
potential distortion (Zoltán Dénes, 2013). Individually, politicization is observed in political 
knowledge, interest, sense of efficacy and political activity. Socially, it represents a change in the 
nature or parameters of the allocated values (Halper & Hartwig, 1975). It turns out that 
politicization processes happen at both the individual and the social level. The first has a 
behavioral influence and is related with the interest and knowledge a person has about politics; 
the latter refers mostly to shared values and focuses on the public arena.  
The ultimate interest of political culture lies on the study of processes and the possibility 
of political transformation (Formisano, 2001; Wilson, 2000) via a reflexive understanding of 
politics and political socialization (Luke, 1989). Using different criteria, their attention is on how 
the preferences of individuals influence their action, and therefore, the possibilities for political 
change. Additionally, such a theory looks at preference formation, at institutional-citizen 
interactions and how one affects the other (Almond, 2000; Wilson, 2000). 
2.3.4 Summary of the theory 
The distinctive focus of this research is on explaining the political construction of social 
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capital. The all-encompassing theoretical framework presented in this section allows the 
examination of the set of resources, the effects of the context of violence, the institutional 
conditions for action, the motivations for social change and the forms of mobilization. More 
precisely, it integrates individual, contextual and institutional factors that operate jointly to shape 
social capital and political action for social change (Ostrom & Ahn, 2009; Serra, 2011). Social 
capital and political culture features are successfully enhanced by collective action, changing the 
structure of incentives, advancing reconstruction and promoting different degrees of cooperation 
and collectivity.  
This research theoretical framework will draw upon the aforementioned theories to 
understand i) how individual actors use their resources for collective mobilization, ii) the effects 
of the context on motivation for mobilization, and iii) the influences that are relevant for the 
political construction of collective action. The resulting mechanism for the analysis will account 
for the diversity of forms in which individual resources and collective goals are managed, 
interiorized and put to work (Ahn & Ostrom, 2002). 
To address the political construction of social capital, the set of social resources, the 
effect of the context of violence, and the motivations for social change will be examined. This 
approach will integrate the individual, contextual and institutional factors that operate jointly to 
shape social capital and political action for social change (Ostrom & Ahn, 2009; Oxoby, 2009; 
Serra, 2011). The analysis is refined by emphasizing how social capital is successfully built and 
used with political aims (Rothstein, 2000). 
The way in which past experiences and emotion management bring people into action 
when facing adversity and physical threat is also critical for this study. Management of despair 
and indifference in favor of hope and active participation has proved to be useful to understand 
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the influences and effects of collective action (Bericat, 2015; Rorty, 1998; A. Stewart, 2002; von 
Scheve & Ismer, 2013). Moreover, it will contribute to the study of people’s emotions, 
perceptions and actions in uncommon conflicting environments (Cohen-Chen et al., 2015; 
Retzinger & Scheff, 2000). 
The merit of the conceptual model (see Figure 3) is that it brings together social change 
studies, collective mobilization theories, and political change research academic traditions. 
Additionally, these approaches are placed in context with conflict and violence studies. The aim 
of this theoretical assemblage is to emphasize their contributions to the investigation while 
discussing the various challenges derived from the study. 
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Note: for the purposes of simplification, demographics are not illustrated.
 
Figure 3. Conceptual Model 
 
2.4 The focus of the research 
Drawing on the aforementioned theories, the conceptual model for this study will employ 
two sets of factors, i) emotions and ii) experiences of violence resulting from the context of 
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conflict and instability that might influence mobilization for collective action (see Figure 3). It is 
hypothesized that these factors, along with individual characteristics (such as age, gender, 
education, and employment) will differently influence why and how people mobilize for 
collective action to advance social change across different localities. The model assumes a direct 
and mediated relationship and examines a) social capital and b) political culture as variables 
affecting the relationship between the individual characteristics, the contextual factors, and 
collective mobilization.   
The emotional component will capture feelings of fear and violence effects which 
account for the various circumstances associated with or resulting from the WoD that alter living 
conditions, wellbeing and governmental responses as well as citizens’ attitudes towards the 
WoD. Social capital will be assessed on its various dimensions including trust, community 
relationships, and social cohesion, while political culture will capture the levels of political 
awareness, participation and commitment. The specific variables and measures are presented in 
chapter 3.  
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Chapter 3. Methods 
3.1 Description of the data  
The data used for this study comes from the Citizenship, Democracy, and Drug-Related Violence 
survey (CIDENA) collected in Mexico in 2011. The data were obtained from the Inter-
University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR16). The survey was designed 
with the purpose of providing information that would help understand the complex relationship 
between society, politics and drug-related violence in a tortuous historical moment in Mexico 
(CIDENA 2011). The survey includes 75 questions and 248 variables that captured topics such 
as respondents’ experiences with crime and drug-related violence, attitudes towards security, 
political behavior, and social attitudes17.  
The instrument used to collect the data was divided in ten sections: 1) Economy and 
Political sophistication, 2) Ideology, 3) Institutional Trust, 4) Political Efficacy and Political 
Knowledge, 5) Electoral Behavior, 6) Democracy, Human Rights, and Civil Liberties, 7) 
Political Behavior and Insecurity, 8) Causes of Violence, 9) Security and Victimization, 10) 
Social Capital. Sociodemographic variables include age, sex, marital status, employment, and 
education. Given its structure, scope, and design, the CIDENA dataset is a reliable source of 
information to examine the research questions and hypothesis advanced in this investigation.  
Prior to the study, a proposal was sent to the Boston College Office of Research 
Protections (ORB) to obtain Institutional Review Board (IRB) clearance. The study has been 
granted an exemption in accordance with 45 CFR 46.101 (b) 4 (IRB Protocol Number 
16.012.01e). 
                                                           
16
 ICPSR Study No. 34670 
17
 Demographic variables include age, sex and employment, marital status, number of children, education, 
first language and territory of residence.  
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3.2 Study Sample 
The survey collected data from Mexican residents: 7,416 men and women over 18 years of age, 
(CIDENA 2011) using face to face interviews that combined cognitive and list experiment 
techniques; the interviews were conducted at the residence of the interviewee18. A probabilistic 
sample design representative of seven states selected by their levels of violence19 was used: four 
states for the high-level group (Chihuahua, Guerrero, Michoacan, and Nuevo Leon), two states 
for the intermediate (Jalisco and Estado de Mexico), and one for the low-level group (Mexico 
City) (see Figure 4). The remaining 25 states were sampled using a probability proportional 
size20. 
For the main analysis, the nationwide sample was used (N = 7,416). Additionally, two 
subsamples were constructed to examine the varying effects the hypothesized relationships 
across regions (north and south). For the north states region, the sample included respondents 
living in Chihuahua and Nuevo Leon (N = 1,800); the south states region sample used responses 
from individuals living in Michoacan and Guerrero (N = 1,716). The purpose was to compare 
states with similar levels of violence but with different social characteristics (see Figure 5). 
                                                           
18
 The interviews and responses were conducted and registered in Spanish. For the purpose of this study, 
the author conducted a simple translation of the selected questions and variables in the data set.  
19
 Using an index of deaths associated with drug related violence reported in local newspapers.  
20
 Mexico is a federal republic comprised of 32 states, with a “tremendous variation in levels of electoral 
democracy, social capital, opposition violence, ethnic cleavages, and modernization, thus inviting 
comparative analysis” (Beer & Mitchell, 2004, p. 298). Electoral sections stratified by state were used as 
the unit of reference. Results are accurate at a 95 percent confidence level, with an overall non-response 
rate of 8 percent. Detailed sampling and data collection techniques and response rate can be retrieved 
from http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/RCMD/studies/34670.  
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Figure 4. Map of the selected oversampled states 
 
 
Figure 5. Map of the selected north region and south region states subsample 
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3.3 Study variables 
The measures utilized in the study to explore the association between contextual and relational 
factors influencing mobilization in collective action are described below. To answer this study 
questions, 87 selected individual items out of the 248 included in the survey were used. The 
selection resulted from an exploration of question the question wording, data screening 
procedures, and preliminary statistical analysis (see the analysis plan section below). 
The main analysis was conducted using structural equation modeling (SEM) for which 13 
variables were used; eight variables were built from selected single items and five demographic 
variables were single original items. Other bivariate and multivariate tests, including regression 
analysis, were conducted previously to examine the relationships between the selected variables 
and other variables of interest. For the complete list of items and questions used for each 
measure, see Appendix, Table A. 
Recoding and construction building of the variables helped to improve parsimony21 and 
to assure there were no different levels of measurement which could compromise the analysis, 
the interpretation of results and the comparison among variables (Kline, 2011; Schumacker & 
Lomax, 2011). The variables used for this study were examined for normality and distribution 
with univariate and bivariate analyses. The reliability and validity of the constructs were 
examined using Cronbach’s alpha. To assess construct validity the selected range of acceptable 
internal consistency (α ≥ 0.60, ideal α = 0.80) was used together with an examination of factor 
loadings and exploration of the question-wording. Standard deviation and variance statistics were 
also estimated for each item.  
                                                           
21
 By using a composite of items, the reliability of the composite can be calculated, and fixing the value of 
the relevant measurement error can be considered, thus reducing the need to estimate an additional 
parameter (Schumacker & Lomax, 2011, p. 192). 
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3.3.1 Dependent Variable 
Mobilization for Collective Action is the main outcome of this study and it is measured by 
a series of indicators of people’s participation in various activities aimed at influencing or 
producing change. Collective action literature has defined collective mobilization as the activities 
pursued by a group to achieve social and political common purposes (Ethridge, 1987; McAdam 
et al., 2004). Acting collectively involves the organization of processes, the mobilization of 
resources as well as designing strategies. It also relates to the varied spaces in which action is 
developed. Activities that individuals do with others with a purpose of political or social change 
include social manifestation, civic participation and political protest (Johansson & Vinthagen, 
2014; Pearlman, 2013; Stockemer, 2013).  
Mobilization in collective action was measured using eight dichotomous items (No = 0, 
Yes = 1)22, accordingly. Respondents answered the question “In the past year have you…”: i) 
participated in associations, ii) contacted an influential person, iii) made the media interested in a 
topic, iv) participated in an informative campaign, v) participated in an election campaign, vi) 
participated in a march or protest, vii) contacted a representative, and viii) participated in a sit-in 
protests. These items were employed in the statistical analyses as a compound built in a latent 
variable named “Mobilization for Collective Action” (MobCA) (α= 0.6484).  
These eight items used to build the construct were examined and selected after 
conducting Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) with principal-component factor analysis (PCF) 
and oblimin rotation23. EFA allowed exploration of the underlying factors in the given set of 
variables. The purpose was to test the best-factor solution measuring the various components of 
                                                           
22
 For analyses purposes, all original dichotomous items were reverse coded. 
23
 PCF is the default oblique rotation method used, it allows assuming that the factors are correlated. 
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collective mobilization. Results show the viability of a one-factor solution loading. Additionally, 
Cronbach alpha was tested for the referred set of items. The new variable was created using a 
sum of the means of the eight selected items. 
3.3.2 Independent variables for the main analyses 
Social Capital: The literature on Social Capital have stressed the importance of 
explaining social relationships dynamics and the resulting agreements, norms and institutions 
which positively contribute solving social problems and empowering communities (Field, 2003; 
Portes, 1998; Svendsen & Svendsen, 2009). For that matter, social capital is defined as the set of 
resources by which individuals relate to each other and build sustainable social relationships 
(Bourdieu, 1986; Coleman, 1988). Despite the empirical difficulty of measuring and testing 
social capital (Sabatini, 2009), most studies examine it by looking at generalized trust and 
solidarity, membership activity or voluntary work, working with others and with the community, 
and various forms of social interaction (Ostrom & Ahn, 2009; Portes, 2000; Svendsen & 
Svendsen, 2009; Tzanakis, 2013). The multidimensionality of this concept is therefore measured 
in this study by using items referring to trust and cohesion at the institutional, community and 
individual levels (see Appendix, Table A for the list of items and questions used for each 
construct). 
This concept was measured by four constructs: i) Trust Government Institutions, ii) Trust 
Security Institutions, iii) Social Cohesion, and iv) Community Help.  
The viability of each construct was observed in a two steps analysis. First, Exploratory 
Factor Analysis (EFA) with principal-component factor analysis (PCF) and oblimin rotation was 
used to test the best-fitting factor solution for each component of each construct. Second, 
Cronbach alpha was tested for each new variable, which was then constructed using the sum of 
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the means of the selected individual items. 
Trust Government Institutions (TrustGovInst) (α = 0.8646) consisted of six ordinal items 
(value range 1 = not any to 4 = a lot) asking respondents “how much do you trust…” i) the 
Presidency, ii) the Congress, iii) the Senate, iv) the Supreme Court of Justice, v) the State 
Governor and vi) the Mayor.  
Respondents’ trust in security institutions (TrustSecInst) (α = 0.8658) was assessed by 
two additional ordinal items (value range 1 = not any to 4 = a lot) asking respondents how much 
they trust i) the Army and ii) the Marine, two governmental institutions directly involved in 
providing security and protection in the context of the war on drugs.  
Social Cohesion (SocCohes) (α = 0.9288) a variable measuring the likelihood of 
community organization was constructed using eight ordinal items (value range 1 = not likely 
any to 4 = very likely) asking respondents “how likely is that in your community people will 
organize to solve issues such as…”; options included public services, delinquency, violence, 
education or health among others.  
The fourth measure for Social Capital was Community Help (CommHelp) (α = 0.8819) a 
construct using five ordinal items (value range 1 = not at all to 4 = a lot) asking people whether 
they were willing to help others with i) time, ii) work, iii) money, iv) materials or v) food.  
Political Culture: Studies on political culture literature looks to extensively account for 
the relevance of political and democratic processes for social life (Almond, 2000; Chilton, 1988; 
Formisano, 2001; Lichterman & Cefaï, 2006). The concept of political culture considers the 
extent to which individuals are well informed about the institutions, processes, and issues 
relevant to the political life; it includes political interest and political participation (Bateson, 
2012; Beer & Mitchell, 2004) and political behavior on diverse environments (Atkinson & 
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Fowler, 2014; Durlauf, 1999). Accordingly, Political Culture captures the levels of political 
awareness, levels, and forms of participation and forms of commitment, as well as how much 
individuals know and remain aware about the political life (see Table 1).  
For analysis, the constructs were built using Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) with 
principal-component factor analysis (PCF) and oblimin rotation. The results displayed the best-
fitting factor solution for each construct. After testing for Cronbach’s alpha, the new variable 
was built using the sum of the means of the selected individual items.  
This construct was measured using two constructs, i) Political knowledge and ii) Being 
informed. First, Political Knowledge (PolKnow) (α = 0.5592) captures respondents’ awareness of 
issues related to national authorities and institutions and was measured by three dichotomous 
(No = 0, Yes = 1) questions: i) “do you know the name of the President?”, ii) “do you know the 
name of the three Powers of the Union?”, and iii) “do you know the how long is the tenure of a 
federal representative?”. For analyses purposes, all items responses were reverse coded.  
Being Informed (Informed) (α = 0.7256) was measured using a compound of six ordinal 
items (value range 1 = never to 4 = always) asking respondents the frequency with which they 
get informed by a) the Television, b) the Radio, c) Magazines, d) Friends and family, and e) the 
Internet.  
The Context: The hypothesized influence of the context on people’s mobilization was 
examined by looking at the indirect effect of respondents’ i) Fear of crime and ii) Exposure to 
violence on mobilization for collective action. In contexts characterized by high social conflict 
and criminal violence, the conditions of the environment are critical components for collective 
action; specifically, because of the emotions processes and repeated exposure behavior is 
affected (Baele et al., 2016; Halperin & Pliskin, 2015; Pearlman, 2013). Because of the context, 
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individuals may change or refrain from engaging in regular activities (Vilalta, 2010, 2013), or 
might use those experiences to collectively propose changes at the social or political levels 
(Groenendyk, 2011; Sabucedo & Vilas, 2014). Moreover, living in such environments may 
translate into experiences that might lead individuals to act for change or to develop measures for 
self-protection (Heinle et al., 2015; Zizumbo-Colunga, 2010). 
Both measures were built using a series of items analyzed using Exploratory Factor 
Analysis (EFA) with principal-component factor analysis (PCF) and oblimin rotation. After 
verifying the best-fitting factor solution for each construct and testing for Cronbach alpha, the 
new variables were constructed using the sum of the means of the selected individual items (see 
table A). 
Exposure to violence (ExpViol) (α = 0.6628) is a measure built from 12 dichotomous 
items (No = 0, Yes = 1) collecting responses on people’s having experienced direct violence; 
items included having heard occasional gunshots, having been beaten, severely injured or having 
been kidnapped or tortured, among others. Specifically, it will account for the material and 
physical harm intentionally perpetrated by crime or by the state violent actions. All item 
responses were reverse coded for purposes of the analysis.  
Fear (α = 0.9047) was measured by using 11 dichotomous reverse coded items (No = 0, 
Yes = 1). Respondents answered the question “during this year have you stopped … because of 
fear of being a victim of drug-related violence?” Options included going out at night, going out 
for fun, letting their children go out, using public transportation or using a taxi, or stopped 
visiting family and friends, among others.  
Demographic characteristics: this study used measures of Age (value range 18 to 89), 
Gender (Male = 0, Female = 1), Education (recoded to values ranging None = 1 to High = 5), 
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Employment (recoded to Non-employed or unemployed = 0, Employed = 1). For locality, 
identification of State, a count variable with seven values was used. Table A summarizes the 
original item values and the descriptive statistics for these variables.  
3.3.3 Other independent variables of interest 
The influence of other individual and contextual conditions of interest were examined 
using regression analysis. These included 12 additional measures of social relationships, political 
awareness and respondent’s emotions and experiences relevant for this research’s argument but 
not directly observed in the main analysis. The measures utilized to explore these additional 
factors are explained below (see Table 1 for the descriptive statistics, including mean and 
standard deviations). 
Trust in People (TrustPpl) was measured using a single item registering respondents’ 
answer to the question “do you think most people can be trusted?”. How much individuals trust 
other people is a measure used in social capital studies to account for interpersonal relationships 
with others (Coleman, 1988; Ostrom & Ahn, 2009). For analysis purposes, the item was recoded 
and dichotomized (No = 0, Yes = 1) to capture positive and negative answers. 
Two measures accounting for people’s levels of awareness and involvement in the 
political life were included (Bateson, 2012; Flores Cuamea & Núñez Noriega, 2016). Together, 
these two measures account for people´s levels of awareness and involvement in the political 
life, as well as their commitment to others and their community. Interested in politics (Interested) 
is a single recoded dichotomous item (No = 0, Yes = 1) for peoples’ expressed interest in 
political issues. Law compliance (LawCompl) is a measure that measures people’s conviction to 
obey the law; it answers the question of “When you think you are right, are you willing to go 
against the law?” The item was reverse coded to register responses in terms of law compliance.  
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The effect of the context in peoples’ lives was additionally accounted for with two 
measures. Feeling safe (Safe) used a single recoded item registering responses to the question 
“how safe do you feel with the army in the streets?” Being concerned about the levels of 
violence was examined using a compound measure, Concern (α = 0.8012) built using three 
ordinal items (value range Nothing = 1 to A lot = 4) asking respondents how worried they were 
about drug-related violence in i) the country, ii) the community, and iii) the state. To examine the 
reliability and validity of the measure, Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) with principal-
component factor analysis (PCF) and oblimin rotation was conducted. Results displayed a one-
factor solution for this construct; after testing for Cronbach’s alpha, the measure was built by 
using the sum of the means of the selected items (see Table A).  
Three other items were used to examine the effect of respondent’s opinion on the 
government performance in relation to the War on Drugs. Their approval of the government’s 
actions (GovActWoD) was measured using a single ordinal recoded item (value range 
Disapprove = 0 to Approve = 3). Respondents’ perception on how successful the government is 
at the War on Drugs (GovWinWoD) was measured with a single dichotomous item (No = 0, Yes 
= 1) registering responses to the question “In your opinion, is the government winning the fight 
against drug dealing?”. Government’s actions to obtain information for the War on Drugs 
(GovObtInf) was measured with a single list experiment item24. For it, respondents were asked: 
“how many of the following activities do you think the government should do in order to gather 
information to fight drug dealing?” The given options included: i) spy on the cartels, ii) 
                                                           
24
 The list experiment is a technique used for sensitive topics (Lavrakas, 2008). This survey uses two sets 
of questions with different number of response options, one with 4 options, another with 5. For estimation 
we used the sum of the standardized the values for the individual measures.  
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interrogate any citizen with no justified reason, iii) install more checkpoints, iv) granting pardon 
to cooperating drug traffickers, and v) torturing detainees25.  
Citizen’s involvement was likewise examined using two measures. First, CtzActWoD (α = 
0.6849) was used to measure respondents’ approval on citizen’s acts on the War on Drugs. The 
measure was built using the sum of the means of the two ordinal items (value range Not at all = 0 
to Agree a lot = 3) on respondent’s levels of agreement on others i) lynch criminals, and ii) 
organize in self-defense groups to protect themselves in the context of the War on Drugs. The 
second, CtzOrgCr (α = 0.6586) is a compound measure accounting for people’s opinion on 
citizen’s collaborating with organized crime a compound of two ordinal items (value range 
Unacceptable and unjustified = 0 to Acceptable and justifiable = 2) using also the list experiment 
technique (see Table A). Both constructs were built using the sum of the means of the selected 
items. Beforehand, Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) with principal-component factor analysis 
(PCF) and oblimin rotation was used to verify the one-factor solution for each measure, and 
Cronbach’s alpha was tested for reliability.  
Lastly, two contextual measures were included. Economy (α = 0.5592) used two ordinal 
items (value range from 1 = very bad to 5 = very good) to register respondents’ opinion on i) 
how bad the current situation of the economy is and ii) their opinion on the state of the economy 
compared to the previous year. A measure of the appreciation of three human rights (Rights) (α = 
0.5079) was also used. The measure was built using three dichotomous items (No =0, Yes =1) 
asking respondents on whether they thought i) abortion, ii) marihuana consumption, and iii) 
same-sex marriage should be legal. The viability of the two measures was examined using 
Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) with principal-component factor analysis (PCF) and oblimin 
                                                           
25
 This was the list experiment modified option. 
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rotation. A one-factor solution was observed for each construct and Cronbach’s alpha was tested. 
Next, each measure was built using the sum of the means of the selected individual items.  
3.4 Analysis plan 
The statistical methods utilized to test the hypothesized relationships, including 
exploratory and univariate analysis, as well as multivariate methods for the main analysis are 
described below. The analysis was conducted using Stata 13 software. The main analysis 
explores five dimensions (see Figure 5): 1) the influence of Social Capital on mobilization for 
collective action, 2) the association of Social Capital and Political Culture, 3) the mediating 
effect of Political Culture, and the influence of 4) exposure to violence and 5) fear of crime in the 
effect that Political Culture has on collective mobilization. A sixth dimension, the varying effects 
across localities of all these associations, is also examined.  
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Figure 6. Analytical model 
 
As explained before, two types of statistical procedures were conducted. Regression 
analysis used a set of 25 selected measures and items (see Figure 7) and SEM used a refined 
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group of 13 variables that allowed to answer the core of the research questions (see Figure 8). 
3.4.1 Data preparation 
Missing data: The characteristics of the data allowed us to expect no missing data issues 
that would affect the analysis or the results of the study. Data screening was used to identify any 
missing values of the variables included in the statistical models and the exploratory analysis.  
The variables used in the main analysis registered less than 2% missing values. Most 
variables used in the preliminary descriptive and exploratory analyses registered no greater than 
4.5% missing values with the exception of Trust in People, which showed up to 11% missing 
values because of recoding26 (see Table 1). Given the large sample size (N = 7,416) the statistical 
power of the statistical analysis is not compromised27. There was no concern that missing values 
would affect the number of cases available for analysis nor a dramatic reduction of the cases for 
computation. Therefore, the statistical analysis in the study dealt with missing values using 
listwise deletion technique, the usual treatment in Stata 13. The final sample used in SEM 
analysis in this study consisted of 7,210 cases, and 1,768 and 1,655 for the north states and the 
south states subsamples respectively. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
3.5 Statistical Analysis 
3.5.1 Univariate and bivariate analysis 
Univariate analysis was conducted to describe the demographic characteristics of the 
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 The original item had tree values: 1: Most people can be trusted, 2: You should always watch your 
back, 3: there are of all sorts / it depends). Value 3 was recoded to missing, 822 missing values resulted. 
27
 Because of the several variables and parameter estimates that are typically not independent and have 
different standard errors, the determination of power and sample size in SEM is complicated (Schumacker 
& Lomax, 2010: 93). A rule of thumb is that a sample of 100 to 150 cases is necessary to maintain power 
and precision of parameter estimates for small SEM models (Schumacker & Lomax, 2011, p. 50).  
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sample and distribution of the variables associated with the country and the context. Statistics 
computed included frequencies and two-way tabulations to obtain the mean, variance, and 
standard deviations, as well as skewedness and kurtosis (see Table 1).  
To examine the relationships between the dependent and independent variables, bivariate 
correlations were obtained. Results showed the association between mobilization for collective 
action and respondent’s emotions and opinions due to the context of violence. The relationships 
between the dependent variable MobCA and the Social Capital and Political Culture measures 
were also examined (See Appendix, Table B and Table C). 
3.5.2 Multivariate analyses 
First, multiple regression (MR) was conducted to examine the relationships between the 
dependent variable (MobCA) and all selected variables related to emotions and experiences of 
the context, Social Capital, and Political Culture (see Figure 7). This form of linear regression 
uses the observed data to estimate the strength of the direct effect of each indicator on the study 
outcome. Moreover, by conducting Multiple Regression (MR), it was possible to appreciate 
relationship between the set of explanatory variables and the dependent variable.  
The analyses allowed observation of the extent to which individual characteristics and 
locality were relevant components that influence the hypothesized relationships for this study, 
specifically, mobilization for collective action. In other words, using regression analysis, the 
association between individual characteristics (age, gender, education, and employment) and the 
place of living (state) with mobilization for collective action was examined (Question 1. Are 
individual characteristics associated with a) Social Capital and b) Political Culture related to 
collective mobilization of citizens living in contexts of enduring conflict? and Question 2. Do the 
observed relationships have varying effects across locations?).  
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Multiple regression analysis also tested for the influence of various economic, social, and 
political conditions of the environment and respondents’ opinions and emotions related to the 
war on drugs on their collective action. The results helped support which measures were relevant 
to explain people’s mobilization for collective action. Additionally, it helped distinguish the 
emotions, experiences, and opinions that were pertinently included to answer the research 
questions. 
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Figure 7. Analytical plan for Regression Analysis 
 
In this phase, four models were estimated. The base line model (M1) examined the 
association between the dependent variable MobCA and the set of 23 variables of interest. 
Results were inspected, and the model was refined by removing the variables displaying 
nonsignificant values. The result was a best fitting model for the observed variables (M2). The 
third and fourth models used separately the two core dimensions of interest: a) emotions and 
experiences (M3), and b) Social Capital and Political Culture (M4). The precise purpose of 
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Model 3 and Model 4 was to observe the relevance of the associations between the dependent 
variable and the measures for the second phase analysis.  
Building from MR results, Structural Equation Modeling regression analysis (SEM) with 
maximum likelihood (ML) estimation method was used to examine the relationships between 
emotional and contextual factors with social and political indicators, and their influence on 
collective mobilization (see Figure 8). 
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Figure 8. Analytical plan for Structural Equation Modeling 
 
SEM is a technique that allows researchers to statistically model and test complex 
phenomena by conducting a series of structural equations. The models’ structure responds to 
various theoretical propositions hypothesizing “how sets of variables define constructs and how 
these constructs are related to each other” (Schumacker & Lomax, 2011, p. 2). As an extension 
of multiple regression and factor analysis, SEM essentially combines path models and 
confirmatory factor models to examine multiple relationships between observed and latent 
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variables28 as well as accounts for measurement errors of each variable providing scores with 
greater validity and reliability (Schumacker & Lomax, 2011).  
To interpret SEM the results various goodness of fit tests between the sample data and 
the theoretical model need to be inspected29 (Cupani, 2012; Schumacker & Lomax, 2011). For 
this study, different model fit criteria were used to assess model fit, model comparison, and 
model parsimony (Schumacker & Lomax, 2010). For model fit, the most common statistics were 
used: chi-square (χ2), Root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA) and Standardized 
Root-mean square residual (SRMR). Model comparison was examined with the comparative fit 
index (CFI) and the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI). To assess the parsimony of the model the Akaike 
information criterion (AIC) were used. Finally, to account for the proportion of the variance in 
the dependent variable predicted from the independent variables, the coefficient of determination 
(CD or R-squared) was used. 
According to the accepted convention (Kline, 2011; Schumacker & Lomax, 2011), a 
nonsignificant value for χ2 is aimed, while for SRMR and RMSEA, tests indicating the fit 
between the hypothesized model and sample data, values less or equal to 0.05 are considered 
good fit values. For CFI and TLI, both comparing the proposed model with a null model, as well 
as for PNFI and AIC that consider the number of degrees of freedom and the differing numbers 
of latent variables respectively, values close to 0.95 indicate good fit.  
The models were conducted using four demographic variables (age, gender, education 
                                                           
28
 A latent variable is a supposed construct that can only be measured by a set of observed variables; it is 
created by using confirmatory factor models set by the researcher based on an a priori specified 
theoretical model. 
29
 The fit is verified if the values of the estimated parameters reproduce as closely as possible the 
observed covariance matrix (the variance-covariance terms of the bivariate variables) (Schumacker & 
Lomax, 2011).  
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and employment), 16 observed variables and three latent variables. In SEM two models are 
included; one is the measurement model displaying how observed indicators are related to 
underlying latent variables, the other is the structural model which shows how the latent 
variables are related to each other30 (Kline, 2011; Schumacker & Lomax, 2011). The model 
included three latent variables (Social Capital, Political Culture, and Mobilization in Collective 
Action) of which only Social Capital is exogenous. There are two additional exogenous observed 
variables (ExpViol and Fear) and two endogenous observed variables (Age and Employment). 
Social Capital is comprised of four observed variables, Political Culture two observed variables, 
and Mobilization in Collective Action eight observed variables. Finally, the direct arrows show 
an expected direct effect relation (see Figure 9), while the double arrow line (see Figure 10) 
indicates an estimated covariance effect between the observed variables. 
                                                           
30
 The measurement model represents the relationships between the latent variables and their indicators, 
while the structural model represents the interrelation between constructs. The measurement model allows 
the researcher to validate the suitability of the selected indicators in the constructs of interest. (Cupani, 
2012). 
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Figure 9. SEM baseline model 
 
The proposed model was estimated. Upon results, the parameters were adjusted to obtain 
the best fitting model solution without compromising the theoretical assumptions of the study 
(Figure 10). The inspection looked at the coefficient values, significance, and direction for each 
of the specified parameters. Modification indices for all non-free parameters were also examined 
to identify the largest coefficient value suggesting that fixing a parameter will most likely 
improve the model fit31. The examination also allowed to determine if a particular covariance 
should be included to better explain the observed relationships.  
To honor the theoretical assumptions for the study, covariances between the observed 
variables and the measurement errors were first identified (double arrow line). Using available 
and relevant theory and research, a new model was specified. After estimation, goodness of fit 
                                                           
31
 “These values serve as an indication of the strength of the structural relationships (prediction measure) 
and are also scaled from 0 to 1” (Schumacker & Lomax, 2010: 65) 
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was reassessed showing the pertinence and strength of the model to represent the relationships of 
interest in this study as well as reflects the hypothesized direct and indirect effects of Social 
Capital and Political Culture on mobilization, and the effect of emotions and experiences of 
violence in these relationships.  
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Figure 10. SEM final model 
 
Eight models were conducted with SEM; six models used the national sample to examine 
this study hypothesized relationships, two additional models were separately estimated for the 
high violent north states and south states subsamples.  
The first set of SEM models (M6 and its fixed version M6.1) examined three paths of 
associations. As portrayed in the diagram, levels of Social Capital are expected to have a direct 
effect over mobilization in collective action (1. Social Capital  Mob. in Coll. Action) and also, 
an indirect effect on Political Culture (2. Social Capital  Political Culture and). For this 
relationship, the total effect of Social Capital on mobilization will be the sum of its direct and 
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indirect effects. Additionally, the effect of respondents’ levels of Political Culture on 
mobilization in collective action was also estimated (3. Political Culture  Mob. in Coll. 
Action). Overall, these paths contribute to answer questions related to the association between 
the three main constructs: a) Social Capital, b) Political Culture on c) Mobilization for Collective 
Action as follows: 
Question 3: To what extent do levels of social capital influence mobilization for collective 
action of citizens living in contexts of enduring conflict? 
Question 4: How important is political culture for collective mobilization in these contexts? 
This study also looks at the forms in which exposure to violence and fear of crime affect 
the effect of Political Culture (4. Exposure to Violence  Political Culture, 5. Fear  Political 
Culture respectively) and of Social Capital (6. Exposure to Violence  Social Capital and 7. 
Fear  Social Capital) on mobilization in collective action. Therefore, four paths were added for 
the second set of SEM models (M7 and its fixed version M7.1). In other words, these models 
explored if Political Culture and Social Capital mediated the indirect effect of context variables 
(exposure to violence and fear of crime) on mobilization in collective action. Also, these 
relationships allowed answers to question 5 and question 6 in this study:  
Question 5: How much do i) emotions and ii) experiences about the context influence 
mobilization for collective action? 
Question 6: Is the relationship between i) emotions and ii) experiences of violence with iii) 
collective mobilization mediated by a) social capital and b) political culture? 
The third group of models included the paths for the sociodemographic variables on 
mobilization for collective action: Age, Education, Gender and Employment (M8). Its fixed 
version (M8.1) it is the final accepted model for the investigation. The final model illustrates the 
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analysis rationale of this study and includes the adequate paths for the hypothesized relationships 
between Social Capital and mobilization in collective action through a mediation relation –or 
indirect effect- of Political Culture, as well as an examination of the effect of the context on these 
associations. 
Lastly, the final model was examined for the two separate subsamples to observe the 
different associations for the north states subsample (M9) and the south states subsample (M10). 
This last set of models provided additional information to observe the varying effects across 
groups; that is, whether parameter estimates are different for each group as reflected in question 
2 (Do the observed relationships have varying effects across locations?). The study findings are 
presented and summarized in Chapter 4.  
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Chapter 4. Findings 
Chapter four will focus on the results of this study. First, the results of the univariate and 
bivariate analyses will be summarized. The univariate statistics include the sample descriptive of 
sociodemographic characteristics, emotions, and perceptions, as well as for social capital and 
political culture associated indicators. For the bivariate analysis, the data pairwise correlations 
and covariances were estimated. Next, the multivariate statistics conducted to answer the study 
questions are presented. Two types of multivariate statistics were used for the analyses. First, 
multiple regression analyses were used a group of selected variables to estimate the effects of the 
context-associated conditions, individual characteristics and the place of living as well as of the 
environment on mobilization in collective action (MobCA). Next, structural equation modeling 
was used to examine the complex relationships between emotional and contextual factors, on 
mobilization as well as the role of social capital and political culture on people’s collective 
action (MobCA). 
4.1 Preliminary findings 
4.1.1 Univariate Statistics 
Univariate analysis displayed the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the 
study sample (see Table 2). The table includes descriptive statistics for the study sample 
(national) as well as for the north states and south states subsamples. Results for the (national) 
study sample will be first described along with some noteworthy differences across regions for 
illustrative purposes.  
The average age for the study sample was 44.67 years old; most respondents were female 
(52.6%) and had completed less than High School level education (61.9%). With regards to 
employment status, more respondents reported being non-employed (44.6%) than self-
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employed/business owner (30.5%) or else as working in the private or public sectors (20.1%). At 
regional levels, statistics for the north states showed similar results; however, for the south states 
sample more people were self-employed respondents (41.1%) and less were working in the 
private or public sectors (13.3%). 
For the study sample, most individuals reported having completed less than high school 
level education (61.9%), compared to 56.4% and 74.7% for the north and the south states 
respectively. Differences in education levels across the three groups are worth mentioning. More 
specifically, the number of respondents in the north states that reported having completed High 
School or more education level was twice as high than those living in south states (41.3% and 
23.3% respectively). Additionally, three times more respondents in the south states had received 
no formal education in comparison to respondents in the north states (10% and 3.1% 
respectively). These differences suggest careful interpretation of the study findings will be 
needed, specifically regarding the potential varying effects of Education and its possible 
association with economic and social features of each region.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
The statistics for the dependent and independent variables used for the preliminary and 
the main analyses are displayed in Tables 2 and 3. A larger mean score in the dependent variable 
MobCA indicates more participation in collective action activities for social change. The same 
applies to the ordinal independent variables measuring Social Capital and Political Culture; for 
instance, higher mean values indicate more levels of trust, of social cohesion, and of how 
informed people report to be.  
As Table 3 shows, slight value differences were observed in the mean value for collective 
mobilization (MobCA) for the study sample (national) (0.05) as compared to north states (0.03) 
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and south states (0.06) subsamples. However, in forms of participation, some differences are 
worth noting. For instance, the study sample showed that the largest percentage of participation 
reported was for individuals that collaborated in an election campaign (8.1%) and the lowest 
percentage corresponded to individuals participating in sit-in or protest actions (2.9%) (see Table 
3). In other regions, proportions are quite different. Overall, respondents living in the south states 
appear to be more active in collective mobilization activities than in the north states. For 
instance, slightly more than 5% respondents living in the north states region reported as having 
participated in associations, compared to the 8.5% respondents living in the south states. Also, 
more than 11% respondents reported having collaborated in an election campaign in south states, 
but only 4.4% respondents in the north did (see Table 3). 
With regards to Social Capital, results showed that only 22.5% of respondents of the 
study sample trust other people, 9.8% of respondents reported that the community would likely 
organize to fight delinquency, 8.3% to advance environmental causes and 5.3% for politics. 
Overall, respondents from the north states reported having higher levels of social cohesion in all 
three items, and as much as twice more than respondents living in the south states (see Table 3). 
Careful interpretation of this finding is critical, as other current and historical socioeconomic 
differences, might affect each regions dynamics. Regarding helping the community, the study 
sample results indicated that respondents were more willing to help with time and work (17.1% 
and 16.5% respectively) than with money (8.4%).  
For Political Culture indicators, as much as 90.1% respondents reported knowing the 
President’s name, three times more than, for instance, naming the three powers of the Union 
(35.9%) The sources by which respondents stay informed show varied results. For instance, for 
the study sample, individuals reported they mostly watch television (39.1%) while a lot less use 
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the internet (5.4%) (see Table 3). While results are similar across the north and south regions, it 
is noteworthy that respondents living in the north states report reading the newspapers and 
listening to the radio as twice as much as those living in the south states. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Statistics for contextual and perceptions variables are displayed in Table 4. More than 
half of respondents had stopped walking in a specific area due to fear of drug-related violence 
(50.8%) and about 63% had stopped going out at night. Results for these items were similarly 
high for the two sub-samples, with values that went up as high as 72.8% for respondents living in 
the north states who reported they had stopped going out at night. Exposure to violence related 
variables displayed a wide range of statistical values. About half of respondents of the study 
sample indicated they had occasionally heard gunfire while only 4% have had to cover from the 
bullets (see Table 4). The mean values of feeling concerned about violence were similar for the 
three samples; however, some differences between the proportions of respondents for the 
individual items were observed. For instance, about 8 out of 10 respondents of the study sample 
were concerned about violence in Mexico, the state and the community (79.7%, 77.5%, and 
80.9% respectively), but the same feeling was reported by more respondents in the north states 
(more than 95% for each of the levels). 
Regarding perceptions on the war on drugs, half of the study sample approved the 
government’s actions in this context (50.1%) and about 30% indicated that the government was 
winning the war on drugs. Approval of citizen’s actions in relation to the war on drugs and drug-
related violence was found to be higher, as much as 80% of respondents were in favor of people 
organizing in self-defense groups and almost 68% approved criminal lynching. A large 
proportion of respondents, although not the majority, indicated that a peasant or a student 
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collaboration to drug dealing groups might be justified (46.5% and 33.1% respectively). 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
4.1.2 Bivariate Statistics 
The relationship between the dependent and the independent study variables was first 
estimated using Pearson correlation coefficients (see Table B in the Appendix A32). Examination 
of the sample characteristics and of the relationships between the study variables validating the 
strength of the constructs and relevance of the hypothesized relationships. Of all the 
sociodemographic items, Education was the only variable with significant coefficients with the 
dependent variable and all the independent variables. Specifically, results showed that Education 
had significant but moderate association with Age (r = ‒ 0.27, p < 0.01), PolKnow (r = 0.36, p < 
0.01), and Informed (r = 0.30, p < 0.01), and a significant but weak association with MobCA (r = 
0.12, p < 0.01), ExpViol (r = 0.15, p < 0.01) and CommHelp (r = 0.15, p < 0.01). Coefficient 
values of Education with Fear, TrustGovInst, TrustSecInst and SocCohes were statistically 
significant, however, there were smaller than 0.1 (r = 0.08, p < 0.01; r = ‒ 0.07, p < 0.01;   r = 
0.04, p < 0.01; and r = 0.05, p < 0.01 respectively). Employment coefficients were statistically 
significant for most variables, except for Fear, TrustGovInst and SocCohes. Specifically, for 
Employment and Informed (r = 0.12, p < 0.01), Age (r = ‒ 0.12, p < 0.01), and Education (r = 
0.14, p < 0.01), results show a statistically significant weak association. Based on the refereed 
results, the relevance of Age and Gender on MobCA was smaller than of the other 
sociodemographic variables (r = -0.03, p < 0.01, r = ‒ 0.11, p < 0.01 respectively). 
The displayed coefficients show that the strength and direction of the association between 
                                                           
32
 The full list of coefficients and significance values displayed in Table B correspond to the variables 
examined for the main analysis using SEM technique. 
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the dependent variable and all independent variables were as expected. Also, except for 
TrustGovInst, all coefficients were statistically significant (p < 0.01) for MobCA. While most of 
the values of the coefficients were small (<0.03) suggesting small strength correlation, it is their 
direction and significance which is informative for this study, allowing to support their relevance 
to answer the study questions. Results show that the largest coefficient values were observed 
between pairs of variables used to measure the main constructs of the study. Namely, for 
TrustGovInst‒TrustSecInst (r = 0.35, p < 0.01), SocCohes‒CommHelp (r = 0.33, p < 0.01), and 
PolKnow‒Informed (r = 0.27, p < 0.01). These results were indicative that the proposed 
measures built for SEM analysis were reliable and strong as expected. 
4.2 Multivariate procedures 
4.2.1 Regression analysis  
To examine the relationships between MobCA and a set of emotions and perceptions that 
people have as a result from the context, as well as with their social and political resources, three 
sets of regression models were estimated (see Table 5). The analyses were conducted in two 
steps; first, a baseline model was estimated. Next, the variables with non-statistically significant 
coefficients were identified and removed. After this, the resulting adjusted model was estimated.  
The first pair of models (M1 and M2) examined the effect of a set of 25 independent 
variables (5 of which were demographics variables) on mobilization for collective action 
(MobCA). After examining the results of the baseline model (M1) nine independent variables 
were removed. The adjusted model (M2) results show the significant effect of most independent 
variables on collective action. To observe in detail the effect of the context-associated variables 
and the Social Capital and Political Culture variables in detail, two additional models were 
estimated. The first (M3) examined the effect of 11 variables associated with emotions and 
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experiences on MobCA, while the second (M4) used the remaining nine variables measuring 
Social Capital and Political Culture. Finally, three models were conducted to estimate the effects 
of the 13 study variables used in the adjusted model (M2) on MobCA. One model was estimated 
for the study sample (M5), one for the north states subsample (M5.1), and another for the south 
states subsample (M5.2). The results are summarized below (see Table 5 and Table 6 for the full 
of the results).  
Overall results for all models show the marginal effect of Age and Gender, while 
Education and Employment displayed results with mixed effects for the different levels. For 
instance, Age presented a consistent nonsignificant effect for the dependent variable. Regarding 
Education, MidHigh Education level was statistically significant only in M3 (when controlled 
for emotions and perceptions) while High Education level showed a statistically significant 
coefficient in M3 and M4 (Social Capital and Political Culture variables controlled for) (see 
Table 5).  
In addition, results show the overall weak and nonsignificant effect of most variables 
associated to the context of the war on drugs. Specifically, Safe and Concern from the emotions 
set, and Economy, GovWinWoD, GovActWoD, CtzActWoD, and CtzOrgCr from the perceptions 
variables, repeatedly displayed nonsignificant coefficients in all models. These results were a 
determining reason for these nine variables to be removed from the main analysis for this study. 
Contrarily, results for ExpViol and Fear were consistently strong and statistically significant in 
all models (M1, M2, M3, and M5) (see Table 5 and Table 6). The same trend was observed for 
most variables associated with Social Capital and Political Culture (see M1, M2, and M4 in 
Table 5). Specifically, except for TrustGovInst, all variables displayed a statistically significant 
coefficient effect on people's mobilization in collective action, when other variables were 
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controlled for.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
As for the models using the north and south states subsamples (M5.1 and M5.2 
respectively), results show some differences in the coefficients for Fear, TrustSecInst, SocCohes 
and CommHelp, as well as for Gender. In particular, the coefficient values of Fear, SocCohes, 
and Gender were statistically significant only for the south states, while TrustSecInst and 
CommHelp coefficient results were significant only for the north states (see Table 6).  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
4.2.2 Structural Equation Modeling 
Building from regression analyses, Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) was used to 
estimate the influence of the sociodemographic variables Age, Gender, Education, and 
Employment on MobCA (Question 1). In addition, the influence of Social Capital measures on 
mobilization for collective action (Question 3), the indirect effect and mediating role of Political 
Culture (Question 4 and Question 6) and the relationships between the context-associated 
emotions and experiences on MobCA (Question 5) were also estimated. Three sets of models 
allowed to explore these assumptions.  
The models were estimated with Stata 13 and used the maximum likelihood (ML) 
method. Results are presented in Table 7 and a number of diagrams are provided to show the 
standardized path coefficients and standard errors for the models. The analytical rationale for 
obtaining the models included preliminary analyses to detect the pertinence and statistical 
significance of each of the selected measures, as follows33. Exploratory factor analyses 
                                                           
33
 Please note that coefficients and covariance of measurement errors omitted from figure 11 to figure 18 
to reduce the complexity of the diagrams. 
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conducted during data preparation were also used to validate the Structural Equation Modeling 
procedures described in the next section. 
First, a baseline model (M6) was estimated to observe the core of the hypothesized 
relationships for this study: the complex multidimensional relationships between respondent’s 
social capital and political culture and their mobilization in collective action. In this model, three 
paths were used to estimate the direct effect of SocCap on MobCA (1), the indirect effect of 
SocCap on MobCA mediated by PolCult (2) and the effect of PolCult on MobCA (3) (see Figure 
11)34. 
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Figure 11. Model 6 (baseline) 
                                                           
34
 All models structure utilized a total of 13 observed variables to measure three latent variables as 
follows: four observed variables (TrustGovInst, TrustSecInst, SocCohes and CommHelp) were used to 
measure the latent variable Social Capital; PolKnow and Informed observed variables were used for the 
latent variable Political Culture; and to measure the latent dependent variable MobCA, eight observed 
variables were used (Assoc, InflPrs, MediaInt, InfmCamp, ElectCamp, MarchProt, Repres and SitInProt); 
additionally, 15 measurement errors were estimated. 
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As shown in Figure 10, all paths estimated in M6 were statistically significant (p < 
0.001). The direct positive effects of Political Culture on MobCA and the mediating effects of 
Political Culture on Social Capital were observed. Specifically, Social Capital was found to have 
a negative significant direct effect on MobCA indicating that individuals reporting higher levels 
of trust and social relations are less engaged in activities for collective action. Overall, the model 
allowed to observe the significance of the structural and measurement paths as well as the 
existence of direct relationships between this study measures. However, goodness of fit statistics 
showed mild results (see Table 7). Modification indices were estimated, after which, four paths 
to examine the correlation for the error terms were included; none of the structural model paths 
was modified (see Figure 12).35  
The adjusted model (M6.1) allowed to further verify the strength, significance, and 
direction of the relationships between the principal measures of this study. Moreover, this model 
displays the complex role of political culture mediation for an increased effect of social capital 
on the dependent variable. The standardized coefficients for all paths were statistically 
significant (p < 0.001) as well as the correlations among error terms (p < 0.05) (see Figure 12). It 
is noted that, after the adjustment, the coefficient for Social Capital on MobCA for this model 
changed direction for a positive significant effect. In other words, when the error terms for the 
                                                           
35
 The estimation of modification indices is estimated in SEM to identify all non-free parameters that, if 
estimated, most likely will improve model fit; the estimated coefficient value for each parameter 
displayed in the modification indices suggest the contribution that parameter will have to the fitting of the 
model. The analysis process involved examination of the parameters with the largest estimated coefficient 
value to determine if a particular covariance between observed variables or between the error terms 
should be included to better explain the observed relationships. Fundamental criteria to determine the 
possible modification of the model are the theoretical assumptions. To honor this, covariances between 
the observed variables and the measurement errors were first identified. Accordingly, this study’s 
theoretical framework guided the definition of the new model. 
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structural latent variables were allowed to correlate, Social Capital had a positive effect on 
people mobilizing for collective action.  
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Figure 12. Model 6.1 (adjusted) 
 
Overall, the adjusted model (M6.1) has good fit results (see Table 7). The chi-square test 
was significant (χ2 = 1,889.39, df = 74, p = 0.001) suggesting the theoretical model does not fit 
the data sample well and that more paths should be included. However, this statistic is only one 
approach of the model consistency with the covariance data but it does not indicate whether the 
model is correct (Kline, 2011). Accordingly, other relevant information of the model fit is 
needed (Schumacker & Lomax, 2010). Taken together, the selected statistics for model fit (χ2, 
RMSEA and SRMR), model comparison (CFI and TLI), and model parsimony (AIC) supported 
the overall goodness of fit for the model fit of the model (RMSEA = 0.02, SRMR = 0.02, CFI = 
0.97, TLI = 0.96). Moreover, the model accounted for 53% of the variance in mobilization for 
collective action (R2 = 0.53). 
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[Insert Table 7 about here] 
The influence of the context was examined next (M7). The purpose of this model was to 
capture the indirect effect of the context on the influence of Social Capital and Political Culture 
on MobCA. For that reason, paths for Exposure and Fear observed measures were included36. 
Results showed that most estimated paths, including the covariances of the error terms, were 
statistically significant (p < 0.001) (see Figure 13). However, the direct effects tested of 
Exposure and Fear each on Social Capital showed to be non-statistically significant. Finally, it 
was noted that, given the strong and significant influence of Emotions and Fear on Political 
Culture, the latent variable Social Capital has a negative significant direct effect on MobCA. This 
is, when exposure and fear to violence are accounted for, Social Capital appears to inhibit people 
mobilizing for collective action. On the contrary, context-associated measures have an indirect 
positive effect on people’s mobilization due to the mediating role of people’s political 
knowledge and levels of information about politics.  
                                                           
36
 After analytical and theoretical review, one additional covariance was included for estimation; this 
modification allowed for the measurement of the error terms of two observed variables used for Political 
Culture: PolKnow and Informed. 
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Figure 13. Model 7 (baseline) 
 
Based on these results and following the analysis rationale for this study, two paths were 
removed (Exposure  Social Capital, and Fear  Social Capital) (see Figure 14). The adjusted 
model (M7.1) results showed the indirect and strong statistically significant effect of Emotions 
and Fear on MobCA mediated by Political Culture. The standardized coefficients for all paths 
and correlations among error terms were statistically significant (p < 0.001). Overall, the 
goodness of fit statistics also showed that the model fits well to the sample data, but most of all, 
that the adjusted model accounts for as much as 88% of the variance in the dependent variable 
(R2 = 0.879) (see Table 7). 
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Figure 14. Model 7.1 (adjusted) 
 
The next set of models estimated the direct effect of the sociodemographic variables on 
people’s levels of collective action (M8 and M8.1). The baseline model (M8) included four new 
paths for Age, Education, Gender and Employment on MobCA (see Figure 15). Results showed 
the small effect of all four, being Education the only variable with a statistically significant 
coefficient result. All other estimated paths, in both the structural and measurement models, were 
statistically significant in showing the consistency of the hypothesized models. Accordingly, and 
informed by the theory and the results obtained in regression analysis (Table 7), the paths for 
Gender and Employment were removed; estimation for Age was kept because of its theoretical 
interest for this study (Schumacker & Lomax, 2010: 64). 
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Figure 15. Model 8 (baseline) 
 
As a result, the final model for this study (M8.1) included one independent latent variable 
(Social Capital), one independent mediating variable (Political Culture), and four observed 
independent variables (Emotions, Fear, Age and Education) having indirect and direct effects on 
the dependent latent variable Mobilization for Collective Action (MobCA) (see Figure 16). Apart 
from for Age, results showed statistically significant coefficients for all variables; as for the 
direction of the effect, all variables but Social Capital showed having a positive effect on 
MobCA. Specifically, Social Capital, Emotions and Fear with the mediation of Political Culture 
have a strong positive effect on mobilization for collective action; however, Social Capital by 
itself has a negative effect on people’s mobilization for collective action. This is, the more social 
relationships, social cohesion, and trust people report to have, the less they mobilize with others 
for the purposes of social change.  
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The goodness of fit statistics for the final model showed strong and acceptable results. As 
explained before, despite that the chi-square value was significant (χ2 = 2,229.19, df = 121, p = 
0.001) which suggested the existence of a potentially better theoretical model to fit the data 
sample, the model fit was not compromised. On the contrary, all the other statistics showed to be 
acceptable and within the conventional criteria (Kline, 2011; Schumacker & Lomax, 2011) 
(RMSEA = 0.05, SRMR = 0.04, CFI = 0.82, TLI = 0.78) and a large proportion of variance 
(90%) explained for mobilization of collective action (R2 = 0.90). 
To further observe the suitability of this model, modification indices were estimated; 
nevertheless, the paths suggested by this calculation (Education  Political Culture, and 
Education  MobCA) were not in line with the theoretical model hypothesized in this study. In 
other words, their inclusion would represent a significant alteration of the assumptions and aims 
of the research. Other than its practical character, adding the recommended path would have no 
substantive interest for the research, which should be the “guiding force in a specification 
search” (Schumacker & Lomax, 2010: 64). 
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Figure 16. Model 8.1 (adjusted) 
 
The last analytical step was conducted to test the final model structure (M8.1) in two 
separate subsamples, one for the north states and another for the south states (M9 and M10 
respectively). The aim was to observe differences, if any, between these groups. It should be 
noted that for this test, the paths included for the models were not modified; our purpose was 
rather to explore whether the presumed economic and social differences between two regions 
with high levels of violence displayed similar results for the same relationships.  
As shown in Table 7, all parameters in M9 and M10, except Age on MobCA, were 
statistically significant. These results indicate that, despite the different sample size, results were 
consistent with this study hypothesis. Finally, goodness of fit statistics for both models were 
mostly alike. While values for each test appear to be in the lower limit of a good fit, this might be 
the effect of a smaller sample size (Schumacker & Lomax, 2010), a larger proportion of the 
variance of the dependent variable was explained by these last two models (R2 = 0.96 and R2 = 
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0.95 respectively) (see Figure 17 and Figure 18 respectively).  
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Figure 17. Model 9 Final model for the north region states 
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Figure 18. Model 10 Final model for the south region states. 
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Summary of main findings 
Overall, the results of this study statistical analysis revealed a negative significant 
influence of Social Capital on mobilization for collective action. Additionally, given the results 
for the mediation of Political Culture measure, the positive strong effect of the context on 
mobilizing for collective action was observed. Finally, the compound of social relationships, 
trust and social cohesion (Social Capital) was found to be significant for mobilization in 
collective action outcomes only when mediated by people’s levels of knowledge and information 
about the political realm (Political Culture). In other words, the relevance of Political Culture 
was observed in mediating the effect of the hostility of the context expressed by respondent’s 
fear and experiences of violence. Results also exhibited the marginal effect of individual 
characteristics for mobilization in collective action; only Education showed to be significant 
which suggests that the more educated people were, the more they were inclined to organize with 
others to advance social change when living in contexts of violence and drug-related crime. 
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Chapter 5. Discussion 
This research examined the effects of social capital and political culture variables on people 
mobilizing for collective action in contexts of enduring conflict. The influence of context-related 
variables, such as fear to crime and exposure to violence was also examined. Specifically, the 
analysis looked at individual and collective responses of Mexican citizens, a context of 
prevailing criminal violence and the weak governmental response.  
The preceding chapter summarized the findings from the study. This chapter will build 
from this study findings to discuss their consistency with the existing literature; their unique 
contributions will also be highlighted. By comparing the research assumptions and the study 
findings we will develop and offer novel and robust explanations to people's collective responses 
to crime violence in contexts of enduring conflict such as in Mexico. The limitations of the study 
are identified followed by its implications and lines for future research.   
5.1 Relation of the findings to theory 
This study findings suggest that, in contexts of violence, such as that of Mexico since 
2006, the extent to which citizens organize with others for social change is highly dependent on 
their social relationships and their levels of politicization. Most interestingly, this research 
findings exhibit that, whether citizens mobilize for social change or not, was mostly dependent 
on their political awareness rather than on their social relationships (their levels of Social 
Capital). To be precise, fear of crime and exposure to violence, two key context-related variables 
examined in this research, influenced people’s active participation only when mediated by their 
political culture. Specifically, people´s lives are affected by the conditions of the place they live 
in but they also act for change specifically if politicized. 
Furthermore, while Social Capital was to be relevant for mobilization; Political Culture 
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conditioned its effect. Social capital is, therefore, a resource at the community level and because 
of close relationships with others; it is a resource contained in the most immediate circle, but for 
it to be a useful resource for organization for social change, it requires the input of political 
awareness and knowledge. Other measures of sociodemographic features were found to have a 
rather irrelevant role on citizens’ assembling for collective action with the purpose of advancing 
social change. 
5.1.1 Individual characteristics and the effect of the context on mobilization 
The association of individual features with Social Capital and Political Culture and with 
mobilization for collective action was explored first (Question 1). Not surprisingly, most 
demographic variables were found to be non-statistically significant on individuals’ willingness 
to organize for collective action. Indeed, existing research has shown that the effect of individual 
and sociodemographic characteristics on collective action and political participation in 
themselves is hardly ever captured (Sabatini, 2009; Stewart, 2005; Stockemer, 2013). Moreover, 
as Stewart (2005) and Sabatini (2009) claimed, individual features are connected with micro and 
macro environmental conditions and should be explained as such. Likewise, studies that have 
found individual characteristics to be explicative of social action show that the levels and forms 
of influence are rather varied across populations and groups due to the effect of the historical or 
political context. As shown by the north region-south region analyses conducted in this study, the 
various economic development levels or cultural characteristics are also key to understand the 
uses of social capital (Deneulin, 2008; Hansen-Nord et al., 2014).  
Particularly, the statistical analyses conducted for this study showed that, by itself, age, 
gender, and employment did not significantly influence people’s levels of collective 
mobilization. In contrast, Education was important to explain respondents’ propensity to 
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mobilize. Education is a variable that accounts for years of formal schooling; however, it is 
necessarily connected with social and cultural conditions by which people make sense of their 
living environment. In other words, Education is a measure indicating the extent to which a 
person can acquire, use and make sense of the political and social climate. 
Specifically, this study results showed that mid and high levels of education showed to be 
relevant to explain citizens’ collective action. Employment and education have proved to be 
important sociodemographic characteristics to explain levels of politicization (Lorenzini & 
Giugni, 2012; Valkonen, 1969). However, this study findings show that their importance can be 
fully explained only in relation conditions of the context.  
Accordingly, as this study has shown, the extent to which individual characteristics 
associated to Social Capital and to Political Culture influence mobilization for collective action 
remains uncertain unless we account for people’s lived experiences and feelings related to crime, 
violence, insecurity, this is, the hardships associated with the context. In line with existing 
empirical research, this research results displayed that when living in complex environments, 
where poverty, crime, and corruption intersect, the strength of individual features are obscured 
by fear, insecurity and mistrust due to the threats of violent crime and social isolation (Banfield, 
2014; Cuesta & Alda, 2012; Wills-Herrera et al.,  2011). Instead, as the study findings suggest, it 
might be said that the engine of social relationships powers the effect of age, education levels, 
gender condition or access to employment as resources for people choosing to mobilize for social 
change. This conclusion might also help explain why education was found to be the only 
individual feature that has significant effect on collective mobilization. In other words, 
interactions with others and relationships within the community appear to be key elements for 
education or employment to become relevant individual resources to advance social change 
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(Cuesta, Alda, & Lamas, 2007; Dinesen et al., 2013).  
The context 
This study hypothesized that the place of residence might differently influence people’s 
participation in collective action activities (Question 2). In fact, it has been observed that the 
diversity of political activities and the social relevance of each form of mobilization highly 
influence how much people get involved in political action (Gellman, 2013; Lorenzini & Giugni, 
2012; Montgomery, 2000). In line with this, the findings of this study revealed that there were 
different forms of participation between the north region states and south region states. 
Additionally, individual and contextual variables, specifically influencing mobilization among 
people living in one region or the other, differed. Specifically, education level, fear, and social 
capital showed to be significant for one region but not for the other.  
To test the varying effects across locations of the relationships of interest, this study used 
two subsamples, one for the two north region states and the other for the two south region states. 
Each subsample grouped states with levels of violence alike but with different cultural and 
socioeconomic conditions. This is to say that, given the similar levels of violence people face, a 
comprehensive explanation of regional differences in mobilization required the inclusion of other 
variables other than exposure to violence and crime experiences. At first glance, the study 
findings showed the two regions subsamples results were similar.  
To be precise, the effect of the context of violence in people’s lives, a key element in this 
study argument, was first examined in the univariate statistics. The analysis showed minor 
variations on the levels of participation reported by respondents. Likewise, the north and south 
regions exhibited similar levels of Social Capital. Regional differences only came up at the level 
of social cohesion. Specifically, in the north region states respondents reported having stronger 
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ties with the community than respondents living in the south region states. Regarding Political 
Culture measures, differences were also observed. In both regions, the analysis of individuals 
levels of knowledge about the government authorities showed similar results. This similarity also 
holds true regarding the levels and sources of information. For instance, regardless of the state 
where respondents live in, TV was reported to be the main source of information while the 
Internet was the least used. 
Conversely, the differences across regions showed to be more complex to explain than 
what univariate analysis or demographic features initially displayed. Results from regression 
analyses that examine the associations between the core constructs (social capital, political 
culture, and mobilization for collective action) showed existing key differences across regions 
that ought to be explored. Indeed, as other scholars have argued, this study findings show that 
people related differently to their experiences and perceptions depending on where they lived 
(Ley, 2015; Rojo-Mendoza, n.d.). More specifically, for this study sample, fear of crime, social 
cohesion, and gender are relevant to explain why people living in the south region states 
mobilize with others for social change; a condition not observed about individuals living in the 
north region states. In contrast, trust in security institutions and community help showed to be of 
significance only for the north region states. In other words, coping with the threats of the 
context meant that social cohesion, and collectively built resources are more relevant 
mechanisms for respondents living in the north region states than external inputs (such as fear of 
crime or being a victim of violence). 
Results obtained from SEM analysis across groups also exhibit this complexity; the 
analyses proved that an explanation of the regional differences was more complex than what the 
data revealed. First, no differences between groups were observed for the socioeconomic 
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measures. Likewise, results in all the examined parameters of social capital, political culture, and 
the context were consistent with the study hypothesis. This means that, when facing similar 
levels of violence and despite their different cultural, political and economic characteristics, the 
forms in which people mobilize and use their social relationships and political awareness hold 
true for the national sample and across groups.  
As a whole, the findings of this study suggest that the type of resources people relate to 
when deciding to mobilize or not towards social change is rather different depending on the 
place they live in. Specifically, in the south region states, people appear to act due to fear but 
relying on their close relationships with others to advance social change. Both fear and social 
capital need to be present for mobilization to activate. On the other hand, individuals living in the 
north region states might mobilize for collective action based on reciprocate confidence and 
community bonds (people helping other people) rather than out of feelings or experiences. 
Institutional trust has also been found relevant to explain the likelihood of citizens mobilizing 
collectively. Indeed, in line with current research, this study findings show that social 
organization and collective mobilization has regional characteristics linked to local and shared 
experiences (Heinle et al., 2015; Sabet, 2014; David A. Shrik et al., 2014), and that action and 
engagement is associated with living conditions (Alvarado Mendoza, 2010; Mendoza Zárate SJ 
& González Candia SJ, 2016; Vilalta, 2010, 2017). Moreover, these processes may not only 
result from recent and current interventions to build social capital or politicization, but of 
historical events and dynamics that reach beyond the scope of this study. However, the study 
findings additionally suggest that a key difference on the functioning of this process might be 
related to how people make sense of their experiences and emotions because of their ability to 
understand the environment, their political awareness and the social support they may rely on. 
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5.1.2 Influence of Social Capital and Political Culture levels on mobilization 
A central issue of interest for this study is to identify and explain the effect of Social 
Capital on mobilization for collective action (Question 3). This connection, however, is not 
tested in isolation, but by the mediating role of Political Culture (Question 4). Existent literature 
argues that social capital is strengthened and positively activated for organization in stable 
conditions (Almond, 2000; Coleman, 1988, 1990; Loveless, 2013; Putnam, 1995). However, 
under conditions of social and political instability, no pattern can be assumed in the presence of 
crime violence and government unresponsiveness. Therefore, as this research proposed, the 
examination of other variables not previously studied is necessary.  
This study findings indicated that greater levels of Social Capital were indeed associated 
with more collective mobilization and that political culture components mediated and 
strengthened those effects. Overall, results on these associations displayed the relevance of social 
capital and political culture as they account for the influence of context-associated emotions and 
experiences. That is, findings proved that, how people relate to others and how much they know 
about the political environment is necessarily connected for mobilization for social change to 
happen. 
A key finding for this study sample is the negative direct significant effect of Social 
Capital on mobilization for collective action. In line with empirical existing research show that 
social networks and social resources might have positive (see Dinesen et al., 2013; Hansen-Nord 
et al., 2014; Payne & Williams, 2008; Ratner et al., 2013) as well as detrimental (see Cuesta & 
Alda, 2012; El Hajj et al., 2011) effects for individual lives and community dynamics. Except for 
one, all SEM model results conducted in this research showed that higher levels of trust, social 
cohesion and community help, tend to inhibit individuals from collective mobilization when 
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other factors are accounted for. In other words, Social Capital only appears have a positive direct 
effect on citizens decision to organize with others for social change if the influence of the context 
is left out of the analysis. Moreover, its indirect effect is positive and statistically significant 
merely because of the mediation of Political Culture.  
Altogether, this apparently surprising finding shows that Social Capital components 
appear to buffer people’s inconformity and frustration with the current state of violence, 
corruption and impunity. Accordingly, it might be said that close relationships with others and 
confidence in the institutional apparatus are sufficient key resources for people to navigate the 
threats of said environments, and that the effect of people’s actions is contained within the 
boundaries of the community. The findings of this study are in accordance with current research 
and knowledge on the virtues of social capital and its limits in contexts of conflict (El Hajj et al., 
2011; Hansen-Nord et al., 2014; Mustafa, 2005). Likewise, this research analysis contribute to 
explain the potential outcomes of Social Capital in contexts of conflict, criminal violence and 
post-conflict environments (see Gellman, 2013; Mustafa, 2005; Payne & Williams, 2008; 
Santoro, Vélez, & Keogh, 2012). In fact, social capital takes different configurations and roles 
depending on the features of the context, the combination set of available resources and 
relationships, and the forms of political engagement at hand (Lorenzini & Giugni, 2012; 
Loveless, 2013; Teney & Hanquinet, 2012). If this more complex understanding is put at work, 
the result might lead to more effective production and use of social capital for it to be an 
effectively positive source for social engagement and social welfare.  
5.1.3 The relationship between Social Capital and Political Culture to Emotions  
Another finding in this study suggests a key difference between Social Capital and 
Political Culture associations to emotions and experiences resulting from the context of criminal 
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violence (Question 5). Results showed that fear of crime and exposure to violence do not 
significantly affect Social Capital influence on mobilization for collective action. In other words, 
the hardships citizens face due to the context of extended violence and crime did not 
significantly seem to affect how they related to each other nor seemed to influence the way in 
which they used or not their social resources to mobilize. Contrarily, levels of political culture 
were significantly influenced by fear of crime and exposure to violence. This means that, when 
the effects of the environment are associated to more knowledge and information about the 
political situation and ongoing events, such emotions are a strong influence for collective 
mobilization. As a result, Political Culture is activated as compelling resource for people 
deciding to organize with others for social change.  
In regards Political Culture mediating role on the indirect effect of emotions and exposure 
on collective action, the findings supported the argument that the more informed and aware 
people are, the more they lean towards mobilization (see Atkinson & Fowler, 2014; Cuesta & 
Alda, 2012; Gellman, 2013; Teney & Hanquinet, 2012); the virtues of cultivating political 
engagement beyond formal political participation were observed. This is to say, information and 
knowledge of the political environment are constructs that help transform the effect of the 
adverse environment into collective actions for social change. These findings contribute to a 
wider and updated understanding of political culture use in contexts of conflicted societies. 
Based on this research findings, it might be said that individuals do not rely solely on 
their social relationships to handle the effect of violence in their daily lives; rather, they are 
aware that a more profound change needs to be pursued for an improvement of their living 
conditions. Again, in line with the current knowledge, this research does not suggest that 
collective mobilization is always a disruptive action, nor that more social capital is necessarily 
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positive for the construction of stronger societies (see Durlauf, 1999; Mustafa, 2005). Indeed, 
this study findings suggest that strengthening Social Capital will make collective mobilization 
less recurrent (see Atkinson & Fowler, 2014; El Hajj et al., 2011; Graeff & Svendsen, 2012; 
Santoro et al., 2012; Teney & Hanquinet, 2012), people might find other more immediate 
significant experiences for security and bonding than those of political mobilization. Such an 
action would instead produce social isolation across groups. 
5.1.4 The importance of Emotions for mobilization  
Finally, of central interest for this study is the role of emotions and experiences due to the 
context for mobilization for collective action (Question 6). The variables used in this study 
captured the relevance of emotions and experiences for collective mobilization when levels of 
trust and social cohesion (Social Capital) and of information and knowledge about the political 
environment (Political Culture) were taken into account. Results showed that an important 
percentage of people have modified their daily activities because of fear of crime. For instance, 
up to 63% respondents have stopped going out at night.  
Altogether, this study findings on the influence of the environment helped support the 
need for understanding why and how people modify their activities due to the presence of crime 
and violence in their living environments. To be precise, fear of crime –an emotion by which 
people refrain or change daily activities- as well as exposure to violence, consistently exhibited 
strong results. In line with current research, these findings help explain how collective 
mobilization is used to promote social change (Goodwin & Jasper, 2006; Ley Gutiérrez, 2014; 
Rojo-Mendoza, n.d.; Vilalta, 2010). As this research analyses exhibit, in the context of the WoD, 
social relationships and political awareness help transform the otherwise negative effect of fear 
and exposure to violence in people’s lives. As suggested by Baele and colleagues (2016) and 
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Halperin & Pliskin (2015), collective mobilization can benefit people's emotions in order to 
channel social change and improve wellbeing.  
One specific dimension of the study points to the association between social capital and 
emotions related to the context of criminal violence. The negative but significant effect of Social 
Capital on mobilization for collective action was further observed in the models testing for the 
influence of fear of crime and exposure to violence along with individual characteristics. As 
others have stressed, results suggest that responses such as indifference, inaction, and 
disengagement (El Hajj et al., 2011; Pickvance, 2001) or else increased participation might be 
taking place (Atkinson & Fowler, 2014; Ostrom & Ahn, 2009).  
By itself, fear of crime was found to significantly influence mobilization for collective 
action in all statistical analyses. Furthermore, its influence is strong and significant when 
mediated by Political Culture measures. Such results supported that, by the effect of political 
knowledge, awareness and interest, an emotion such as fear might be transformed into a positive 
resource for action and change. Indeed, as Baele and colleagues argue (2016) emotions have a 
key role in the course of conflict, from the commencement of the conflict up to its resolution or 
perpetuation (Baele et al., 2016). This is explained by the fact that, specifically anger and fear 
influence group perceptions on the environment and the interpretation of institutional or 
individual responsibility and might, as a result, prevent cooperation (Halperin & Gross, 2011). 
This study findings support the argument that being informed and aware about the political 
environment might help people to use fear as fuel to their determination in organizing with 
others in order to change the current situations of adversity (see Barrett, Matter, Lisa, & Barrett, 
2016; Flores Cuamea & Núñez Noriega, 2016; Kashdan, Barrett, & McKnight, 2015). 
Lastly, the indirect effect of exposure to violence and fear on mobilization for collective 
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action was examined. An indirect positive effect was expected. As observed in the research 
findings, it was only through the mediation of political culture that social capital measures 
appeared to have a positive effect on mobilization for collective action. In sum, this study’s 
assumption that stronger social ties (social networks and trust) and increased political culture 
(access to information and political knowledge) would affect the relationship between fear of 
crime and exposure to violence and mobilization for collective action was observed. 
The study environment: Mexico 
Respondents’ perceptions for this study sample on the various governmental and citizens’ 
actions on the WoD are worth commenting on. While citizens extensively report supporting 
government’s actions to fight drug crime, they mostly remained skeptical of their results and did 
not agree on the fact that the WoD had been won. A growing suspicion of the government might 
explain their skepticism; a general lack of trust regarding institutions contrasts with people’s 
support towards collaborating with organized crime if they were in need, or their support on 
people’s organizing in self-defense groups if felt threatened and defenseless. Indeed, current 
research shows the increasing trend of communities of taking justice into their own hands (see 
Heinle et al., 2015; Olson et al., 2014; Zizumbo-Colunga, 2010). 
Regression analysis results further showed that, overall, most variables measuring 
opinions and perceptions about the WoD were not relevant to explain why people mobilize for 
collective action. More precisely, this study findings show that people do not change their 
practices of collective action only because of their feelings or views on the context. Rather, 
levels of mobilization seemed to respond to the strength and type of community relationships and 
to political awareness, as well as to how this awareness has been employed.  
Overall, this study findings are of particular relevance for Mexico, a country deeply 
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affected by more than ten years of the WoD and high levels of criminal and drug-related 
violence. This research results showed that, in this context, government actions to fight crime or 
citizens forms of collective resistance and whether they had positive or negative results did not 
affect individuals’ mobilization for collective action. On the contrary, , as other studies suggest, 
rather than direct exposure or emotional reactions being relevant to organizing for social change, 
it is possible that awareness and strong social interactions hold more influence (see Flores 
Cuamea & Núñez Noriega, 2016; Nadeau, Niemi, & Amato, 1995; Olson, Shirk, & Wood, 2014; 
Pagano, 2007; Pearlman, 2013; Sabucedo & Vilas, 2014). 
5.2 Study limitations 
A number of limitations of the current study must be noted. First, the research used data 
collected in 2011, which has been the most violent and effervescent time in recent years in 
Mexico. However, while the data might exceptionally capture the profound effects of the 
environment in peoples’ lives during this particular time, its scope may be limited. This means 
that, despite its strength, the data was collected as events were evolving, therefore it might not 
have been comprehensive enough to account for the ongoing conditions and the way in which 
they were affecting people’s lives at the time. This study is also restricted by the use of cross-
sectional data. Such kind of data constrains the possibilities of looking at causal inferences or 
tracking observed relationships over time. Despite this, and given the time and place in which the 
data was collected, it continues to be a strong and informative source to achieve this study’s 
aims.  
This study is also limited by the use of secondary data designed and collected for 
purposes unknown by the researcher. Because of it, some responses remain limited for 
exploration. For instance, given events in the recent years, it might have been fruitful to the 
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analysis to ask about other forms of violence, experiences and emotional reactions related to, for 
instance, increasing numbers of human disappearances. The inclusion of more complex 
questions in some sections would better inform the diverse reasons why citizens mobilize or not 
in an increasingly violent context. Indeed, existing studies that look at social capital and citizen’s 
participation in conflicted environments have encountered similar constraints (Cuesta & Alda, 
2012; Institute for Economics and Peace [IEP], 2014; Sabatini, 2009; Tzanakis, 2013). Finding 
out how people define and value self-defense organizations, their understanding of trusting 
people as opposed to trusting institutions, and accounts of other forms of drug-related violence, 
would also be illuminating.  
An additional limitation also results from the use of secondary data. The selection of the 
sample assured representativeness at the national level with an adequate distribution between 
respondents’ age, gender, and profession. However, it did not allow to observe individual and 
socioeconomic characteristics, such as the specific profiles of young men, citizens living in 
urban settings with informal employment among other aspects that other studies have stressed 
(see Ratner, Mam, & Halpern, 2014; Stockemer, 2013; Straus, 2012). Similarly, given the 
sample design, community level information is missing. Consequently, the specificity of local 
dynamics that inform about the association of these items across communities and the municipal 
levels is not captured. Complex sample techniques such as list experiment and the use of 
clustering or multi-stage sampling designs might contribute for an in-depth exploration of critical 
situations while improving access and maintaining accuracy as well as cost-effectiveness without 
compromising respondents’ safety and anonymity. 
Finally, some contextual information obtained from historical records and other 
documents might be useful to trace the context-specific features and further discuss the issue. 
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The lack of information at the local level contained in the data forbids us from proposing wide-
ranging objectives that are relevant for this research nor demand careful interpretation of the 
study findings and implications. To further understand people’s decision to organize with others 
when in the presence of violence and to identify the specific set of social and political resources 
at hand, additional research that collects primary data from respondents in critical areas in 
Mexico would be necessary. 
5.3 Implications and recommendations of the study 
Based on this study findings, a number of implications can be outlined. Overall, a follow 
up of the highlighted lessons will be decisive to propose future lines of research and social policy 
in unusual conflict settings. A crucial implication is related to the processes of citizen 
politicization, the construction of social capital, as well as the generation and quality of 
information. The need for more comprehensive and current measures has also been observed. A 
critical analysis of the understanding and measurement of the core concepts used in this research 
is imperative to build stronger explanations; such an endeavor will require as well of studies and 
measures designed to effectively capture local and regional processes. 
5.3.1 Lessons for politicization: institutions, democracy and law enforcement 
i) Institutional accountability and scrutiny 
In contexts such as that of Mexico, addressing governments' unresponsiveness and the 
weakening of democratic institutions is of key importance in the resolution of the ongoing 
security crisis of the recent decades. The goal of achieving powerful political institutions is to 
ensure that principles of institutional design; for instance, deliberation, reasoned analysis, 
openness, and transparency, are used together with a transformative perspective. A perspective 
such as this presents a challenge to current scholarship for the development of appropriate 
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theorization and the development of informed responses for institutional crisis; this is, a 
sophistication of the notion of political culture and the development of compelling models 
explaining institutional change. Specifically, this study findings will allow building robust 
research and meticulous scrutiny of institutional performance on matters such as the exercise of 
rigorous comparative research covering non-conventional scenarios, the incorporation of relevant 
local practices, and on the production and share of community-based resources for development 
(cfr Braithwaite, 2004; Niño Pérez & Devia Garzón, 2015). 
Furthermore, a policy and community practice inspired by the goal of building and 
transforming institutions is compulsory. Only by the construction of horizontal collaborative 
relationships between authorities and citizens, and across communities, will the aforementioned 
social policy perspective be fully accomplished. Based on collaborative relationships, 
communication will strengthen among and across institutional and social actors, and different 
government levels, (Shirk, Wood, & Selee, 2014) guaranteeing citizens’ feedback and 
involvement. Furthermore, the conditions for more profound social relationships will be created. 
In other words, if social programs and policies built to inhibit crime effectively incorporate the 
local experience and sensibly incorporate the local levels and citizens’ participation and 
commitment, stronger and more secure community relationships will be guaranteed. This, in 
turn, will ultimately debilitate the spread of delinquency and coercion and, in the long-term, the 
association between local authorities and the mafias would die down. 
The violent and insecure conditions are an additional challenge for practitioners and 
policymakers. In conflicted societies, such as in Mexico, the development of comprehensive 
perspectives built from past experiences is said to be crucial in order to generate regional and 
local viable alternatives (Carrion M., 2005). Other forms of social capital besides building trust 
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within the society should also be encouraged as obligations and expectations should accompany 
trustworthiness for structures to respond to the social demands (Coleman, 1988; Portes, 1998), 
considering reciprocity and solidarity among actors. Building from this study findings, future 
research could include additional items to account other dimensions of social capital and 
politicization processes not included in the available data. Furthermore, as described below, 
reliable channels of information, effective sanctions, and clear norms will facilitate the formation 
of social capital, strong and non-excluding social networks, and appropriable social organization 
(Coleman, 1988; Tzanakis, 2013).  
ii) Containment of the effects resulting from low or negative social capital 
As observed, citizens living in environments of enduring conflict suffer the long-term 
effects of threats of violence on a daily basis, a situation which sometimes extends over 
generations (Jaspars & O’Callaghan, 2010; Little, 2014). Specifically in Mexico, and supported 
by this research findings, besides facing the effects of crime-violence, citizens have to deal with 
the consequences of a weak democratic system, corrupted institutions and government 
unresponsiveness (Schedler, 2014; Shirk & Wallman, 2015). In order to fill the void, citizens’ 
organization have emerged to improve security and self-administer justice; conviviality and 
social cohesion, however, might be at high risk. 
Containing the effects of low social capital, distrust and inefficient legal and political 
institutions is an urgent matter for societies like the Mexican. An understanding of citizen's 
endeavors and well as the form and degree of population support is urged. Current scholarship is 
confronted with the need to propose persuasive explanations of the ongoing clashes between 
government actions and citizens' needs. Citizens are organizing for self-protection because they 
perceive a lack of efficacy; there is a dearth in the literature of convincing explanations on the 
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permanence of these initiatives and their consequences for security and wellbeing. The 
prevailing explanation asserts that by deploying their own measures, citizens hold on to what 
they perceive is the last resource (Grayson, 2011; Sabet, 2014; Thomas & Louis, 2014). In line 
with Sabet’s argument (2014) and building on the findings of this study, research focusing on 
social policies as public goods should be advanced; and while they are operated and promoted by 
security institutions and the police, their administration can only be sustained and enforced by 
citizens. The accompaniment of scholars and policymakers for the development of such a 
strategy is imperative.  
In the face of the lack of support for self-protection initiatives worsened by a detached 
citizens-government dialogue, developing and promoting reforms focused on security 
management and true law enforcement is necessary to reinforce democratic values, far-reaching 
trust and compelling social engagement (Bunker, 2013; Zizumbo-Colunga, 2010). As a 
consequence of promoting a stronger institutional system at the civil and governmental levels, 
the growth of negative social capital hiding behind institutional weakness, corruption, and abuse 
will be effectively contained (Zizumbo-Colunga, 2010).  
The use of valuable shared memories and experiences might be key for such a process 
(Rothstein, 2000). Program and intervention designs should be able to account for the legacy of 
shared experiences and the collective decisions to help understand why specific norms, decision-
making processes, citizens' responsibilities, or legal proceedings exist. Specific transformations 
for ongoing programs that build up from these, the modification of ongoing agreements and the 
creation of new institutions can be fully advanced. This is a pressing matter in enduring conflict 
scenarios, where the normalization of violence permeates all forms of social interactions; 
systematic and succinct empirical research on the role of experiences and memory on enduring 
 109 
conflicts is projected. Moreover, without efficient formal and informal institutions, the 
production of public goods and multilevel cooperation will remain unresolved (Wacquant, 2004). 
In sum, using collective memories would be a key measure to build trust from below, set 
institutional mechanisms to honor that trust, and allow civil society to become active in the 
effective production of social capital (Rothstein, 2000).  
5.3.2 Lessons for community engagement and social organization 
i) The importance of emotions for political action 
The creation of stronger institutions would also require the incorporation of social 
learning and of the emotional dynamics leading social mobilization. As summarized by 
Braithwaite (2004) social hope can be a rich source of re-defining or creating rules, norms, and 
practices that would ensure room for social change and enhanced harmony. All social and 
government institutions embrace hope; for instance, hope for democracy, transparency, fair 
trade, or justice. However, as society and authorities disengage, policies and programs designed 
and operated from above prevail, and as a result, institutions loose their objective and action 
purpose. This proposal reaches beyond the recovery of common expectations about aspired 
living conditions; rather, it requires a shaping of the future of social organization based on 
effective engagement and institutional structures (see Ratner et al., 2014; Sabet, 2014; Shrik et 
al., 2014). For instance, by assuring the support of the population, law enforcement would be 
consistent and effective, foreseeing long-term social transformation 
As for policy research and policy intervention dimensions, this study would help build an 
approach to identify propitious ways to channel citizens’ emotions, perceptions and disposition; 
this in turn could nourish positive initiatives and programs towards crime prevention, violence, 
insecurity containment and building resilience (Olson et al., 2014). For instance, other than 
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vigilantism or self-defense groups, in Guerrero and Michoacan, two of the states most affected 
by violence, positive responses for collective security have been observed. Among the relevant 
examples, community-funded police forces and crime-reporting civilian groups have emerged, as 
social engagement takes the form of a “combative civil society” (Olson et al., 2014, p. 17) 
promoting a public debate on the rule of law and the importance of citizens’ political action.  
In sum, the adversities people face when living in environments of prevalent criminal 
violence and impunity produce devastating distress and frustration; these emotions combined 
with their firm rejection of the status quo, freeze civilians in fear or force them to resort to taking 
the law into their own hands (Grayson, 2011; Heinle et al., 2015). Building from this research 
findings, future research projects and social interventions paying attention to these emotional 
changing processes would contribute to the increase of safety.  
ii) Strengthening community relationships 
The focus of this study allowed the examination of individuals’ perceptions and emotions 
which might develop into actions towards change or into strategies for self-protection. By 
emphasizing relational resources –specifically, trust and social cohesion- this research embraces 
the conviction among scholars of the fruitful role of social capital for engagement and 
institutional functionality (Bebbington, 2007; Montgomery, 2000; Wacquant, 2004; Wollebæk & 
Selle, 2007). However, it must also be stressed that strengthening non-governmental organization 
requires the true and committed participation of various actors along with collectively built 
institutions and the appreciation of social practices, participative rules, and decision-making 
processes. The resulting institutional apparatus will enable societies, such as in Mexico, to move 
towards more active formal participation at local, regional, national and international levels 
(Braithwaite, 2004). The proposed perspective will, in turn, nurture other scholars' efforts to 
reinforce social organization as a compelling collective force for social change (see Braithwaite, 
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2004; Edwards, 2014; Lazarus, 1999; Ratner et al., 2014; Sabet, 2014; Tzanakis, 2013). 
As it has been discussed in the preceding chapters, there is little attention in current 
scholarship towards the study of ordinary and unstructured social organization, and their role on 
security matters is frequently underestimated (Sabet, 2014). Research projects and scholars 
collaboration to develop approaches to solve this gap is urged. Evidence in Mexico shows that a 
large part of criminal cases and violence are solved because citizens are involved in justice 
(Herrera-Lasso, 2013; Shirk & Wallman, 2015; Villagran, 2013). In Mexico, a number of groups 
and initiatives launched by victims or otherwise derived from experiences of violence can be 
identified. Among these non-profit organizations promoting victim’s rights, there are 
organizations (such as Mexico SOS and The Movement for Peace with Justice and Dignity) that 
work to advance judicial reforms and crime, on forced disappearances, the murders of journalists 
or kidnappings, or on campaigns that work towards gathering information or else through social 
media platforms (Edmonds-Poli, 2013; Olson et al., 2014, pp. 14–17; Villagran, 2013).  
Indeed, victims’ rights organizations have created a network which appeals to ordinary 
and organized action, met with authorities at the federal, state and municipal levels, and worked 
closely to review and improve national law reforms (such as the victim law and the disappeared 
laws). Altogether, the growing social networks and the efforts towards increasing trust in the 
police and judiciary lead to greater citizen participation and increase engagement activities in 
Mexico. Another more recent type of peoples’ involvement has been through citizen 
observatories which have emerged to help “identify, develop, as well as track reliable and 
accurate indicators of police and criminal justice system performance” (Sabet, 2014). Examples 
of existing observatories, such as the Civic National Observatory of Security, Justice, and 
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Legality (Observatorio Nacional Ciudadano de Seguridad, Justicia y Legalidad37) and the 
National Observatory Network show the potential association between academia and 
practitioners. Of crucial relevance is the development of applied research projects that could 
strongly contribute to change social and political life as well as to enrich the current research. 
5.3.3 Lessons for security: the advancement of social capital-based policy 
Following Arriagada’s analysis (2005) on the use of social capital for policy and 
informed by this study findings, attention to community development is recommended. Local 
heritage and shared practices might constitute resources for effective social capital; actors’ 
participation would strengthen and, in turn, state interventions would be sustained. Such an 
approach will emphasize the diversity of social actors and their role, integrate the cultural 
perspective on social and security policies, as well as help identify individuals and organizations 
that lead to the preservation of social capital and local knowledge.  
Reforms for increasing and ensuring a strict respect of human rights, intervention of 
judiciary as well as prosecuting institutions, in addition to a prioritization of programs focused 
on effective crime prevention and prosecution are crucial to grant security and enforcement of 
institutions at all levels (Zizumbo-Colunga, 2010). Other urgent matters include greater political 
support and increased federal funding for state and municipal level programs focused on crime 
prevention, law enforcement, protection for victims and dealing with corruption (Campbell & 
Hansen, 2014; Sabet, 2014). An in-depth critical analysis of existing programs would be critical 
for the advancement of social capital-based policy. Enhancing security and intensified crime 
prosecuting should not overlook abuses to human rights (Human Rights Watch, 2011, 2013), the 
                                                           
37
 The observatory works to foster an understanding of the security, justice and legality conditions of the 
country, and to influence policy (see www.onc.org.mx).  
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fight against corruption (Morris, 2013), or the care of the thousands of children in despair (Barra 
& Joloy, 2011). 
The lack of accurate and accessible information is also a challenge (Shirk & Wallman, 
2015). Gathering relevant and reliable data to build a “cohesive security apparatus” (Duran-
Martinez, 2015, p. 1383) is a task for scholars and citizens alike. Building from current local 
knowledge and increasing access to schooling is only one step towards the construction of 
political action. The increase in education should reach beyond literacy; rather, it should enhance 
people’s awareness and comprehension of their living context, the political structure of their 
country, and their ability to effectively use, produce and distribute information with the purpose 
of social action. 
Moreover, the availability of precise information will help give a voice to effective social 
organization and civic initiatives, which will, in turn, contribute to reduce uncertainty and 
helplessness among the population. Better information will also help improve planning and 
operating processes of security force interventions (Guerrero Gutiérrez, 2012) at regional and 
local levels. Finally, reliable information will contribute to better understand the dynamics of 
drug-related violence, contain crime and extortion practices especially there where criminals and 
citizens hold relationships of patronage (Aguayo Quezada, 2013). In sum, flowing and current 
information will be fruitful to build a basis of knowledge from which successful community 
initiatives are identified and replicated, the overwhelming effect of daily violent crimes reduced, 
and the reliability of state protection actions increased.  
Finally, fighting suspicion is a key resource for trust development. As such, an 
assemblage of all recommended efforts might help sustain long-term collective action initiatives 
(Ostrom & Ahn, 2009; Serra, 2011). Building from common understandings, the difficulties of 
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social organization may resolve (Fox & Hoelscher, 2012; Stockemer, 2013). An urgency for 
promoting comprehensive self-development, especially amongst the youth, is urgent in Mexico. 
A specific attention to education, employment and leisure is suggested as critical (Barra & Joloy, 
2011). This approach must incorporate an understanding of the emotional and ideological 
processes that influence political action and conflict regulation (Halperin & Pliskin, 2015; Jasper, 
2011).  
5.4 Courses for future research 
Building from the study findings and the identified lessons for scholarship, some lines for future 
research are now outlined. First, there is an urgent need to understand complex social dynamics 
that will lead to detrimental outcomes to social welfare. Specifically, more research on the social 
and political conditions for enduring conflict transformation will be proposed. As this research 
has shown, our knowledge on the possibilities and forms of collective mobilization in unusual 
enduring conflicts and the features of social engagement is quite scarce. Such a theoretical 
endeavor will expand on existing approaches to the development of social capital and collective 
action. Furthermore, it will contribute to develop novel understandings on how citizen 
politicization occurs as a way of managing their experiences and use them to transform their 
living conditions. Indeed, more research on the political use of emotions will contribute to 
broaden current explanations of how social capital is built and on mobilization for collective 
action dynamics in unstable contexts. 
Future empirical research should also contribute to measuring development. A more 
critical analysis of the current measures which are used to examine the forms of social capital 
and the features of political culture is urgent, as existing empirical research on social capital in 
contexts facing crime violence remains limited. This insufficiency is further aggravated by the 
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absence of a satisfactory scale of social capital that accounts for the variety of resources 
determining the existence of social resources in its ample definition. Before long, an exploration 
of other studies and available measures would be developed, as essential steps to recognize and 
include elements other than trust and social cohesion, such as local shared knowledge, self-
developed measures and collective memories and their associated processes.  
It is imperative to propose and develop research on the political use of citizen’s 
knowledge and mindfulness regarding the sphere of political culture, as, in spite of the existence 
of a large body of work on the subject, the matter remains focused on explaining political 
behavior or cultural environments. Likewise, research on the political use of citizen’s knowledge 
and mindfulness is imperative. Additionally, the study of the political use of emotions remains 
allocated within collective action traditional approaches. The development of theoretical and 
empirical approaches, which still remain at the margins of scholarship, will allow to project 
studies that focus on the possibilities of the positive transformation of emotions to bring about 
effective democratic social change.  
While a body of research on complex understanding of social capital (Bebbington, 2007; 
Grootaert & Van Bastelaer, 2001; Ostrom, 2000; Sabatini, 2009; Wills-Herrera et al., 2011), 
political culture processes (Denk & Christensen, 2016; Wilson, 2000) and social emotions 
dynamics (Halperin & Pliskin, 2015; Sabucedo, Durán, Alzate, & Barreto, 2011; Stewart, 2002) 
exists, it remains an unfinished task. Next steps include a critical examination of how these 
concepts are theorized, and a study on the generation of a diversified set of selected indicators 
which is essential for future stronger and substantive research.  
Furthermore, designing studies with the purpose of detailed examination of regional and 
subregional processes is compulsory; only then will a refined comparison across communities 
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and potent policy interventions become achievable. Such a project could additionally benefit 
from the actual development of local longitudinal and empirical research. A study design focused 
on collecting repeated observations over time and across different groups could contribute to 
bridge local and national spheres for policy-making as well as to account for transgenerational 
processes to inform social policy design.  
Building or restoring the social thread is a complex task, specifically when looking at 
community or micro levels (Mendoza Zárate SJ & González Candia SJ, 2016). This points to the 
urgency of constructing empirical studies built through primary research. Research projects to 
identify and gather first-hand sources of information may well be developed as it is critical for a 
comprehensive understanding of the effects of crime violence and the stresses of the future 
development of citizens living in conflict-ridden environments. 
5.5 Conclusions  
This study was intended to understand how and why citizens living in conflicting environments 
mobilize for collective action. It was guided by a shared concern among scholars, policy analysts 
and social actors about the governmental incapacity affecting peoples’ daily lives and the 
development of strong and feasible responses to contain the effect of ongoing crime violence. 
Specifically, this exploration examined social capital and political culture resources and their 
association with context-related emotions as well as perceptions and suggested these processes 
might vary across localities within the country. 
The study findings support the hypothesized relationships. Namely that, i) 
sociodemographic features will differently influence why and how people mobilize for collective 
action; and that ii) there is an emotional component, mostly associated with fear of crime and 
experiences of violence, that helps understanding under which conditions citizens mobilize for 
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collective action. As for the role of Social Capital and Political Culture hypothesis, this study 
showed that: iii) social capital and political culture measures are key indicators of people’s 
decision to organize with others for social change, but that iv) it is because of the mediating role 
of political culture that both a) emotional and b) the social capital indicators are relevant for 
people deciding to pursue collective mobilization actions.  
Overall, the results of this study suggest that most of the explored variables and paths 
displayed the expected effects. This was observed particularly in fear of crime, and exposure to 
violence, factors which influenced respondents’ Political Culture and therefore supported the 
important effect the context has on political action. This condition, in turn, leads to an increased 
propensity for collective mobilization. However, some apparently surprising findings were 
observed related to Social Capital measures; trust, social cohesion, and community help appear 
to have a positive effect on mobilization only when mediated by Political Culture factors. This 
can be explained with what has been labeled as “the negative side of social capital”. As recent 
research has shown (Sabatini, 2009; Wacquant, 1998), people use social bonds to develop 
protective measures against the threats of the environment. Therefore, if social capital is 
examined in isolation, its negative form predominates. Moreover, social capital measures are not 
significantly affected by context-associated variables, which indicates that they are valuable 
resources only under stable conditions; while when the environment is stressing citizens’ lives, it 
stifles the inspiration on other types of actions. As a whole, this study findings show that Social 
Capital and mobilization for collective action are associated in a complex and non-
straightforward manner (Portes & Landolt, 2000; Teney & Hanquinet, 2012; Zizumbo-Colunga, 
2010).  
Some of this study’s key implications for policy and scholarship relate to the importance 
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of developing a comprehensive theoretical understanding of mobilization in uncommon settings, 
such as environments facing enduring conflict and crime violence. Such development requires 
taking into consideration the consequences of a weakened democratic environment, high levels 
of social distrust, as well as government unresponsiveness and impunity. This challenge crucially 
requires a systematic study of self-directed processes of justice by which citizens organize with 
the aim of improving security and law enforcement. The risk of negative consequences will 
persist if we remain incapable of using local resources in order to transform existing common 
practices and experiences into reformed institutions and shared responsibilities.  
Lying at the core of the recommendations brought on by this study, is the proposal 
towards containing the effects of low social capital as well as building trust from the bottom 
upwards. Further research on the role of collective memories and experiences that translate into 
social learning will help understand and use emotional dynamics positively. This will also 
contribute to effectively deal with the consequences of crime, and to intervene and strengthen the 
existing institutions.  
Overall, strengthening civic engagement, reinforcing local leadership and supporting 
social organization will foster social engagement and institutional functionality. This will, in 
turn, restore the already affected citizen-government relationships via effective ordinary and 
unstructured collective forces for social change. As for social policy for the containment of  
violence, willful politics and the support of citizens is required for the prevention and 
prosecution of crime, as civilian participation will benefit law enforcement at national and 
municipal levels.  
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Tables 
Table 1. Statistics of the study variables (N=7,416). 
 
Variable No. 
itemsa 
N missing 
valuesb 
Mean (SD) Cronbach’s 
alpha 
Dependent variable 
Mobilize in Collective Action  8 7,412  .05 (.13) α = 0.6484 
Independent variables 
Social Capital 
Trust Government Institutions 6 7,407  2.27 (.69) α = 0.8646 
Trust Security Institutions 2 7,373  3.01 (.83) α = 0.8658 
Social Cohesion 8 7,400  2.09 (.76) α = 0.9288 
Community Help 5 7,406  2.35 (.77) α = 0.8819 
Political Culture 
Political knowledge 3 7,413  .54 (.30) α = 0.5592 
Being informed 6 7,415  1.19 (.62) α = 0.7256 
Context 
Fear of crime 11 7,414  .39 (.34) α = 0.9047 
Exposure to violence 13 7,414  .11 (.13) α = 0.6628 
Demographics 
Age  7,397 0.3% 44.67 (16.77)  
Gender  7,416    
Education (rec)  7,269 2.0%   
Employment (rec)  7,360 0.8%   
State  7,416    
Other variables of interest (preliminary analyses) 
Trust people  6,594 11.0% .22 (.42)  
Interested in Politics  7,378  .72 (.45)  
Law compliance (obey the law)  7,160 3.5% 2.86 (1.13)  
Feeling safe  6,317 1.0% 1.82 (.94)  
Concern 3 7,413  3.71 (.54) α = 0.8012 
Approve Government’s actions on the WoD   5,750 1.0% .51 (.50)  
Government winning the WoD  5,943  .36 (.48)  
Government obtaining information for the WoD 2 7,282  -1.12 (.99)  
Citizens’ acts on the War on Drugs 2 7,389  2.43 (.92) α = 0.6849 
Citizens collaborate with organized crime 2 7,389  .48 (.55) α = 0.6586 
Economic situation  2 7,411  2.29 (.84) α = 0.5592 
Rights (legalization of) 3 7,410  .36 (.33) α = 0.5079 
a Number of original items used for the measure 
b Number and percentage of missing values, values under 0.05% are not reported 
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Table 2. Descriptive demographic statistics of the study sample (N=7,416). 
 
Variables National sample (N = 7,416) 
North region 
states 
(N = 1,800) 
South region 
states 
(N = 1,716) 
Age (mean) 44.67 46.67   43.71 
Less than 35 years old  33.4%  30.5%    36.3% 
Gender (females) 52.6%  54.8%     51% 
Employment    
Public / Private sector  20.1%  23.1%    13.3% 
Self-Employed / Owner  30.5%  25.7%    41.1% 
Non-Employed  44.6%  45.8%    38.8% 
Education   
None   5.3%   3.1% 10% 
Less than High School  61.9%  56.4%    74.7% 
High School or more  36.1%  41.3%    23.3% 
* Values do not add to 100% because of missing values. 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics of the study sample (N=7,416): for Mobilization for Collective 
Action, Social Capital and Political Culture variables. 
 
 
Variables 
 
National sample 
(N = 7,416) 
North region 
states 
(N = 1,800) 
South region 
states 
(N = 1,716) 
Dependent variable    
Mobilize in Collective Action (mean)  0.05 0.03  0.06 
Participated in associations  7.3% 5.3%   8.5% 
Made the media interested in an issue 4.7% 3.6%   3.8% 
Participated in an election campaign 8.1% 4.4% 11.4% 
Participated in a march  5.4% 2.3%   7.0% 
Participated in a sit-in or protest  2.9% 0.9%   2.9% 
Social Capital     
Trust government (mean)  2.27 2.28  2.28 
Trust security forces (mean)  3.01 3.14  2.95 
Trust people (yes)  22.5% 19.7% 17.2% 
Social cohesion (mean)  2.09 2.18   1.97 
For delinquency (very likely)   9.8% 12.7%   6.7% 
For the environment (very likely)   8.3% 12.8%   6.8% 
For politics (very likely)   5.3%   8.3%   4.2% 
Help the community (mean) 2.35  2.41  2.35 
with time (very willing) 17.1% 18.7% 15.3% 
with work (very willing) 16.5% 18.4% 16.6% 
with money (very willing)   8.4%  13%   7.2% 
Political Culture    
Knows:    
The President's name 90.1% 91.9% 80.5% 
The name of the three powers of the Union 35.9% 28.6% 22.8% 
How long is the tenure of a Federal congressperson 35.2% 31.0% 25.9% 
Informed about politics     
By the TV (always) 39.1% 38.4% 33.7% 
By newspapers (always) 13.4% 18.1% 7.9% 
By radio (always) 11.6% 13.4% 6.8% 
By the internet (always) 5.4% 5.9% 3.4% 
Interested in Politics (yes) 72.3% 68.0% 68.4% 
Law compliance (always) 40.1% 44.9% 47.4% 
* Values do not add to 100% because of missing values. 
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics of the study sample (N=7,416): context and perceptions 
variables. 
 
Variables 
 
National sample 
(N = 7,416) 
North region 
states 
(N = 1,800) 
South region 
states 
(N = 1,716) 
Context    
Fear (mean) 0.39 0.52 0.39 
Stopped going out at night 62.5% 72.8% 66.6% 
Stopped walking at specific area 50.8% 64.5% 46.5% 
Stopped traveling by road 31.1% 41.0% 33.1% 
Exposure to violence (mean) 0.11 0.14 0.09 
Had property or belongings damaged 21.3% 20.1% 15.8% 
Heard gunfire occasionally 52.9% 65.5% 46.1% 
Heard gunfire frequently 23.8% 37.3% 17.1% 
Witnessed someone being beaten    19.0% 14.8% 12.0% 
Cover from bullets or shootings       4.0% 6.9% 2.7% 
Had been threatened 5.6% 6.4% 4.6% 
Feel safe with the army in the streets 54.6% 60.8% 53.2% 
Concerned about violence (mean) 3.71 3.73 3.71 
In Mexico (somewhat or very) 79.7% 95.6% 92.0% 
In the community (somewhat or very) 77.5% 95.5% 87.9% 
In the state (somewhat or very) 80.9% 95.8% 92.2% 
Perceptions    
Approve government’s actions in the WoD 50.1% 48.8% 49.4% 
Government winning the WoD 28.7% 28.3% 36.8% 
Government obtaining information for the WoD (mean) -1.12 0.46 -0.26 
Citizens actions on the WoD    
Approve lynching criminals 67.3% 68.6% 65.6% 
Approve Self-Defense organization 80.6% 77.3% 81.4% 
Justifiable a peasant grow marijuana 46.5%  44.1% 32.2% 
Justifiable students join criminal groups 33.1% 32.4% 24.5% 
Economic current situation perception*    
Really bad or bad 68.9% 69.6% 66.9% 
Good or very good 10.1% 10.1% 12.9% 
Rights (to be legal)    
Abortion  55.5% 50.9% 41.7% 
Same-sex marriage  30.6% 28.7% 21.4% 
Marihuana consumption  22.4% 23.2% 17.0% 
* Values do not add to 100% because of missing values. 
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Table 5. Regression analysis (other variables of interest) on Mobilization for Collective 
Action. 
 
  Other variables of interest 
Variables  M1 
β 
M2 
β 
M3 
β 
M4 
β 
Context      
Exposure to Violence    0.170***   0.167***   0.181***  
Feeling safe  ‒0.009* ‒0.002                 ‒0.007  
Fear     0.018**    0.021***       0.019***              
Perceptions      
Concerned   ‒0.006  ‒0.004                  
Economic situation    0.003    0.005*                
Rights (legalization of)    0.007     0.013*  
Gov. winning the WoD    0.000     0.005    
Gov. obtaining information on WoD    0.004     0.005**               
Approve Gov.’s actions on WoD    0.002   ‒0.000                  
Citizens’ acts on WoD    0.001   ‒0.000                  
Citizens’ collaborate w/organized crime  ‒0.007   ‒0.005  
Social Capital      
Trust people    0.000    ‒0.000 
Trust Gov. Institutions    0.008*                 0.008**    0.003 
Trust Security Institutions  ‒0.007*                ‒0.007**  ‒0.007** 
Social Cohesion    0.011***               0.010***    0.010*** 
Community Help    0.015***        0.011***               0.014*** 
Political Culture      
Interested in Politics    0.012*          0.014***               0.017*** 
Being informed    0.018***        0.016***               0.019*** 
Political Knowledge    0.0189*          0.015*                 0.018** 
Law Compliance  ‒0.007***     ‒0.010***              ‒0.010*** 
Demographics      
Age    0.000           0.000           0.000           0.000         
Education (baseline none)      
Low    0.001         ‒0.000           0.004           0.002         
Mid-Low  ‒0.001         ‒0.002           0.009           0.004         
Mid-High    0.004           0.012           0.021*          0.015         
High    0.018           0.025**         0.043***        0.027**       
Gender  ‒0.008         ‒0.005         ‒0.009*       ‒0.003         
Employment   ‒0.005                ‒0.003           0.000           0.002 
State (baseline: all other)      
Chihuahua  ‒0.041***     ‒0.025***     ‒0.049***     ‒0.016** 
Mexico City    0.027***        0.028***       0.026***        0.028*** 
Estado de Mexico    0.009           0.009           0.004           0.008 
Guerrero    0.013           0.017**         0.008           0.006 
Jalisco  ‒0.021*       ‒0.018**      ‒0.021**      ‒0.029*** 
Michoacan    0.009           0.012         ‒0.007           0.008 
Nuevo León  ‒0.038***     ‒0.035***     ‒0.045***     ‒0.037*** 
N  4,257 5,855 4,890 6,099 
F  17.87 30.83 18.23 25.34 
R2  0.126 0.117 0.086 0.088 
Adjusted R2  0.119 0.113 0.081 0.084 
Constant (b)  ‒0.039 ‒0.042** 0.024 ‒0.015 
*p < 0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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Table 6. Regression analysis (study variables) on Mobilization for Collective Action. 
 
 
 Study variables  
Variables  M5 
β 
M5.1 
β 
M5.2 
β 
Context      
Exposure to Violence    0.173***        0.090***         0.200***   
Fear    0.019***         0.0119            0.038***   
Social Capital    
Trust Gov. Institutions   0.007**          0.009*           0.012* 
Trust Security Institutions ‒0.007***      ‒0.020***      ‒0.005 
Social Cohesion   0.013***         0.002            0.012* 
Community Help   0.010***         0.007*           0.007 
Political Culture    
Being informed   0.017***         0.014***         0.024*** 
Political Knowledge   0.016**       ‒0.002            0.008 
Demographics    
Age   0.000            0.000            0.000      
Education (baseline none)    
Low    0.002            0.008         ‒0.005 
Mid-Low    0.000            0.013         ‒0.004 
Mid-High    0.013            0.028            0.008 
High    0.030***         0.049**          0.033* 
Gender  ‒0.004         ‒0.000         ‒0.014* 
Employment    0.001            0.009         ‒0.006      
State (baseline: all other)     
Chihuahua  ‒0.021***   
Mexico City    0.024***   
Estado de Mexico    0.005   
Guerrero    0.014*   
Jalisco  ‒0.019***   
Michoacan    0.007   
Nuevo León  ‒0.045***   
N  7,117 1,731 1,635 
F  37.78 10.13 10.97 
R2  0.105 0.081 0.092 
Adjusted R2  0.102 0.073 0.084 
Constant (b)  ‒0.050*** ‒0.004 ‒0.050* 
*p < 0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001   
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Table 7. Structural Equation Model coefficient results for the study variables. 
 
 
 
     
 North region 
states 
South region 
states 
Path direction  M6
1,2
 
N = 7,286 
M6.13 
N = 7,286 
M74 
N = 7,282 
M7.11,2 
N = 7,282 
M85 
N = 7,079 
M8.11.6 
N = 7,129 
M91.7 
N = 1,736 
M101,8 
N = 1,645 
Age  Mob. in Coll. Action        .021 .021 .017 .049 
Education  Mob. in Coll. Action        .060*** .061*** .127**** .033 
Gender  Mob. in Coll. Action  
  
  −.001    
Employment  Mob. in Coll. Action        .018    
Political Culture  Mob. in Coll. Action    .301*** .218***    .869*** .861***   .804*** .818*** .859**** .726**** 
Social Capital  Mob. in Coll. Action  −.095*** .121** −.508* -.508*** −.481*** -.492*** -.688*** -.374** 
Social Capital  Political Culture    .236*** .554***    .866*** .883***   .888*** .893*** .960**** .907**** 
Exposure to Violence  Political Culture       .252*** .260***   .270*** .268*** .171**** .304**** 
Fear  Political Culture       .057*** .056***   .060*** .058*** .063* .123*** 
Exposure to Violence  Social Capital       .027      
Fear  Social Capital  
  −.003      
chi2  1889.39**** 372.67**** 607.96**** 609.47**** 2,357.09**** 2,229.19**** 891.43**** 935.37**** 
df  74 70 93 95 147 121 121 121 
RMSEA (≤0.05)  0.058 0.024 0.028 0.027 0.046 0.049 0.06 0.06 
SRMR (≤0.05)  0.053 0.022 0.025 0.023 0.043 0.044 0.05 0.05 
CFI (≤0.95)  0.810 0.968 0.949 0.949 0.812 0.820 0.79 0.75 
TLI (≤0.95)  0.766 0.959 0.935 0.936 0.776 0.781 0.75 0.70 
AIC  65376.688 63867.965 58461.786 58459.299 170682.146 152919.974 30937.10    33329.01 
CD (R2)  0.534 0.530 0.310 0.879 0.893 0.898 0.964 0.951 
Standard errors are shown in parenthesis; *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001, **** p < 0.0000 
1
 all the observed paths are statistically significant (p≤0.001) 
2
 negative but statistically significatn paths observed (MobCA <- SocCap) 
3
 all the observed paths are statistically significant (p≤0.001), few at (p≤0.05), four convariances of the error terms were addedd: (e.TrustGovInst,e.TrustSecInst), 
(e.SocCohes,e.CommHelp), (e.InflPrs,e.Repres), (e.MarchProt,e.SitInProt) 
4
 nonstatistically significant paths observed (SocCap <- ExpViol, SocCap <- Fear), an adittional covariance of error term was addedd: (e.PolKnow,e.Informed) 
5
 nonstatistically significant paths observed (MobCA <- Age, MobCA <- Gen, MobCA <- Occup, MobCA <- MediaInt, MobCA <- Repres) 
6
 nonstatistically significant paths observed (MobCA <- Age) 
7
 nonstatistically significant paths observed (MobCA <- Age, Fear  Political Culture, (e.PolKnow,e.Informed)) 
8
 nonstatistically significant paths observed (MobCA <- Age, (e.PolKnow,e.Informed)) 
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Appendix A 
Table A. Variables and original items used for the proposed study. 
 
Variable Individual Items used a N Item values b Value range 
Dependent variable 
1. Mobilize in Collective 
Action 
Used eight dichotomous items on respondents having: 
1. Participated in associations 
2. Contacting an influential person  
3. Made media to be interested in a topic 
4. Participated in an informative campaign 
5. Participated in an election campaign 
6. Participated in a march or protest 
7. Contacted a Representative person 
8. Participated in a Sit-in protest at a government office 
7,412 No = 0, Yes = 1 range: [0,1]  
values: 16  
Independent variables 
Social Capital 
1. Trust Government 
Institutions 
Used six ordinal items on individual’s trust in: 
1. The President 
2. The Congress 
3. The Senators 
4. The Supreme Court of Justice 
5. The State Governor 
6. The Mayor 
7,407 Nothing = 1                      A little = 2 
Somewhat = 3                  A lot = 4 
range: [1,4]  
values: 36  
2. Trust Security 
Institutions 
Used two ordinal items of respondents’ trust in: 
1. The Army 
2. The Marine 
7,373 Nothing = 1                      A little = 2 
Somewhat = 3                  A lot = 4 
range: [1,4] 
values: 7   
3. Social Cohesion Used eight ordinal items on the likelihood that the 
community will organize to solve, improve or discuss: 
1. Public services 
2. Delinquency 
3. Pollution and the environment 
4. Violence 
5. Education 
6. Health 
7. Religion issues 
8. Politics 
7,400 Unlikely =1 
Little likely = 2 
Somewhat likely = 3 
Very likely = 4 
range: [1,4]  
values: 60  
4. Community Help Used five ordinal items on people willing to help others 
with:  
1. Time 
7,406 Unwilling = 1 
A little willing = 2 
Somewhat willing = 3 
range: [1,4]  
values: 29  
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Variable Individual Items used a N Item values b Value range 
2. Work 
3. Money 
4. Materials 
5. Food 
Very willing = 4 
Political Culture 
5. Political knowledge Used three dichotomous items of respondents’ knowing: 
1. The name of the President 
2. The three Powers of the Union  
3. How long is the tenure of a Federal congressperson  
7,413 No = 0, Yes = 1 range: [0,1]  
values: 5 
6. Being informed Used six ordinal items on how often respondents’ get 
informed by: 
1. The Television 
2. Journals 
3. The Radio 
4. Magazines 
5. Talking with family and friends 
6. The Internet 
7,415 Never = 1 
Almost never = 2 
Sometimes = 3 
Always = 4 
range: [0,3]  
values: 32 
Context 
7. Fear of crime Used 11 dichotomous items on things respondents stop-
ped doing because of fear of being a victim of violence: 
1. Going out –at night- 
2. Allowing the kids to go out 
3. Going for a walk at a specific hour 
4. Going out for dinner or fun 
5. Going to the movies or events 
6. Using taxis 
7. Using public transportation 
8. Visiting specific areas in the locality 
9. Visiting friends and family in the locality 
10. Visiting friends and family in a different locality 
11. Traveling by road 
7,414 No = 0, Yes = 1 range: [0,1] 
values: 43 
8. Exposure to violence Used 13 dichotomous items on respondents’ exposure to 
violence because: 
1. Someone damaged his/her property or belongings 
2. Occasionally heard gunfire 
3. Frequently heard gunfire 
4. Witnessed someone being beaten 
5. Witnessed an armed confrontation 
6. Witnessed a violent death 
7. Was beaten up 
8. Had to hide from bullets or a shooting 
7,414 No = 0, Yes = 1 range: [0,1] 
values: 24 
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Variable Individual Items used a N Item values b Value range 
9. Was severely wounded 
10. Was threatened 
11. Had to pay for protection 
12. Was Kidnapped 
13. Was Tortured 
Demographics 
1. Age Single item 7,397  range [18-80] 
values: 63 
2. Gender Single dichotomous item, reverse coded 7,416 Male = 0 
Female = 1 
range [0,1] 
values: 2 
3. Education (rec) Single item, recoded 7,269 None = 1 
Low = 2 
Mid-Low = 3 
Mid-High = 4 
High = 5 
(original item had 12 values; 1: None to 11: 
Graduate) 
range [1,5] 
values: 5 
4. Employment (rec)  Single item, recoded 7,360 Non-employed or unemployed = 0 
Employed = 1 
(original item had 12 values, such as working for the 
government, working in the private sector, self-
employed, student, housewife or working part-time) 
range [1,6] 
values: 6 
5. State Single item 7,416 All other states = 0 
Chihuahua = 1 
Mexico City = 2 
Estado de Mexico = 3 
Guerrero = 4 
Jalisco = 5 
Michoacan = 6 
Nuevo Leon = 7 
values: 8 
Other variables of interest (regression and exploratory analyses) 
1. Trust people Single item, recoded 6,594 No = 0, Yes = 1 
(original item values: 1: Most people can be trusted, 
2: You should always watch your back, 3: there are 
of all sorts / it depends) 
range: [0,1]  
values: 2  
2. Interested in Politics Single dichotomous item, reverse coded 7,378 No = 0, Yes = 1 
(original item values: 1: Not interested, 2: A little 
interested, 3: Fairly interested, 4: Very interested) 
range: [0,1 
 values: 2  
3. Law compliance (obey 
the law) 
Single ordinal item, reverse coded 7,160 Never = 1 
Almost never = 2 
Almost always = 3 
range: [1,4]  
values:  4  
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Always = 4 
4. Feeling safe Single ordinal item, recoded coded 6,317 Not safe = 0 
A little safe = 1 
Somewhat safe = 2 
Very safe = 3 
range: [0,3]  
values: 4  
5.  Concern Used three ordinal items on respondents’ concern of drug-
related violence in: 
1. The country 
2. The community 
3. The State 
7,413 Nothing = 1                       
A little = 2 
Somewhat = 3 
A lot = 4 
range: [1,4] 
values: 12 
Perceptions  
6. Approve 
Government’s actions 
on the WoD  
Single ordinal item, recoded 7,336 No = 0, Yes = 1 
(original item values: 0: disapprove, 1: Little 
disapprove, 2: Somewhat approve, 3: Approve) 
range: [0,1]  
values: 2 
7. Government winning 
the WoD 
Single ordinal item, reverse coded 5,943      No = 0, Yes = 1 
(original item values: No = 0, Yes = 1, Nor winning 
nor loosing = 2) 
range: [0,1]  
values: 2   
8. Government obtaining 
information for the 
WoD 
Used two ordinal items (derived from list experiment 
questions) registering: 
How many activities do you agree the government uses to 
obtain information to fight drug dealing? 
7,282 0 to 4 / 0 to 5 range:  
[-1.66,2.77]  
values: 11 
9. Citizens’ acts on the 
WoD 
Used two ordinal items on people agreeing that others: 
1. Lynch criminals for justice 
2. Organize in self-defense groups for protection 
7,389 Not at all = 0    
Little agree = 1 
Somewhat agree = 2               
Agree a lot = 3 
range: [1,4]  
values: 7  
10. Citizens collaborate 
with organized crime 
Used two ordinal items that: 
1. A peasant grow marihuana if in need 
2. A student collaborate with organized crime if in need 
7,389 Unacceptable and unjustified = 0 
Unacceptable but justifiable = 1 
Acceptable and justifiable = 2 
range: [0,2] 
values: 5 
11. Economic situation  Used two items on respondents’ opinion of: 
1. The current economic situation  
2. Improvement of the economy compared to last year  
7,411 Very bad / Much worse = 1 
Bad / Worse = 2 
Regular / The same = 3 
Good / Improved = 4 
Very good / Much improved = 5 
range: [1,5]  
values: 9  
12. Rights (legalization 
of) 
Used three dichotomous items: 
1. Should abortion be legal? 
2. Should marihuana consumption be legal? 
3. Should same-sex marriage be legal? 
7,410  range: [0,1] 
values: 5 
a
 All new variables were built using the sum of the means of the original items. 
b
 All dichotomous items coded “Yes = 1, No = 2” were recoded to “No = 0, Yes = 1”. 
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Table B. Pairwise correlation of the study variables (N=7,416). 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1   1.00             
2   0.19*   1.00            
3   0.08*    0.25*   1.00           
4 ‒ 0.01   -0.12*  -0.04* 1.00          
5 ‒ 0.05*  ‒0.05*   0.03*   0.35* 1.00         
6  0.10*  ‒0.01   ‒0.06*   0.04*   0.06* 1.00        
7  0.18*  0.042   0.02    0.04*   0.08*   0.33* 1.00       
8  0.11*   0.09*   0.04*  ‒0.04*   0.05*   0.09*   0.12* 1.00      
9  0.16*   0.13*   0.07*   0.05*   0.08*   0.15*   0.23* 0.27*   1.00     
10 ‒0.04*  ‒0.12*   0.00    0.02    0.02    0.03* ‒0.08* ‒0.07*  ‒0.09*   1.00      
11 0.12*  0.15* 0.08* ‒0.08*   0.04*   0.05* 0.15* 0.36*   0.30*  ‒0.27* 1.00   
12 ‒0.03*  ‒0.05* 0.06* 0.00   ‒0.05* ‒0.02   ‒0.03* ‒0.11*  ‒0.10*  ‒0.06*  ‒0.03* 1.00  
13 0.06*   0.09* 0.01   ‒0.02    0.02* 0.02   0.07* 0.10*   0.12*  ‒0.12*   0.14*  ‒0.45* 1.00 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed test). 
Notation: 1. Mobilize in Collective Action, 2. Exposure to violence, 3. Fear, 4. Trust government institutions, 5. Trust security institutions, 6. Social 
cohesion, 7. Community help, 8. Political knowledge, 9. Informed about politics, 10. Age, 11. Education, 12. Gender, 13. Employment 
 
 
 
Table C. Covariance matrix for the study variables (N=7,416). 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 .0162             
2 .0032   .0163            
3 .0034   .0106   .1141           
4 ‒.0007 .4715 ‒.0110 ‒.0102            
5 ‒.0059  ‒.0059  .0092  .1974   .6856         
6  .0094  ‒.0008  ‒.0143 .0189  .0389 .5845        
7 .0117   .0042   .0063   .0218   .0526   .1959   .5981       
8  .0041  .0032   .0040  ‒.0082  .0129   .0199   .0285   .0894      
9 .0126   .0103  .0143  .0205   .0400   .0703   .1086   .0511  .3795     
10 ‒.0780 ‒.2528   .0077 .2249  .2671 .3657 ‒1.038  ‒.3231 ‒.9013   280.23    
11 .0154  .0184  .0273 ‒.0547  .0295  .0352 .1149   .1079 .1867 ‒4.584 1.019   
12 ‒.0021   ‒.0032  .0094 .0009 ‒.0193 ‒.0077 ‒.0098 ‒.0156 ‒.0297 ‒.4715 ‒.0131 .2497  
13 .0035   .0059  .0018 ‒.0062  .0088 .0101 .0293   .0156   .0351 ‒.9930 .0699 ‒.1126 .2500 
Notation: 1. Mobilize in Collective Action, 2. Exposure to violence, 3. Fear, 4. Trust government institutions, 5. Trust security institutions, 6. Social 
cohesion, 7. Community help, 8. Political knowledge, 9. Informed about politics, 10. Age, 11. Education, 12. Gender, 13. Employment  
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Appendix B 
SEM Output 
 
Model 6. Baseline model for Social Capital and Political Culture on Mobilization for Collective 
Action 
 
sem (SOCCAP -> TrustGovInst,) (SOCCAP -> TrustSecInst,) (SOCCAP -> SocCohes,) (SOCCAP 
-> POLCULT,) (SOCCAP -> MobCA,) > (SOCCAP -> CommHelp,) (POLCULT@1 -> PolKnow,) 
(POLCULT -> Informed,) (POLCULT -> MobCA,) (MobCA@1 -> Assoc,) (MobCA -> InflPrs,) 
(MobCA -> MediaInt,) (MobCA -> InfmCamp,) (MobCA -> ElectCamp,) (MobCA -> MarchProt,) 
(MobCA -> Repres,) (MobCA -> SitInProt,), standardized latent(SOCCAP POLCULT MobCA) 
nocapslatent 
note: The following latent variable name is also present in the data: MobCA.  
(130 observations with missing values excluded) 
 
Endogenous variables 
 
Measurement:  TrustGovInst TrustSecInst SocCohes CommHelp PolKnow Informed Assoc  
              InflPrs MediaInt InfmCamp ElectCamp MarchProt Repres SitInProt 
Latent:       POLCULT MobCA 
 
Exogenous variables 
 
Latent:       SOCCAP 
 
Fitting target model: 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -32687.123   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -32675.536   
[Output omitted] 
Iteration 6:   log likelihood = -32643.344   
 
Structural equation model                       Number of obs     =      7,286 
Estimation method  = ml                         Log likelihood     = -32643.344 
 
 ( 1)  [PolKnow]POLCULT = 1 
 ( 2)  [Assoc]MobCA = 1 
 ( 3)  [TrustGovInst]SOCCAP = 1 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                   |                 OIM 
      Standardized |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Structural         | 
  POLCULT <-       | 
            SOCCAP |   .2363217   .0261172     9.05   0.000     .1851329    .2875106 
  -----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  MobCA <-         | 
           POLCULT |    .300666   .0238468    12.61   0.000     .2539271    .3474049 
            SOCCAP |  -.0954275   .0219798    -4.34   0.000    -.1385071   -.0523479 
-------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Measurement        | 
  TrustGovInst <-  | 
            SOCCAP |   .5037793   .0179461    28.07   0.000     .4686057    .5389529 
             _cons |   3.308651   .0298076   111.00   0.000     3.250229    3.367073 
  -----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  TrustSecInst <-  | 
            SOCCAP |   .6330935   .0267132    23.70   0.000     .5807366    .6854503 
             _cons |   3.627152   .0322505   112.47   0.000     3.563942    3.690362 
  -----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
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  SocCohes <-      | 
            SOCCAP |   .1636172   .0210013     7.79   0.000     .1224554     .204779 
             _cons |   2.738951   .0255355   107.26   0.000     2.688902    2.788999 
  -----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  CommHelp <-      | 
            SOCCAP |   .1939923   .0216508     8.96   0.000     .1515576     .236427 
             _cons |   3.089249   .0281455   109.76   0.000     3.034085    3.144414 
  -----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  PolKnow <-       | 
           POLCULT |   .3910834   .0228445    17.12   0.000     .3463091    .4358577 
             _cons |   1.792851   .0189164    94.78   0.000     1.755776    1.829927 
  -----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Informed <-      | 
           POLCULT |   .7053589   .0375781    18.77   0.000     .6317072    .7790106 
             _cons |   1.939759   .0198862    97.54   0.000     1.900782    1.978735 
  -----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Assoc <-         | 
             MobCA |   .4778581   .0118435    40.35   0.000     .4546453    .5010709 
             _cons |   .2812253   .0119447    23.54   0.000     .2578141    .3046366 
  -----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  InflPrs <-       | 
             MobCA |   .5177765   .0115117    44.98   0.000      .495214    .5403391 
             _cons |   .2535175   .0119021    21.30   0.000     .2301898    .2768452 
  -----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  MediaInt <-      | 
             MobCA |   .5127397   .0115133    44.53   0.000     .4901741    .5353053 
             _cons |    .222606   .0118596    18.77   0.000     .1993616    .2458504 
  -----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  InfmCamp <-      | 
             MobCA |   .4749889   .0118774    39.99   0.000     .4517096    .4982682 
             _cons |   .2397386   .0118825    20.18   0.000     .2164494    .2630279 
  -----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  ElectCamp <-     | 
             MobCA |    .443642   .0121047    36.65   0.000     .4199172    .4673669 
             _cons |   .2960152   .0119692    24.73   0.000      .272556    .3194745 
  -----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  MarchProt <-     | 
             MobCA |   .4304721   .0123082    34.97   0.000     .4063485    .4545957 
             _cons |   .2403781   .0118834    20.23   0.000     .2170871    .2636691 
  -----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Repres <-        | 
             MobCA |   .4955701   .0117215    42.28   0.000     .4725965    .5185437 
             _cons |   .1923679   .0118232    16.27   0.000     .1691948     .215541 
  -----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  SitInProt <-     | 
             MobCA |   .3642926   .0127993    28.46   0.000     .3392064    .3893788 
             _cons |   .1718496   .0118015    14.56   0.000      .148719    .1949802 
-------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
var(e.TrustGovInst)|   .7462064   .0180817                      .7115953    .7825009 
var(e.TrustSecInst)|   .5991926   .0338239                      .5364348    .6692926 
    var(e.SocCohes)|   .9732294   .0068724                      .9598526    .9867926 
    var(e.CommHelp)|    .962367   .0084002                       .946043    .9789727 
     var(e.PolKnow)|   .8470538   .0178682                      .8127469    .8828088 
    var(e.Informed)|   .5024688   .0530121                      .4086059    .6178935 
       var(e.Assoc)|   .7716516    .011319                      .7497827    .7941585 
     var(e.InflPrs)|   .7319075    .011921                      .7089117    .7556491 
    var(e.MediaInt)|    .737098   .0118066                      .7143169    .7606056 
    var(e.InfmCamp)|   .7743855   .0112833                      .7525835    .7968192 
   var(e.ElectCamp)|   .8031818   .0107403                      .7824045    .8245107 
   var(e.MarchProt)|   .8146938   .0105967                      .7941872    .8357299 
      var(e.Repres)|   .7544103   .0116176                      .7319804    .7775275 
   var(e.SitInProt)|   .8672909   .0093254                      .8492047    .8857623 
     var(e.POLCULT)|    .944152   .0123441                      .9202653    .9686588 
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       var(e.MobCA)|   .9140545   .0135381                      .8879018    .9409775 
        var(SOCCAP)|          1          .                             .           . 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
LR test of model vs. saturated: chi2(74)  =   1889.39, Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
.  
. . estat gof, stats (all) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Fit statistic        |      Value   Description 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
Likelihood ratio     | 
         chi2_ms(74) |   1889.392   model vs. saturated 
            p > chi2 |      0.000 
         chi2_bs(91) |   9641.458   baseline vs. saturated 
            p > chi2 |      0.000 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
Population error     | 
               RMSEA |      0.058   Root mean squared error of approximation 
 90% CI, lower bound |      0.056 
         upper bound |      0.060 
              pclose |      0.000   Probability RMSEA <= 0.05 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
Information criteria | 
                 AIC |  65376.688   Akaike's information criterion 
                 BIC |  65686.905   Bayesian information criterion 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
Baseline comparison  | 
                 CFI |      0.810   Comparative fit index 
                 TLI |      0.766   Tucker-Lewis index 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
Size of residuals    | 
                SRMR |      0.053   Standardized root mean squared residual 
                  CD |      0.534   Coefficient of determination 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Modification indices 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                  |                                      Standard 
                                  |        MI     df   P>MI        EPC        EPC 
----------------------------------+---------------------------------------------- 
[output omitted] 
cov(e.TrustGovInst,e.TrustSecInst)|   964.192      1   0.00   1.233519   3.243579 
    cov(e.TrustGovInst,e.SocCohes)|    41.546      1   0.00  -.0470276  -.1050579 
    cov(e.TrustGovInst,e.CommHelp)|    68.572      1   0.00  -.0657757  -.1462878 
     cov(e.TrustGovInst,e.PolKnow)|    61.377      1   0.00  -.0179086  -.1099365 
    cov(e.TrustGovInst,e.Informed)|     5.685      1   0.02  -.0128193  -.0494874 
    cov(e.TrustGovInst,e.InfmCamp)|     4.224      1   0.04   .0032704    .027658 
   cov(e.TrustGovInst,e.MarchProt)|     5.567      1   0.02  -.0038157  -.0313865 
     cov(e.TrustGovInst,e.POLCULT)|    50.860      1   0.00  -.0106733  -.1586888 
    cov(e.TrustSecInst,e.SocCohes)|    89.608      1   0.00  -.1019492  -.2103867 
    cov(e.TrustSecInst,e.CommHelp)|    97.814      1   0.00  -.1175288  -.2414603 
    cov(e.TrustSecInst,e.Informed)|    21.952      1   0.00  -.0350365  -.1249424 
    cov(e.TrustSecInst,e.MediaInt)|    17.192      1   0.00  -.0073676  -.0630596 
     cov(e.TrustSecInst,e.POLCULT)|    39.812      1   0.00  -.0139659  -.1918103 
       cov(e.TrustSecInst,e.MobCA)|    44.431      1   0.00  -.0121578  -.1591439 
        cov(e.SocCohes,e.CommHelp)|   745.589      1   0.00   .1898006    .331281 
         cov(e.SocCohes,e.PolKnow)|    12.095      1   0.00   .0089056    .042904 
        cov(e.SocCohes,e.Informed)|    63.824      1   0.00   .0420123   .1272807 
           cov(e.SocCohes,e.Assoc)|     9.553      1   0.00   .0066066   .0382107 
         cov(e.SocCohes,e.InflPrs)|     4.048      1   0.04   .0038741    .025171 
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        cov(e.SocCohes,e.InfmCamp)|    12.065      1   0.00   .0064651   .0429084 
         cov(e.SocCohes,e.POLCULT)|   151.115      1   0.00   .0172963   .2018155 
           cov(e.SocCohes,e.MobCA)|    50.331      1   0.00   .0093734   .1042395 
         cov(e.CommHelp,e.PolKnow)|    22.810      1   0.00   .0123348   .0591611 
        cov(e.CommHelp,e.Informed)|   198.405      1   0.00    .074866   .2258074 
           cov(e.CommHelp,e.Assoc)|    12.035      1   0.00     .00747   .0430126 
        cov(e.CommHelp,e.InfmCamp)|     7.315      1   0.01   .0050711   .0335073 
       cov(e.CommHelp,e.MarchProt)|     7.518      1   0.01   .0052302   .0336127 
          cov(e.CommHelp,e.Repres)|     7.826      1   0.01   .0042607   .0348586 
         cov(e.CommHelp,e.POLCULT)|   377.666      1   0.00    .027654   .3212379 
           cov(e.CommHelp,e.MobCA)|    65.146      1   0.00   .0107728   .1192691 
          cov(e.PolKnow,e.POLCULT)|     5.732      1   0.02   .0066507   .2132416 
            cov(e.PolKnow,e.MobCA)|     5.730      1   0.02   .0021319   .0651476 
         cov(e.Informed,e.InflPrs)|     3.896      1   0.05  -.0030081  -.0337732 
         cov(e.Informed,e.POLCULT)|     5.716      1   0.02  -.0247304  -.4986401 
           cov(e.Informed,e.MobCA)|     5.730      1   0.02  -.0079385  -.1525555 
           cov(e.Assoc,e.MediaInt)|     4.388      1   0.04   .0012478   .0299321 
           cov(e.Assoc,e.InfmCamp)|    50.300      1   0.00   .0045096   .0987374 
          cov(e.Assoc,e.MarchProt)|    11.917      1   0.00  -.0022021   -.046895 
             cov(e.Assoc,e.Repres)|    35.028      1   0.00  -.0030806  -.0835175 
          cov(e.Assoc,e.SitInProt)|    15.191      1   0.00  -.0018335  -.0515208 
         cov(e.InflPrs,e.MediaInt)|     6.657      1   0.01   .0014107   .0380151 
         cov(e.InflPrs,e.InfmCamp)|     5.540      1   0.02  -.0013701   -.033699 
        cov(e.InflPrs,e.MarchProt)|    44.210      1   0.00  -.0038733  -.0926609 
           cov(e.InflPrs,e.Repres)|    83.818      1   0.00   .0043685   .1330429 
        cov(e.InflPrs,e.SitInProt)|    23.129      1   0.00  -.0020604  -.0650387 
        cov(e.MediaInt,e.InfmCamp)|     7.508      1   0.01   .0014196   .0390771 
       cov(e.MediaInt,e.ElectCamp)|    23.480      1   0.00  -.0030103  -.0677766 
          cov(e.MediaInt,e.Repres)|     6.370      1   0.01  -.0010717  -.0365277 
       cov(e.InfmCamp,e.ElectCamp)|    12.028      1   0.00   .0023041   .0473494 
       cov(e.InfmCamp,e.MarchProt)|    11.842      1   0.00  -.0019099  -.0466722 
          cov(e.InfmCamp,e.Repres)|    33.750      1   0.00  -.0026303   -.081827 
       cov(e.InfmCamp,e.SitInProt)|     4.653      1   0.03   -.000883  -.0284731 
      cov(e.ElectCamp,e.MarchProt)|     5.604      1   0.02   .0015805    .031591 
         cov(e.ElectCamp,e.Repres)|     6.376      1   0.01    .001372   .0349107 
      cov(e.ElectCamp,e.SitInProt)|    27.679      1   0.00  -.0025953   -.068446 
      cov(e.MarchProt,e.SitInProt)|   216.333      1   0.00   .0060684   .1903207 
        cov(e.MarchProt,e.POLCULT)|     6.911      1   0.01   .0011369   .0488457 
          cov(e.MarchProt,e.MobCA)|     7.357      1   0.01  -.0040595  -.1662247 
         cov(e.Repres,e.SitInProt)|     4.127      1   0.04    .000679   .0271087 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
EPC = expected parameter change 
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Model 6.1. Adjusted model for Social Capital and Political Culture on Mobilization for 
Collective Action with four covariances of the error terms included 
 
sem (SOCCAP -> TrustGovInst,) (SOCCAP -> TrustSecInst,) (SOCCAP -> SocCohes,) (SOCCAP 
-> POLCULT,) (SOCCAP -> MobCA,) (SOCCAP -> CommHelp,) (POLCULT@1 -> PolKnow,) (POLCULT 
-> Informed,) (POLCULT -> MobCA,) (MobCA@1 -> Assoc,) (MobCA -> InflPrs,) (MobCA -> 
MediaInt,) (MobCA -> InfmCamp,) (MobCA -> ElectCamp,) (MobCA -> MarchProt,) (MobCA -> 
Repres,) (MobCA -> SitInProt,), standardized latent(SOCCAP POLCULT MobCA ) cov( 
e.TrustGovInst*e.TrustSecInst e.SocCohes*e.CommHelp e.InflPrs*e.Repres 
e.MarchProt*e.SitInProt) nocapslatent 
note: The following latent variable name is also present in the data: MobCA.  
(130 observations with missing values excluded) 
 
Endogenous variables 
 
Measurement:  TrustGovInst TrustSecInst SocCohes CommHelp PolKnow Informed Assoc  
              InflPrs MediaInt InfmCamp ElectCamp MarchProt Repres SitInProt 
Latent:       POLCULT MobCA 
 
Exogenous variables 
 
Latent:       SOCCAP 
 
Fitting target model: 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -32687.123  (not concave) 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -32217.034  (not concave) 
[Output omitted] 
Iteration 34:  log likelihood = -31884.983   
Iteration 35:  log likelihood = -31884.982   
 
Structural equation model                       Number of obs     =      7,286 
Estimation method  = ml                         Log likelihood     = -31884.982 
 
 ( 1)  [PolKnow]POLCULT = 1 
 ( 2)  [Assoc]MobCA = 1 
 ( 3)  [TrustGovInst]SOCCAP = 1 
                     |                 OIM 
        Standardized |      Coef.   Std. Err.      Z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Structural           | 
  POLCULT <-         | 
              SOCCAP |    .554225    .064758     8.56   0.000     .4273017    .6811483 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  MobCA <-           | 
             POLCULT |   .2183928   .0344626     6.34   0.000     .1508473    .2859382 
              SOCCAP |   .1214929   .0361085     3.36   0.001     .0507216    .1922642 
---------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Measurement          | 
  TrustGovInst <-    | 
              SOCCAP |   .0740911   .0175055     4.23   0.000      .039781    .1084012 
               _cons |   3.308651   .0298076   111.00   0.000     3.250229    3.367073 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  TrustSecInst <-    | 
              SOCCAP |   .1402685   .0192268     7.30   0.000     .1025846    .1779523 
               _cons |   3.627153   .0322504   112.47   0.000     3.563943    3.690363 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  SocCohes <-        | 
              SOCCAP |   .4030965   .0487852     8.26   0.000     .3074793    .4987137 
               _cons |   2.738951   .0255355   107.26   0.000     2.688903       2.789 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  CommHelp <-        | 
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              SOCCAP |   .5866604   .0638929     9.18   0.000     .4614327    .7118882 
               _cons |   3.089251   .0281455   109.76   0.000     3.034087    3.144415 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  PolKnow <-         | 
             POLCULT |   .3999577   .0177157    22.58   0.000     .3652356    .4346799 
               _cons |    1.79285   .0189164    94.78   0.000     1.755775    1.829926 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Informed <-        | 
             POLCULT |   .6897129   .0261348    26.39   0.000     .6384896    .7409362 
               _cons |   1.939756   .0198862    97.54   0.000     1.900779    1.978732 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Assoc <-           | 
               MobCA |   .4971207   .0119725    41.52   0.000      .473655    .5205864 
               _cons |   .2812253   .0119447    23.54   0.000     .2578141    .3046366 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  InflPrs <-         | 
               MobCA |   .4941805   .0123259    40.09   0.000     .4700222    .5183388 
               _cons |   .2535175   .0119021    21.30   0.000     .2301898    .2768452 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  MediaInt <-        | 
               MobCA |   .5192534   .0117665    44.13   0.000     .4961915    .5423152 
               _cons |    .222606   .0118596    18.77   0.000     .1993616    .2458504 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  InfmCamp <-        | 
               MobCA |   .4950072   .0120079    41.22   0.000     .4714721    .5185424 
               _cons |   .2397386   .0118825    20.18   0.000     .2164494    .2630279 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  ElectCamp <-       | 
               MobCA |   .4500846   .0123243    36.52   0.000     .4259293    .4742399 
               _cons |   .2960152   .0119692    24.73   0.000      .272556    .3194745 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  MarchProt <        | 
               MobCA |   .4014381   .0127872    31.39   0.000     .3763757    .4265005 
               _cons |   .2403781   .0118834    20.23   0.000     .2170871    .2636691 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Repres <-          | 
               MobCA |   .4600099   .0127442    36.10   0.000     .4350317    .4849882 
               _cons |   .1923679   .0118232    16.27   0.000     .1691948     .215541 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  SitInProt <-       | 
               MobCA |   .3251111   .0133857    24.29   0.000     .2988756    .3513466 
               _cons |   .1718496   .0118015    14.56   0.000      .148719    .1949802 
---------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  var(e.TrustGovInst)|   .9945105    .002594                      .9894393    .9996077 
  var(e.TrustSecInst)|   .9803248   .0053938                      .9698099    .9909537 
      var(e.SocCohes)|   .8375132   .0393303                      .7638685    .9182581 
      var(e.CommHelp)|   .6558295   .0749668                      .5241933    .8205225 
       var(e.PolKnow)|   .8400338   .0141711                      .8127132    .8682728 
      var(e.Informed)|   .5242961    .036051                      .4581918    .5999374 
         var(e.Assoc)|    .752871   .0119036                      .7298982    .7765668 
       var(e.InflPrs)|   .7557856   .0121824                      .7322818    .7800439 
      var(e.MediaInt)|   .7303759   .0122195                      .7068145    .7547228 
      var(e.InfmCamp)|   .7549679    .011888                      .7320236    .7786313 
     var(e.ElectCamp)|   .7974239    .011094                      .7759738    .8194669 
     var(e.MarchProt)|   .8388475   .0102665                      .8189649    .8592127 
        var(e.Repres)|   .7883909   .0117249                      .7657421    .8117095 
     var(e.SitInProt)|   .8943028   .0087037                      .8774055    .9115254 
       var(e.POLCULT)|   .6928346    .071781                      .5655109     .848825 
         var(e.MobCA)|   .9081334   .0111961                      .8864523    .9303447 
          var(SOCCAP)|          1          .                             .           . 
---------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
cov(e.TstGvIn,e.TstSIn)  .3401155   .0105043    32.38   0.000     .3195275    .3607035 
cov(e.SCohes,e.CHelp)|     .12711   .0611412     2.08   0.038     .0072754    .2469446 
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cov(e.InflPrs,e.Repr)|   .1211521   .0136827     8.85   0.000     .0943345    .1479697 
cov(e.MchPr,e.SitInPr)|  .1817778   .0121806    14.92   0.000     .1579042    .2056514 
LR test of model vs. saturated: chi2(70)  =    372.67, Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
.  
. . estat gof, stats (all) 
Fit statistic        |      Value   Description 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
Likelihood ratio     | 
         chi2_ms(70) |    372.669   model vs. saturated 
            p > chi2 |      0.000 
         chi2_bs(91) |   9641.458   baseline vs. saturated 
            p > chi2 |      0.000 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
Population error     | 
               RMSEA |      0.024   Root mean squared error of approximation 
 90% CI, lower bound |      0.022 
         upper bound |      0.027 
              pclose |      1.000   Probability RMSEA <= 0.05 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
Information criteria | 
                 AIC |  63867.965   Akaike’s information criterion 
                 BIC |  64205.757   Bayesian information criterion 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
Baseline comparison  | 
                 CFI |      0.968   Comparative fit index 
                 TLI |      0.959   Tucker-Lewis index 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
Size of residuals    | 
                SRMR |      0.022   Standardized root mean squared residual 
                  CD |      0.530   Coefficient of determination 
 
  
 154 
Model 7. Initial model for Exposure and Fear on Social Capital and on Political Culture, and for 
Social Capital and Political Culture on Mobilization for Collective Action with five 
covariances of the error terms included 
 
sem (SocCap -> TrustGovInst,) (SocCap -> TrustSecInst,) (SocCap -> SocCohes,) (SocCap 
-> MobCA,) (SocCap -> MobCA,) (SocCap -> CommHelp,) (PC@1 ->  PolKnow,) (MobCA -> 
Informed,) (MobCA -> MobCA,) (MobCA@1 -> Assoc,) (MobCA -> InflPrs,) (MobCA -> 
MediaInt,) (MobCA -> InfmCamp,) (MobCA -> ElectCamp,) (MobCA -> MarchProt,) (MobCA -> 
Repres,) (MobCA -> SitInProt,) (ExpViol -> SocCap,) (ExpViol -> MobCA,) (Fear -> 
SocCap,) (Fear -> MobCA,), standardized latent(SocCap MobCA MobCA ) cov 
(e.TrustGovInst*e.TrustSecInst e.SocCohes*e.CommHelp e.PolKnow*e.Informed 
e.InflPrs*e.Repres e.MarchProt*e.SitInProt) nocapslatent 
note: The following latent variable name is also present in the data: MobCA.  
(134 observations with missing values excluded) 
 
Endogenous variables 
 
Measurement:  TrustGovInst TrustSecInst SocCohes CommHelp PolKnow Informed Assoc  
              InflPrs MediaInt InfmCamp ElectCamp MarchProt Repres SitInProt 
Latent:       SocCap MobCA MobCA 
 
Exogenous variables 
 
Observed:     ExpViol Fear 
 
Fitting target model: 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -30230.698  (not concave) 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -29534.518  (not concave) 
[Omitted output] 
Iteration 40:  log likelihood = -29176.893   
Iteration 41:  log likelihood = -29176.893   
 
Structural equation model                       Number of obs     =      7,282 
Estimation method  = ml                         Log likelihood     = -29176.893 
 
 ( 1)  [TrustGovInst]SocCap = 1 
 ( 2)  [PolKnow]MobCA = 1 
 ( 3)  [Assoc]MobCA = 1 
                     |                 OIM 
        Standardized |      Coef.   Std. Err.      Z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Structural           | 
  SocCap <-          | 
             ExpViol |   .0271449   .0213535     1.27   0.204    -.0147072    .0689971 
                Fear |   -.003428    .020933    -0.16   0.870     -.044456       .0376 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  MobCA <-           | 
              SocCap |   .8663465   .0483221    17.93   0.000     .7716368    .9610561 
             ExpViol |   .2519349   .0270712     9.31   0.000     .1988762    .3049935 
                Fear |   .0567578   .0173843     3.26   0.001     .0226852    .0908303 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  MobCA <-           | 
              SocCap |  -.5082547   .1869134    -2.72   0.007    -.8745982   -.1419111 
               MobCA |   .8689995   .0973339     8.93   0.000     .6782286     1.05977 
---------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Measurement          | 
  TrustGovInst <-    | 
              SocCap |   .0870249   .0191284     4.55   0.000     .0495339    .1245158 
               _cons |   3.307412   .0299239   110.53   0.000     3.248762    3.366061 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
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  TrustSecInst <-    | 
              SocCap |    .146485    .019357     7.57   0.000      .108546     .184424 
               _cons |   3.623706   .0325235   111.42   0.000     3.559961    3.687451 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  SocCohes <-        | 
              SocCap |    .390468   .0475675     8.21   0.000     .2972374    .4836985 
               _cons |   2.731554   .0276549    98.77   0.000     2.677352    2.785757 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  CommHelp <-        | 
              SocCap |   .5463758   .0596783     9.16   0.000     .4294084    .6633432 
               _cons |   3.078687   .0318824    96.56   0.000     3.016199    3.141176 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  PolKnow <-         | 
               MobCA |   .2721572   .0232141    11.72   0.000     .2266584     .317656 
               _cons |     1.7075   .0215542    79.22   0.000     1.665255    1.749746 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Informed <-        | 
               MobCA |   .4624594   .0315621    14.65   0.000     .4005988    .5243199 
               _cons |   1.794939   .0247875    72.41   0.000     1.746356    1.843521 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Assoc <-           | 
               MobCA |   .4957554   .0118951    41.68   0.000     .4724415    .5190694 
               _cons |   .1517611   .0150763    10.07   0.000     .1222121    .1813101 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  InflPrs <-         | 
               MobCA |   .4978304   .0121944    40.82   0.000     .4739299     .521731 
               _cons |   .1231734   .0150375     8.19   0.000     .0937003    .1526464 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  MediaInt <-        | 
               MobCA |   .5191601   .0116655    44.50   0.000     .4962961    .5420242 
               _cons |   .0873044   .0151485     5.76   0.000      .057614    .1169949 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  InfmCamp <-        | 
               MobCA |   .4928697   .0119267    41.32   0.000     .4694938    .5162455 
               _cons |   .1112975   .0149395     7.45   0.000     .0820166    .1405783 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  ElectCamp <-       | 
               MobCA |   .4495474   .0122422    36.72   0.000     .4255532    .4735416 
               _cons |   .1786143   .0146857    12.16   0.000     .1498309    .2073977 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  MarchProt <-       | 
               MobCA |   .4029088    .012694    31.74   0.000     .3780291    .4277886 
               _cons |   .1353936   .0141992     9.54   0.000     .1075637    .1632234 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Repres <-          | 
               MobCA |   .4611123   .0126282    36.51   0.000     .4363616    .4858631 
               _cons |   .0714235   .0146152     4.89   0.000     .0427783    .1000687 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  SitInProt <-       | 
               MobCA |    .325041   .0133082    24.42   0.000     .2989573    .3511246 
               _cons |   .0871471   .0135291     6.44   0.000     .0606306    .1136635 
---------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  var(e.TrustGovInst)|   .9924267   .0033293                      .9859228    .9989735 
  var(e.TrustSecInst)|   .9785421    .005671                        .96749    .9897205 
      var(e.SocCohes)|   .8475348   .0371472                      .7777672    .9235606 
      var(e.CommHelp)|   .7014735   .0652136                      .5846258    .8416753 
       var(e.PolKnow)|   .9259305   .0126358                      .9014931    .9510303 
      var(e.Informed)|   .7861313   .0291924                      .7309479    .8454809 
         var(e.Assoc)|   .7542266   .0117941                      .7314612    .7777005 
       var(e.InflPrs)|   .7521648   .0121415                      .7287405    .7763422 
      var(e.MediaInt)|   .7304728   .0121126                      .7071142    .7546029 
      var(e.InfmCamp)|   .7570795   .0117566                      .7343841    .7804762 
     var(e.ElectCamp)|   .7979071   .0110069                      .7766231    .8197745 
 156 
     var(e.MarchProt)|   .8376645    .010229                       .817854    .8579549 
        var(e.Repres)|   .7873754    .011646                      .7648774    .8105352 
     var(e.SitInProt)|   .8943484   .0086514                      .8775516    .9114667 
        var(e.SocCap)|    .999297   .0010979                      .9971476    1.001451 
            var(e.PC)|     .16394   .0730304                        .06847    .3925274 
         var(e.MobCA)|   .7578166   .0378273                      .6871878    .8357047 
---------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
cov(e.TrtGvIn,e.TrtSIn)|  .3384747   .0105966    31.94   0.000    .3177057    .3592437 
cov(e.SCohs,e.CommHp)|   .1512668   .0521164     2.90   0.004     .0491205     .253413 
cov(e.PolKn,e.Infrmd)|    .175777   .0191798     9.16   0.000     .1381853    .2133686 
cov(e.InflPrs,e.Repr)|   .1177681   .0136631     8.62   0.000     .0909889    .1445473 
cov(e.MchPrt,e.StInPrt)|  .1813634    .012164    14.91   0.000    .1575224    .2052044 
LR test of model vs. saturated: chi2(93)  =    607.96, Prob > chi2 = 0.0000  
.  
. . estat gof, stats (all) 
Fit statistic        |      Value   Description 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
Likelihood ratio     | 
         chi2_ms(93) |    607.961   model vs. saturated 
            p > chi2 |      0.000 
        chi2_bs(119) |  10262.914   baseline vs. saturated 
            p > chi2 |      0.000 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
Population error     | 
               RMSEA |      0.028   Root mean squared error of approximation 
 90% CI, lower bound |      0.026 
         upper bound |      0.030 
              pclose |      1.000   Probability RMSEA <= 0.05 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
Information criteria | 
                 AIC |  58461.786   Akaike’s information criterion 
                 BIC |  58834.016   Bayesian information criterion 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
Baseline comparison  | 
                 CFI |      0.949   Comparative fit index 
                 TLI |      0.935   Tucker-Lewis index 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
Size of residuals    | 
                SRMR |      0.025   Standardized root mean squared residual 
                  CD |      0.310   Coefficient of determination 
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Model 7.1. Adjusted model for Exposure and Fear on Political Culture, and for Social Capital 
and Political Culture on Mobilization for Collective Action with five covariances of 
the error terms included 
 
sem (MobCA -> Assoc,) (MobCA -> InflPrs,) (MobCA -> MediaInt,) (MobCA -> InfmCamp,) 
(MobCA -> ElectCamp,) (MobCA -> MarchProt,) (MobCA -> Repres,) (MobCA -> SitInProt,) 
(SOCCAP -> MobCA,) (SOCCAP -> TrustGovInst,) (SOCCAP -> TrustSecInst,) (SOCCAP -> 
SocCohes,) (SOCCAP -> CommHelp,) (SOCCAP -> POLCULT,) (POLCULT -> MobCA,) (POLCULT -> 
PolKnow,) (POLCULT -> Informed,) (ExpViol -> POLCULT,) (Fear -> POLCULT,), 
covstruct(_lexogenous, diagonal) cov(_lexogenous*_oexogenous@0) standardized 
latent(MobCA SOCCAP POLCULT ) cov( e.InflPrs*e.Repres e.MarchProt*e.SitInProt 
e.TrustGovInst*e.TrustSecInst e.SocCohes*e.CommHelp e.PolKnow*e.Informed) nocapslatent 
note: The following latent variable name is also present in the data: MobCA. 
(134 observations with missing values excluded) 
 
Endogenous variables 
 
Measurement:  Assoc InflPrs MediaInt InfmCamp ElectCamp MarchProt Repres SitInProt  
              TrustGovInst TrustSecInst SocCohes CommHelp PolKnow Informed 
Latent:       MobCA POLCULT 
 
Exogenous variables 
 
Observed:     ExpViol Fear 
Latent:       SOCCAP 
 
Fitting target model: 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -30455.883  (not concave) 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  -29725.77  (not concave) 
[Omitted Output] 
Iteration 34:  log likelihood =  -29177.65   
Iteration 35:  log likelihood =  -29177.65   
 
Structural equation model                       Number of obs      =      7282 
Estimation method  = ml                         Log likelihood     =  -29177.65 
 
 ( 1)  [Assoc]MobCA = 1 
 ( 2)  [PolKnow]POLCULT = 1 
 ( 3)  [TrustGovInst]SOCCAP = 1 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                     |                 OIM 
        Standardized |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Structural           | 
  MobCA <-           | 
             POLCULT |   .8610462   .0861636     9.99   0.000     .6921688    1.029924 
              SOCCAP |  -.5079466   .0952689    -5.33   0.000    -.6946703    -.321223 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  POLCULT <-         | 
             ExpViol |   .2602549   .0238157    10.93   0.000     .2135771    .3069328 
                Fear |   .0558898   .0152382     3.67   0.000     .0260235    .0857561 
              SOCCAP |    .882959   .0413182    21.37   0.000     .8019769    .9639412 
---------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Measurement          | 
  Assoc <-           | 
               MobCA |   .4955531   .0118928    41.67   0.000     .4722436    .5188627 
               _cons |   .1527155   .0150379    10.16   0.000     .1232417    .1821892 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  InflPrs <-         | 
               MobCA |   .4976986   .0121921    40.82   0.000     .4738025    .5215948 
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               _cons |   .1241103   .0150014     8.27   0.000     .0947082    .1535125 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  MediaInt <-        | 
               MobCA |   .5189784   .0116644    44.49   0.000     .4961165    .5418402 
               _cons |   .0882907   .0151098     5.84   0.000      .058676    .1179054 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  InfmCamp <-        | 
               MobCA |   .4927208   .0119249    41.32   0.000     .4693483    .5160932 
               _cons |   .1122282   .0149032     7.53   0.000     .0830185    .1414379 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  ElectCamp <-       | 
               MobCA |   .4494573   .0122397    36.72   0.000     .4254679    .4734467 
               _cons |   .1794543   .0146541    12.25   0.000     .1507329    .2081757 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  MarchProt <-       | 
               MobCA |   .4027422   .0126904    31.74   0.000     .3778695    .4276148 
               _cons |   .1361623   .0141706     9.61   0.000     .1083884    .1639363 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Repres <-          | 
               MobCA |   .4609374   .0126257    36.51   0.000     .4361914    .4856834 
               _cons |   .0722975   .0145816     4.96   0.000      .043718     .100877 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  SitInProt <-       | 
               MobCA |   .3248852   .0133041    24.42   0.000     .2988096    .3509609 
               _cons |    .087767   .0135072     6.50   0.000     .0612934    .1142406 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  TrustGovInst <-    | 
              SOCCAP |   .0944914    .018436     5.13   0.000     .0583574    .1306254 
               _cons |   3.309212   .0298201   110.97   0.000     3.250766    3.367658 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  TrustSecInst <-    | 
              SOCCAP |   .1515447   .0184477     8.21   0.000     .1153879    .1877015 
               _cons |   3.626737   .0322561   112.44   0.000     3.563516    3.689958 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  SocCohes <-        | 
              SOCCAP |   .3747762    .039951     9.38   0.000     .2964737    .4530786 
               _cons |   2.739633   .0255475   107.24   0.000      2.68956    2.789705 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  CommHelp <-        | 
              SOCCAP |   .5204759    .049497    10.52   0.000     .4234636    .6174883 
               _cons |    3.08999   .0281588   109.73   0.000     3.034799     3.14518 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  PolKnow <-         | 
             POLCULT |    .278611    .022605    12.33   0.000      .234306    .3229161 
               _cons |     1.7089   .0213319    80.11   0.000     1.667091     1.75071 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Informed <-        | 
             POLCULT |   .4749254   .0296048    16.04   0.000      .416901    .5329498 
               _cons |   1.797221   .0242607    74.08   0.000     1.749671    1.844771 
---------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         var(e.Assoc)|   .7544271   .0117871                       .731675    .7778867 
       var(e.InflPrs)|   .7522961    .012136                       .728882    .7764622 
      var(e.MediaInt)|   .7306615   .0121072                      .7073131    .7547806 
      var(e.InfmCamp)|   .7572262   .0117513                      .7345408    .7806123 
     var(e.ElectCamp)|   .7979881   .0110024                      .7767125    .8198465 
     var(e.MarchProt)|   .8377987   .0102219                      .8180019    .8580748 
        var(e.Repres)|   .7875367   .0116394                      .7650512     .810683 
     var(e.SitInProt)|   .8944496   .0086446                      .8776659    .9115543 
  var(e.TrustGovInst)|   .9910714   .0034841                      .9842661    .9979237 
  var(e.TrustSecInst)|   .9770342   .0055913                      .9661367    .9880546 
      var(e.SocCohes)|   .8595428   .0299453                        .80281    .9202848 
      var(e.CommHelp)|   .7291048    .051524                      .6348011    .8374178 
       var(e.PolKnow)|   .9223759    .012596                      .8980156     .947397 
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      var(e.Informed)|   .7744459   .0281202                      .7212468    .8315689 
         var(e.MobCA)|   .7729413   .0345838                      .7080454    .8437853 
       var(e.POLCULT)|   .1423951   .0650281                        .05818    .3485111 
          var(SOCCAP)|          1          .                             .           . 
---------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
cov(e.InfPrs,e.Reprs)|   .1177619   .0136637     8.62   0.000     .0909815    .1445423 
cov(e.MchPrt,e.StInPt)|   .181381   .0121639    14.91   0.000     .1575402    .2052218 
cov(e.TstGvIn,e.TstScI)|  .3373703   .0105898    31.86   0.000    .3166146   .3581259 
cov(e.ScCoh,e.CommHlp)|  .1704259   .0396709     4.30   0.000     .0926723    .2481794 
cov(e.PolKnw,e.Ifrmd)|   .1694203   .0189241     8.95   0.000     .1323297    .2065108 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
LR test of model vs. saturated: chi2(95)  =    609.47, Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
 
. estat gof, stats (all) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Fit statistic        |      Value   Description 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
Likelihood ratio     | 
         chi2_ms(95) |    609.475   model vs. saturated 
            p > chi2 |      0.000 
        chi2_bs(119) |  10262.914   baseline vs. saturated 
            p > chi2 |      0.000 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
Population error     | 
               RMSEA |      0.027   Root mean squared error of approximation 
 90% CI, lower bound |      0.025 
         upper bound |      0.029 
              pclose |      1.000   Probability RMSEA <= 0.05 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
Information criteria | 
                 AIC |  58459.299   Akaike's information criterion 
                 BIC |  58817.743   Bayesian information criterion 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
Baseline comparison  | 
                 CFI |      0.949   Comparative fit index 
                 TLI |      0.936   Tucker-Lewis index 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
Size of residuals    | 
                SRMR |      0.023   Standardized root mean squared residual 
                  CD |      0.879   Coefficient of determination 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Model 8. Initial model for Exposure and Fear on Political Culture, and for Social Capital and 
Political Culture and Demographic variables on Mobilization for Collective Action 
with five covariances of the error terms included 
 
sem (MobCA -> Assoc,) (MobCA -> InflPrs,) (MobCA -> MediaInt,) (MobCA -> InfmCamp,) 
(MobCA -> ElectCamp,) (MobCA -> MarchProt,) (MobCA -> Repres,) (MobCA -> SitInProt,) 
(SOCCAP -> MobCA,) (SOCCAP@1 -> TrustGovInst,) (SOCCAP -> TrustSecInst,) (SOCCAP -> 
SocCohes,) (SOCCAP -> CommHelp,) (SOCCAP -> POLCULT,) (POLCULT -> MobCA,) (POLCULT -> 
PolKnow,) (POLCULT -> Informed,) (ExpViol -> POLCULT,) (Fear -> POLCULT,) (Age -> 
MobCA,) (Educ -> MobCA,) (Gen -> MobCA,) (Occup_dyc -> MobCA,), covstruct(_lexogenous, 
diagonal) cov(_lexogenous*_oexogenous@0) standardized latent(MobCA SOCCAP POLCULT ) 
cov( e.InflPrs*e.Repres e.MarchProt*e.SitInProt e.TrustGovInst*e.TrustSecInst 
e.SocCohes*e.CommHelp e.PolKnow*e.Informed) nocapslatent  
 
note: The following latent variable name is also present in the data: MobCA.  
(337 observations with missing values excluded) 
 
Endogenous variables 
 
Measurement:  Assoc InflPrs MediaInt InfmCamp ElectCamp MarchProt Repres SitInProt  
              TrustGovInst TrustSecInst SocCohes CommHelp PolKnow Informed 
Latent:       MobCA POLCULT 
 
Exogenous variables 
 
Observed:     ExpViol Fear Age Educ Gen Occup_dyc 
Latent:       SOCCAP 
 
Fitting target model: 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -86750.627  (not concave) 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  -86044.99  (not concave) 
Iteration 31:  log likelihood = -85285.073   
 
Structural equation model                       Number of obs      =      7079 
Estimation method  = ml                         Log likelihood     = -85285.073 
 
 ( 1)  [Assoc]MobCA = 1 
 ( 2)  [PolKnow]POLCULT = 1 
 ( 3)  [TrustGovInst]SOCCAP = 1 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                     |                 OIM 
        Standardized |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Structural           | 
  MobCA <-           | 
             POLCULT |   .8040213    .083765     9.60   0.000     .6398449    .9681976 
                 Age |   .0212202   .0148448     1.43   0.153     -.007875    .0503155 
                Educ |   .0600203    .015983     3.76   0.000     .0286942    .0913464 
                 Gen |  -.0013657   .0158707    -0.09   0.931    -.0324716    .0297402 
           Occup_dyc |   .0179468   .0159833     1.12   0.262    -.0133799    .0492734 
              SOCCAP |  -.4806762   .0916256    -5.25   0.000    -.6602591   -.3010933 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  POLCULT <-         | 
             ExpViol |   .2704522    .025158    10.75   0.000     .2211435    .3197609 
                Fear |   .0600061   .0162535     3.69   0.000     .0281499    .0918624 
              SOCCAP |   .8885946   .0418706    21.22   0.000     .8065298    .9706593 
---------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Measurement          | 
  Assoc <-           | 
               MobCA |   .4999065   .0119524    41.82   0.000     .4764801    .5233328 
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               _cons |   .0784285   .0334007     2.35   0.019     .0129643    .1438927 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  InflPrs <-         | 
               MobCA |   .4964398   .0122912    40.39   0.000     .4723495    .5205301 
               _cons |   .0498862   .0331856     1.50   0.133    -.0151563    .1149287 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  MediaInt <-        | 
               MobCA |     .52157    .011742    44.42   0.000      .498556    .5445839 
               _cons |   .0094482   .0345587     0.27   0.785    -.0582856     .077182 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  InfmCamp <-        | 
               MobCA |   .4962514   .0119855    41.40   0.000     .4727603    .5197426 
               _cons |    .036095   .0331237     1.09   0.276    -.0288263    .1010163 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  ElectCamp <-       | 
               MobCA |   .4489757   .0123532    36.34   0.000     .4247639    .4731876 
               _cons |   .1130423   .0304863     3.71   0.000     .0532902    .1727944 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  MarchProt <-       | 
               MobCA |   .4039232   .0127847    31.59   0.000     .3788657    .4289808 
               _cons |   .0759326   .0279942     2.71   0.007      .021065    .1308002 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Repres <-          | 
               MobCA |   .4593689   .0127311    36.08   0.000     .4344164    .4843215 
               _cons |   .0046659   .0311274     0.15   0.881    -.0563427    .0656746 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  SitInProt <-       | 
               MobCA |   .3238184   .0134214    24.13   0.000      .297513    .3501238 
               _cons |   .0413981   .0238081     1.74   0.082     -.005265    .0880613 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  TrustGovInst <-    | 
              SOCCAP |   .0933614   .0187661     4.97   0.000     .0565804    .1301423 
               _cons |   3.304709   .0302097   109.39   0.000     3.245499    3.363919 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  TrustSecInst <-    | 
              SOCCAP |   .1532556   .0186776     8.21   0.000     .1166482    .1898629 
               _cons |   3.630367   .0327437   110.87   0.000     3.566191    3.694544 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  SocCohes <-        | 
              SOCCAP |   .3885726   .0417178     9.31   0.000     .3068071     .470338 
               _cons |   2.742067   .0259294   105.75   0.000     2.691247    2.792888 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  CommHelp <-        | 
              SOCCAP |   .5322323   .0512613    10.38   0.000     .4317621    .6327025 
               _cons |   3.090155   .0285609   108.20   0.000     3.034177    3.146133 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  PolKnow <-         | 
             POLCULT |   .2655372   .0227201    11.69   0.000     .2210068    .3100677 
               _cons |   1.710024   .0216382    79.03   0.000     1.667614    1.752434 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Informed <-        | 
             POLCULT |   .4664004   .0301299    15.48   0.000      .407347    .5254539 
               _cons |     1.7919   .0246508    72.69   0.000     1.743586    1.840215 
---------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         var(e.Assoc)|   .7500935   .0119502                      .7270334     .773885 
       var(e.InflPrs)|   .7535475   .0122037                      .7300044    .7778499 
      var(e.MediaInt)|   .7279648   .0122486                      .7043496    .7523717 
      var(e.InfmCamp)|   .7537345   .0118957                      .7307764    .7774139 
     var(e.ElectCamp)|   .7984208   .0110926                      .7769731    .8204606 
     var(e.MarchProt)|    .836846   .0103281                      .8168463    .8573355 
        var(e.Repres)|   .7889802   .0116966                      .7663852    .8122414 
     var(e.SitInProt)|   .8951417   .0086922                      .8782664    .9123412 
  var(e.TrustGovInst)|   .9912837   .0035041                      .9844396    .9981753 
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  var(e.TrustSecInst)|   .9765127   .0057249                      .9653564     .987798 
      var(e.SocCohes)|   .8490114   .0324208                      .7877874    .9149934 
      var(e.CommHelp)|   .7167288   .0545658                      .6173784     .832067 
       var(e.PolKnow)|     .92949    .012066                      .9061393    .9534424 
      var(e.Informed)|   .7824706   .0281052                      .7292798     .839541 
         var(e.MobCA)|   .8013733   .0328715                      .7394682    .8684609 
       var(e.POLCULT)|   .1256498   .0662187                       .044727    .3529829 
          var(SOCCAP)|          1          .                             .           . 
---------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
cov(e.InlPrs,e.Reprs)|   .1216114   .0137934     8.82   0.000     .0945768    .1486461 
cov(e.MchPrt,e.StInPt)|   .1833788   .0123214    14.88   0.000     .1592292   .2075283 
cov(e.TstGvIn,e.TstSI)|   .3374524   .0107464    31.40   0.000     .3163898    .358515 
cov(e.ScCoh,e.CommHlp)|   .1608002   .0435084     3.70   0.000     .0755254   .2460751 
cov(e.PolKnw,e.Ifrmd)|   .1812289   .0184117     9.84   0.000     .1451426    .2173152 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
LR test of model vs. saturated: chi2(147) =   2357.09, Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
 
. estat gof, stats (all) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Fit statistic        |      Value   Description 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
Likelihood ratio     | 
        chi2_ms(147) |   2357.092   model vs. saturated 
            p > chi2 |      0.000 
        chi2_bs(175) |  11914.732   baseline vs. saturated 
            p > chi2 |      0.000 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
Population error     | 
               RMSEA |      0.046   Root mean squared error of approximation 
 90% CI, lower bound |      0.044 
         upper bound |      0.048 
              pclose |      1.000   Probability RMSEA <= 0.05 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
Information criteria | 
                 AIC | 170682.146   Akaike's information criterion 
                 BIC | 171066.580   Bayesian information criterion 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
Baseline comparison  | 
                 CFI |      0.812   Comparative fit index 
                 TLI |      0.776   Tucker-Lewis index 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
Size of residuals    | 
                SRMR |      0.043   Standardized root mean squared residual 
                  CD |      0.893   Coefficient of determination 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Model 8.1. Final model for Exposure and Fear on Political Culture, and for Social Capital, 
Political Culture, Age and Education on Mobilization for Collective Action with five 
covariances of the error terms included 
 
sem (MobCA -> Assoc,) (MobCA -> InflPrs,) (MobCA -> MediaInt,) (MobCA -> InfmCamp,) 
(MobCA -> ElectCamp,) (MobCA -> MarchProt,) (MobCA -> Repres,) (MobCA -> SitInProt,) 
(SOCCAP -> MobCA,) (SOCCAP@1 -> TrustGovInst,) (SOCCAP -> TrustSecInst,) (SOCCAP -> 
SocCohes,) (SOCCAP -> CommHelp,) (SOCCAP -> POLCULT,) (POLCULT -> MobCA,) (POLCULT -> 
PolKnow,) (POLCULT -> Informed,) (ExpViol -> POLCULT,) (Fear -> POLCULT,) (Age -> 
MobCA,) (Educ -> MobCA,), covstruct(_lexogenous, diagonal) 
cov(_lexogenous*_oexogenous@0) standardized latent(MobCA SOCCAP POLCULT ) cov( 
e.InflPrs*e.Repres e.MarchProt *e.SitInProt e.TrustGovInst*e.TrustSecInst 
e.SocCohes*e.CommHelp e.PolKnow*e.Informed) nocapslatent  
note: The following latent variable name is also present in the data: MobCA.  
(287 observations with missing values excluded) 
 
Endogenous variables 
 
Measurement:  Assoc InflPrs MediaInt InfmCamp ElectCamp MarchProt Repres SitInProt  
              TrustGovInst TrustSecInst SocCohes  CommHelp PolKnow Informed 
Latent:       MobCA POLCULT 
 
Exogenous variables 
 
Observed:     ExpViol Fear Age Educ 
Latent:       SOCCAP 
 
Fitting target model: 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -77903.147  (not concave) 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -77057.513  (not concave) 
[output omitted] 
Iteration 32:  log likelihood = -76405.987   
Iteration 33:  log likelihood = -76405.987   
 
Structural equation model                       Number of obs      =      7129 
Estimation method  = ml                         Log likelihood     = -76405.987 
 
 ( 1)  [Assoc]MobCA = 1 
 ( 2)  [PolKnow]POLCULT = 1 
 ( 3)  [TrustGovInst]SOCCAP = 1 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                     |                 OIM 
        Standardized |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Structural           | 
  MobCA <-           | 
             POLCULT |   .8185479   .0855288     9.57   0.000     .6509146    .9861812 
                 Age |   .0208382    .014639     1.42   0.155    -.0078538    .0495302 
                Educ |    .061067   .0159123     3.84   0.000     .0298795    .0922546 
              SOCCAP |  -.4921787   .0935814    -5.26   0.000    -.6755949   -.3087626 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  POLCULT <-         | 
             ExpViol |   .2681826   .0251332    10.67   0.000     .2189224    .3174428 
                Fear |   .0583994   .0159747     3.66   0.000     .0270895    .0897093 
              SOCCAP |   .8929114   .0414557    21.54   0.000     .8116596    .9741631 
---------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Measurement          | 
  Assoc <-           | 
               MobCA |   .4997684    .011914    41.95   0.000     .4764173    .5231195 
               _cons |   .0851049   .0292476     2.91   0.004     .0277807    .1424292 
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  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  InflPrs <-         | 
               MobCA |   .4957064   .0122594    40.43   0.000     .4716784    .5197343 
               _cons |   .0571888   .0290676     1.97   0.049     .0002174    .1141602 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  MediaInt <-        | 
               MobCA |   .5215803   .0117091    44.54   0.000     .4986308    .5445297 
               _cons |   .0170025   .0302282     0.56   0.574    -.0422436    .0762487 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  InfmCamp <-        | 
               MobCA |   .4955236   .0119584    41.44   0.000     .4720855    .5189617 
               _cons |   .0444474   .0289893     1.53   0.125    -.0123706    .1012654 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  ElectCamp <-       | 
               MobCA |   .4496208   .0123143    36.51   0.000     .4254852    .4737563 
               _cons |   .1191268   .0268772     4.43   0.000     .0664485     .171805 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  MarchProt <-       | 
               MobCA |   .4038316    .012747    31.68   0.000     .3788479    .4288153 
               _cons |   .0812957    .024796     3.28   0.001     .0326963     .129895 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Repres <-          | 
               MobCA |   .4591472   .0126942    36.17   0.000      .434267    .4840273 
               _cons |   .0111307   .0273673     0.41   0.684    -.0425082    .0647697 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  SitInProt <-       | 
               MobCA |   .3239157   .0133811    24.21   0.000     .2976893    .3501421 
               _cons |   .0457237   .0213648     2.14   0.032     .0038494     .087598 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  TrustGovInst <-    | 
              SOCCAP |   .0918463   .0185981     4.94   0.000     .0553947    .1282978 
               _cons |   3.307911   .0301281   109.80   0.000     3.248861    3.366961 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  TrustSecInst <-    | 
              SOCCAP |   .1520139   .0186092     8.17   0.000     .1155405    .1884873 
               _cons |   3.634365   .0326598   111.28   0.000     3.570353    3.698377 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  SocCohes <-        | 
              SOCCAP |   .3874271   .0415459     9.33   0.000     .3059985    .4688557 
               _cons |   2.740699   .0258281   106.11   0.000     2.690077    2.791321 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  CommHelp <-        | 
              SOCCAP |    .527596   .0508736    10.37   0.000     .4278855    .6273065 
               _cons |   3.088062   .0284445   108.56   0.000     3.032312    3.143812 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  PolKnow <-         | 
             POLCULT |   .2678532   .0228412    11.73   0.000     .2230853     .312621 
               _cons |   1.710142   .0215518    79.35   0.000     1.667901    1.752382 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Informed <-        | 
             POLCULT |   .4671815   .0303714    15.38   0.000     .4076546    .5267085 
               _cons |    1.79256   .0245206    73.10   0.000       1.7445    1.840619 
---------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         var(e.Assoc)|   .7502315   .0119085                      .7272506    .7739387 
       var(e.InflPrs)|   .7542752   .0121541                      .7308258     .778477 
      var(e.MediaInt)|    .727954   .0122145                      .7044035     .752292 
      var(e.InfmCamp)|   .7544564   .0118514                      .7315821    .7780459 
     var(e.ElectCamp)|   .7978412   .0110735                        .77643    .8198428 
     var(e.MarchProt)|     .83692   .0102953                      .8169829    .8573437 
        var(e.Repres)|   .7891839    .011657                      .7666641    .8123651 
     var(e.SitInProt)|   .8950786   .0086687                      .8782485    .9122312 
  var(e.TrustGovInst)|   .9915643   .0034163                      .9848909    .9982828 
  var(e.TrustSecInst)|   .9768918   .0056577                      .9658655    .9880439 
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      var(e.SocCohes)|   .8499002   .0321921                      .7890901    .9153966 
      var(e.CommHelp)|   .7216425   .0536814                      .6237392    .8349129 
       var(e.PolKnow)|   .9282547   .0122362                      .9045794    .9525496 
      var(e.Informed)|   .7817414    .028378                      .7280542    .8393876 
         var(e.MobCA)|    .800346     .03351                      .7372903    .8687944 
       var(e.POLCULT)|   .1196652   .0658347                      .0407074    .3517734 
          var(SOCCAP)|          1          .                             .           . 
---------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
cov(e.InlPrs,e.Reprs)|   .1219324   .0137382     8.88   0.000      .095006   .1488587 
cov(e.MchPrt,e.StInPt)|   .1836682   .0122774    14.96   0.000     .1596049   .2077314 
cov(e.TstGvIn,e.TstSI)|   .3381539   .0106952    31.62   0.000     .3171917   .3591161 
cov(e.ScCoh,e.CommHlp)|    .163501   .0427683     3.82   0.000     .0796766   .2473254 
cov(e.PolKnw,e.Ifrmd)|   .1798561   .0185986     9.67   0.000     .1434036    .2163086 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
LR test of model vs. saturated: chi2(121) =   2229.19, Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
 
. estat gof, stats (all) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Fit statistic        |      Value   Description 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
Likelihood ratio     | 
        chi2_ms(121) |   2229.195   model vs. saturated 
            p > chi2 |      0.000 
        chi2_bs(147) |  11843.951   baseline vs. saturated 
            p > chi2 |      0.000 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
Population error     | 
               RMSEA |      0.049   Root mean squared error of approximation 
 90% CI, lower bound |      0.048 
         upper bound |      0.051 
              pclose |      0.693   Probability RMSEA <= 0.05 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
Information criteria | 
                 AIC | 152919.974   Akaike's information criterion 
                 BIC | 153291.058   Bayesian information criterion 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
Baseline comparison  | 
                 CFI |      0.820   Comparative fit index 
                 TLI |      0.781   Tucker-Lewis index 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
Size of residuals    | 
                SRMR |      0.044   Standardized root mean squared residual 
                  CD |      0.898   Coefficient of determination 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Model 9. Final model for Exposure and Fear on Political Culture, and for Social Capital, 
Political Culture, Age and Education on Mobilization for Collective Action with five 
covariances of the error terms included / North region states subsample 
 
sem (MobCA -> Assoc,) (MobCA -> InflPrs,) (MobCA -> MediaInt,) (MobCA -> InfmCamp,) 
(MobCA -> ElectCamp,) (MobCA -> MarchProt,) (MobCA -> Repres,) (MobCA -> SitInProt,) 
(SOCCAP -> MobCA,) (SOCCAP@1 -> TrustGovInst,) (SOCCAP -> TrustSecInst,) (SOCCAP -> 
SocCohes,) (SOCCAP -> CommHelp,) (SOCCAP -> POLCULT,) (POLCULT -> MobCA,) (POLCULT -> 
PolKnow,) (POLCULT -> Informed,) (ExpViol -> POLCULT,) (Fear -> POLCULT,) (Age -> 
MobCA,) (Educ -> MobCA,), covstruct(_lexogenous, diagonal) 
cov(_lexogenous*_oexogenous@0) standardized latent(MobCA SOCCAP POLCULT ) cov( 
e.InflPrs*e.Repres e.MarchProt *e.SitInProt e.TrustGovInst*e.TrustSecInst 
e.SocCohes*e.CommHelp e.PolKnow*e.Informed) nocapslatent  
note: The following latent variable name is also present in the data: MobCA.  
(64 observations with missing values excluded) 
 
Endogenous variables 
 
Measurement:  Assoc InflPrs MediaInt InfmCamp ElectCamp MarchProt Repres SitInProt  
              TrustGovInst TrustSecInst SocCohes CommHelp PolKnow Informed 
Latent:       MobCA POLCULT 
 
Exogenous variables 
 
Observed:     ExpViol Fear Age Educ 
Latent:       SOCCAP 
 
Fitting target model: 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -16426.136  (not concave) 
[output omitted] 
Iteration 10:  log likelihood = -15414.548   
Iteration 11:  log likelihood = -15414.547   
 
Structural equation model                       Number of obs      =      1736 
Estimation method  = ml                         Log likelihood     = -15414.547 
 
 ( 1)  [Assoc]MobCA = 1 
 ( 2)  [PolKnow]POLCULT = 1 
 ( 3)  [TrustGovInst]SOCCAP = 1 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                     |                 OIM 
        Standardized |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Structural           | 
  MobCA <-           | 
             POLCULT |   .8591283   .1950874     4.40   0.000     .4767639    1.241493 
                 Age |   .0167414   .0285874     0.59   0.558    -.0392889    .0727718 
                Educ |   .1267535   .0293006     4.33   0.000     .0693253    .1841816 
              SOCCAP |  -.6881961   .1982149    -3.47   0.001     -1.07669   -.2997021 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  POLCULT <-         | 
             ExpViol |   .1716493   .0313737     5.47   0.000     .1101579    .2331406 
                Fear |   .0626431   .0275677     2.27   0.023     .0086114    .1166748 
              SOCCAP |   .9596435   .0337067    28.47   0.000     .8935796    1.025707 
---------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Measurement          | 
  Assoc <-           | 
               MobCA |   .6554105   .0194657    33.67   0.000     .6172584    .6935626 
               _cons |  -.0662325   .0742206    -0.89   0.372    -.2117021    .0792372 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 167 
  InflPrs <-         | 
               MobCA |   .5859938    .020839    28.12   0.000     .5451502    .6268374 
               _cons |  -.0624599   .0675579    -0.92   0.355     -.194871    .0699511 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  MediaInt <-        | 
               MobCA |    .556299   .0213256    26.09   0.000     .5145016    .5980964 
               _cons |  -.0641562   .0644099    -1.00   0.319    -.1903973    .0620849 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  InfmCamp <-        | 
               MobCA |   .6122081     .02014    30.40   0.000     .5727344    .6516818 
               _cons |  -.0933146   .0701624    -1.33   0.184    -.2308303    .0442011 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  ElectCamp <-       | 
               MobCA |   .4735193     .02303    20.56   0.000     .4283814    .5186572 
               _cons |  -.0028947   .0568004    -0.05   0.959    -.1142215    .1084321 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  MarchProt <-       | 
               MobCA |   .2984101   .0261603    11.41   0.000      .247137    .3496833 
               _cons |   .0189122   .0415786     0.45   0.649    -.0625805    .1004048 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Repres <-          | 
               MobCA |    .427064   .0249964    17.08   0.000     .3780719    .4760562 
               _cons |  -.0351285    .052769    -0.67   0.506    -.1385539    .0682968 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  SitInProt <-       | 
               MobCA |   .3277314   .0257433    12.73   0.000     .2772755    .3781873 
               _cons |  -.0527244   .0437368    -1.21   0.228    -.1384468    .0329981 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  TrustGovInst <-    | 
              SOCCAP |    .210497    .033991     6.19   0.000     .1438758    .2771181 
               _cons |   3.356681   .0618131    54.30   0.000     3.235529    3.477832 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  TrustSecInst <-    | 
              SOCCAP |   .1835912   .0344792     5.32   0.000     .1160133    .2511691 
               _cons |   3.748805   .0679977    55.13   0.000     3.615532    3.882078 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  SocCohes <-        | 
              SOCCAP |   .4136998   .0435775     9.49   0.000     .3282895    .4991101 
               _cons |   2.711682   .0519024    52.25   0.000     2.609955    2.813409 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  CommHelp <-        | 
              SOCCAP |   .4924017   .0553549     8.90   0.000     .3839081    .6008953 
               _cons |   2.945705   .0554542    53.12   0.000     2.837017    3.054393 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  PolKnow <-         | 
             POLCULT |   .3270657   .0498489     6.56   0.000     .2293637    .4247678 
               _cons |   1.737199   .0456944    38.02   0.000      1.64764    1.826758 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Informed <-        | 
             POLCULT |   .6517744   .0576601    11.30   0.000     .5387626    .7647861 
               _cons |   1.510208   .0521656    28.95   0.000     1.407965    1.612451 
---------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         var(e.Assoc)|   .5704371   .0255161                      .5225561    .6227054 
       var(e.InflPrs)|   .6566113    .024423                      .6104462    .7062675 
      var(e.MediaInt)|   .6905314   .0237268                       .645559    .7386367 
      var(e.InfmCamp)|   .6252012   .0246598                      .5786899    .6754508 
     var(e.ElectCamp)|   .7757795   .0218103                      .7341885    .8197265 
     var(e.MarchProt)|   .9109514    .015613                      .8808588     .942072 
        var(e.Repres)|   .8176163   .0213502                      .7768235    .8605512 
     var(e.SitInProt)|   .8925922   .0168738                      .8601254    .9262844 
  var(e.TrustGovInst)|    .955691     .01431                      .9280515    .9841537 
  var(e.TrustSecInst)|   .9662943   .0126601                      .9417967     .991429 
      var(e.SocCohes)|   .8288525    .036056                      .7611128     .902621 
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      var(e.CommHelp)|   .7575406   .0545137                      .6578884    .8722874 
       var(e.PolKnow)|    .893028   .0326077                      .8313513    .9592804 
      var(e.Informed)|   .5751902   .0751628                      .4452265    .7430908 
         var(e.MobCA)|   .9033789   .0401427                      .8280295    .9855851 
       var(e.POLCULT)|   .0395341   .0622296                      .0018077    .8646187 
          var(SOCCAP)|          1          .                             .           . 
---------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
cov(e.InlPrs,e.Reprs)|   .2026003   .0266481     7.60   0.000     .1503709    .2548296 
cov(e.MchPrt,e.StInPt)|   .2116278   .0237821     8.90   0.000     .1650159   .2582398 
cov(e.TstGvIn,e.TstSI)|   .2095588   .0237644     8.82   0.000     .1629814   .2561362 
cov(e.ScCoh,e.CommHlp)|   .1936932    .044393     4.36   0.000     .1066845   .2807019 
cov(e.PolKnw,e.Ifrmd)|   .0668025   .0583231     1.15   0.252    -.0475087    .1811137 
  ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
LR test of model vs. saturated: chi2(121) =    891.43, Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
 
. estat gof, stats (all) 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Fit statistic        |      Value   Description 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
Likelihood ratio     | 
        chi2_ms(121) |    891.433   model vs. saturated 
            p > chi2 |      0.000 
        chi2_bs(147) |   3859.947   baseline vs. saturated 
            p > chi2 |      0.000 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
Population error     | 
               RMSEA |      0.061   Root mean squared error of approximation 
 90% CI, lower bound |      0.057 
         upper bound |      0.064 
              pclose |      0.000   Probability RMSEA <= 0.05 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
Information criteria | 
                 AIC |  30937.095   Akaike's information criterion 
                 BIC |  31231.899   Bayesian information criterion 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
Baseline comparison  | 
                 CFI |      0.793   Comparative fit index 
                 TLI |      0.748   Tucker-Lewis index 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
Size of residuals    | 
                SRMR |      0.052   Standardized root mean squared residual 
                  CD |      0.964   Coefficient of determination 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Model 10. Final model for Exposure and Fear on Political Culture, and for Social Capital, 
Political Culture, Age and Education on Mobilization for Collective Action with five 
covariances of the error terms included / South region states subsample 
 
sem (MobCA -> Assoc,) (MobCA -> InflPrs,) (MobCA -> MediaInt,) (MobCA -> InfmCamp,) 
(MobCA -> ElectCamp,) (MobCA -> MarchProt,) (MobCA -> Repres,) (MobCA -> SitInProt,) 
(SOCCAP -> MobCA,) (SOCCAP@1 -> TrustGovInst,) (SOCCAP -> TrustSecInst,) (SOCCAP -> 
SocCohes,) (SOCCAP -> CommHelp,) (SOCCAP -> POLCULT,) (POLCULT -> MobCA,) (POLCULT -> 
PolKnow,) (POLCULT -> Informed,) (ExpViol -> POLCULT,) (Fear -> POLCULT,) (Age -> 
MobCA,) (Educ -> MobCA,), covstruct(_lexogenous, diagonal) 
cov(_lexogenous*_oexogenous@0) standardized latent(MobCA SOCCAP POLCULT ) cov( 
e.InflPrs*e.Repres e.MarchProt *e.SitInProt e.TrustGovInst*e.TrustSecInst 
e.SocCohes*e.CommHelp e.PolKnow*e.Informed) nocapslatent  
note: The following latent variable name is also present in the data: MobCA.  
(71 observations with missing values excluded) 
 
Endogenous variables 
 
Measurement:  Assoc InflPrs MediaInt InfmCamp ElectCamp MarchProt Repres SitInProt  
              TrustGovInst TrustSecInst SocCohes  CommHelp PolKnow Informed 
Latent:       MobCA POLCULT 
 
Exogenous variables 
 
Observed:     ExpViol Fear Age Educ 
Latent:       SOCCAP 
 
Fitting target model: 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -17348.853  (not concave) 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -16916.837  (not concave) 
[output omitted] 
Iteration 24:  log likelihood = -16610.505   
Iteration 25:  log likelihood = -16610.505   
 
Structural equation model                       Number of obs      =      1645 
Estimation method  = ml                         Log likelihood     = -16610.505 
 
 ( 1)  [Assoc]MobCA = 1 
 ( 2)  [PolKnow]POLCULT = 1 
 ( 3)  [TrustGovInst]SOCCAP = 1 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                     |                 OIM 
        Standardized |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Structural           | 
  MobCA <-           | 
             POLCULT |   .7258225    .130633     5.56   0.000     .4697866    .9818584 
                 Age |   .0486315   .0299127     1.63   0.104    -.0099963    .1072594 
                Educ |    .032875   .0335818     0.98   0.328    -.0329441    .0986941 
              SOCCAP |  -.3741627   .1482382    -2.52   0.012    -.6647041   -.0836212 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  POLCULT <-         | 
             ExpViol |   .3043125   .0490829     6.20   0.000     .2081118    .4005132 
                Fear |   .1230074   .0353824     3.48   0.001     .0536592    .1923556 
              SOCCAP |   .9070697   .0919712     9.86   0.000     .7268095     1.08733 
---------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Measurement          | 
  Assoc <-           | 
               MobCA |   .4546587    .024788    18.34   0.000      .406075    .5032423 
               _cons |   .1044335   .0542914     1.92   0.054    -.0019756    .2108427 
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  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  InflPrs <-         | 
               MobCA |   .5632972   .0235206    23.95   0.000     .5171977    .6093968 
               _cons |  -.0520877   .0630472    -0.83   0.409    -.1756579    .0714824 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  MediaInt <-        | 
               MobCA |   .5498532   .0231433    23.76   0.000     .5044931    .5952132 
               _cons |  -.0428284   .0622641    -0.69   0.492    -.1648637     .079207 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  InfmCamp <-        | 
               MobCA |   .5225888   .0237542    22.00   0.000     .4760314    .5691461 
               _cons |    .011484   .0601634     0.19   0.849    -.1064341    .1294022 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  ElectCamp <-       | 
               MobCA |    .454687   .0248811    18.27   0.000     .4059209    .5034531 
               _cons |   .1563876   .0543416     2.88   0.004     .0498799    .2628952 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  MarchProt <-       | 
               MobCA |   .4912172   .0242383    20.27   0.000      .443711    .5387234 
               _cons |   .0561796    .057332     0.98   0.327    -.0561892    .1685483 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Repres <-          | 
               MobCA |   .4788237   .0254878    18.79   0.000     .4288686    .5287789 
               _cons |    -.05467   .0556389    -0.98   0.326    -.1637202    .0543802 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  SitInProt <-       | 
               MobCA |   .3340172   .0271552    12.30   0.000     .2807939    .3872405 
               _cons |   .0250942   .0439427     0.57   0.568     -.061032    .1112204 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  TrustGovInst <-    | 
              SOCCAP |   .1120737   .0399423     2.81   0.005     .0337882    .1903591 
               _cons |    3.41139   .0643821    52.99   0.000     3.285203    3.537576 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  TrustSecInst <-    | 
              SOCCAP |   .1936425   .0421545     4.59   0.000     .1110212    .2762637 
               _cons |   3.514761   .0660511    53.21   0.000     3.385303    3.644219 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  SocCohes <-        | 
              SOCCAP |   .2819515   .0658047     4.28   0.000     .1529767    .4109264 
               _cons |   2.651788   .0523953    50.61   0.000     2.549095    2.754481 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  CommHelp <-        | 
              SOCCAP |   .4075186   .0730308     5.58   0.000     .2643809    .5506564 
               _cons |   3.128543   .0598572    52.27   0.000     3.011225    3.245861 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  PolKnow <-         | 
             POLCULT |    .305631   .0483777     6.32   0.000     .2108126    .4004495 
               _cons |   1.413678   .0432695    32.67   0.000     1.328872    1.498485 
  -------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Informed <-        | 
             POLCULT |   .5371252   .0588504     9.13   0.000     .4217806    .6524699 
               _cons |   1.519769   .0484966    31.34   0.000     1.424718    1.614821 
---------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         var(e.Assoc)|   .7932855   .0225402                      .7503152    .8387168 
       var(e.InflPrs)|   .6826962   .0264982                      .6326871    .7366583 
      var(e.MediaInt)|   .6976615   .0254508                      .6495204    .7493708 
      var(e.InfmCamp)|    .726901   .0248274                      .6798333    .7772274 
     var(e.ElectCamp)|   .7932597   .0226262                      .7501299    .8388694 
     var(e.MarchProt)|   .7587056   .0238125                      .7134404    .8068427 
        var(e.Repres)|   .7707278   .0244083                      .7243429    .8200832 
     var(e.SitInProt)|   .8884325   .0181406                      .8535796    .9247086 
  var(e.TrustGovInst)|   .9874395    .008953                       .970047    1.005144 
  var(e.TrustSecInst)|   .9625026   .0163258                      .9310307    .9950384 
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      var(e.SocCohes)|   .9205033   .0371075                       .850573     .996183 
      var(e.CommHelp)|   .8339286   .0595228                      .7250586    .9591457 
       var(e.PolKnow)|   .9065897   .0295714                      .8504446    .9664414 
      var(e.Informed)|   .7114965   .0632201                       .597777    .8468497 
         var(e.MobCA)|   .8230511   .0547964                      .7223642    .9377722 
       var(e.POLCULT)|   .0533035   .1512488                      .0002049    13.86893 
          var(SOCCAP)|          1          .                             .           . 
---------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
cov(e.InlPrs,e.Reprs)|   .0697568   .0300546     2.32   0.020     .0108509    .1286627 
cov(e.MchPrt,e.StInPt)|   .1212363    .026682     4.54   0.000     .0689406    .173532 
cov(e.TstGvIn,e.TstSI)|    .308791   .0230511    13.40   0.000     .2636118   .3539703 
cov(e.ScCoh,e.CommHlp)|   .2958763   .0406226     7.28   0.000     .2162575    .375495 
cov(e.PolKnw,e.Ifrmd)|   .0918246   .0469912     1.95   0.051    -.0002765    .1839257 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
LR test of model vs. saturated: chi2(121) =    935.37, Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
 
. estat gof, stats (all) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Fit statistic        |      Value   Description 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
Likelihood ratio     | 
        chi2_ms(121) |    935.371   model vs. saturated 
            p > chi2 |      0.000 
        chi2_bs(147) |   3367.888   baseline vs. saturated 
            p > chi2 |      0.000 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
Population error     | 
               RMSEA |      0.064   Root mean squared error of approximation 
 90% CI, lower bound |      0.060 
         upper bound |      0.068 
              pclose |      0.000   Probability RMSEA <= 0.05 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
Information criteria | 
                 AIC |  33329.010   Akaike's information criterion 
                 BIC |  33620.906   Bayesian information criterion 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
Baseline comparison  | 
                 CFI |      0.747   Comparative fit index 
                 TLI |      0.693   Tucker-Lewis index 
---------------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
Size of residuals    | 
                SRMR |      0.054   Standardized root mean squared residual 
                  CD |      0.951   Coefficient of determination 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------  
  
